webauthn-rs-core
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.5.5(semver)
Fixed versions
0.5.5
Fix
- Fixed version
0.5.5cargo update -p webauthn-rs-core --precise 0.5.5
Advisory
Also known as: None
webauthn-rs-core/webauthn-authenticator-rs: Origin validation mismatch possible when subdomains are allowed
Summary
webauthn-rs-core ([Relying Party][rp]) and webauthn-authenticator-rs ([client][]) checked that [an Origin in CollectedClientData][origin] is valid for [an RP ID][rpid] with [str::ends_with()][ends-with], [without checking for a dot (.) before the RP ID when allowing subdomains][registerable-suffix].
This check is flawed, and could allow requests from an attacker-controlled domain such as hermit-crab.example to be accepted for the RP ID crab.example (assuming .example was publicly-registerable TLD) when the RP allows authenticating from a subdomain (disabled by default in webauthn-rs-core and webauthn-rs).
[registerable-suffix]: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#is-a-registrable-domain-suffix-of-or-is-equal-to
[ends-with]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/std/primitive.str.html#method.ends_with
[client]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#client
[rp]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#relying-party
[rpid]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#rp-id
[origin]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#dom-collectedclientdata-origin
webauthn-rs-core, this only applies when:true (the default is false), *and* webauthn-rs can set allow_subdomains_origin via `WebauthnBuilder::allow_subdomains`. Fixing the bug in webauthn-rs-core also fixes it in webauthn-rs.
webauthn-authenticator-rs, the flawed check is in `WebauthnAuthenticator::do_registration()` and `do_authentication()`. A conforming [Relying Party][rp] implementation would reject such requests, but webauthn-rs-core did not.
An application can still provide an incorrect origin parameter to webauthn-authenticator-rs, or use lower-level APIs that bypass these checks entirely, and this is by design.
These issues are a violation of WebAuthn Level 3 §13.4.9, §5.1.3 Step 8 and §5.1.4.1 Step 7.
Details
webauthn-rs-core/src/core.rs line 1213:https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/blob/197cddf8487a2dbdd5d374e50d80aa1e4682f3ab/webauthn-rs-core/src/core.rs#L1211-L1216
webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs line 274:https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/blob/197cddf8487a2dbdd5d374e50d80aa1e4682f3ab/webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs#L274-L277
webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs line 335:https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/blob/197cddf8487a2dbdd5d374e50d80aa1e4682f3ab/webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs#L335-L338
[str::ends_with()][ends-with] performs a raw string suffix match _without_ [enforcing a domain label boundary][registerable-suffix]:
Origin | RP ID | Expected result | Result with incorrect ends_with check
-- | -- | -- | --hermit-crab.example | crab.example | rejected | accepted (bug!)auth.crab.example | crab.example | accepted | accepted (subdomain)crab.example | crab.example | accepted | accepted (exact match)hermit-crab.example | auth.crab.example | rejected | rejectedauth.crab.example | auth.crab.example | accepted | accepted (exact match)
Fix
When webauthn-rs-core v0.5.5 checks if an Origin is a valid subdomain of an RP ID, it will check that it ends with the RP ID prefixed with a dot (.{rp_id}). webauthn-rs v0.5.5 will be fixed by depending on webauthn-rs-core v0.5.5.
webauthn-authenticator-rs v0.5.5 now uses webauthn-rs-core's checks in WebauthnAuthenticator.
Regression tests for this bug have been added to both libraries.
Impact
With a both a non-conforming [client][] implementation and vulnerable version of webauthn-rs-core configured to allow subdomains (not the default), this bug would allow an attacker at hermit-crab.example to phish a target's credential for the RP ID crab.example by directly proxying a legitimate navigator.credentials.get() request on the attacker's domain.
However, _conforming_ [client implementations][client] (ie: all web browsers) will refuse to process WebAuthn requests for an RP ID that does not match the Origin of the current page and is not a related `Origin`.
In the scenario above with _conforming_ client-side checks, this would force the attacker to change the request's RP ID to hermit-crab.example (the attacker's Origin). This would also change the RP ID hash, and `webauthn-rs-core` would reject it (per WebAuthn §7.2 Step 15).
Severity
Per WebAuthn §13.4.9:
> The Relying Party MUST NOT accept unexpected values of origin, as doing so could allow a malicious website to obtain valid credentials. Although the scope of WebAuthn credentials prevents their use on domains outside the RP ID they were registered for, the Relying Party’s origin validation serves as an additional layer of protection in case a faulty authenticator fails to enforce credential scope.
Unfortunately, the chain needed to exploit this bug makes it difficult to classify with the CVSS framework. Kanidm came up with anywhere between "low" and "high" depending on the approach, and GitHub only provides one CVSS field for everything.
An attacker could easily bypass a _correctly-implemented_ server-side Origin check, if they can convince a target to use their authenticator with an attacker-controlled client device or buggy/malicious client application. FIDO's Security Reference assumes that "the FIDO user device and applications involved in a FIDO operation are trustworthy agents of the user", and violating that limits the protections FIDO can provide, so it would be ridiculous to describe those bypasses as a "high" severity vulnerability.
Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
0, fixed 0.5.5 (semver)0.5.5
0.5.5cargo update -p webauthn-rs-core --precise 0.5.50.6.0-dev, fixed 0.6.1-dev (semver)0.6.1-dev
0.6.1-devcargo update -p webauthn-authenticator-rs --precise 0.6.1-dev0.6.0-dev, fixed 0.6.1-dev (semver)0.6.1-dev
0.6.1-devcargo update -p webauthn-rs-core --precise 0.6.1-dev0, fixed 0.5.5 (semver)0.5.5
0.5.5cargo update -p webauthn-authenticator-rs --precise 0.5.5Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0