gitpython
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.1.60(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
3.1.60
Fix
- Fixed version
3.1.60pip install --upgrade gitpython==3.1.60
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-87817, PYSEC-2026-3982
GitPython: Repository content can impersonate the git directory, leading to arbitrary code execution
Summary
Repo.__init__ decides which directory is the git directory by testing candidate paths in an order that
considers the real .git last. Two earlier tests can be satisfied by ordinary tracked files. Git
reserves only the literal name .git, so HEAD, objects/, refs/, config, gitdir, commondir
and hooks/ at a repository root are all legal tracked content.
Consequently, after a victim opens or clones an attacker's repository, GitPython resolves git_dir to
the working-tree root while real git correctly resolves <root>/.git. Everything GitPython then
treats as "inside the git directory" is attacker-authored content — including hooks/, which it
executes.
CVE-2026-87817
Affected code (3.1.59)
The discovery loop in git/repo/base.py tests, in order:
git/repo/base.py:299 — isfile(curpath/gitdir) and isfile(curpath/commondir) and isfile(curpath/HEAD)git/repo/base.py:320 — is_git_dir(curpath)git/repo/base.py:341 — dotgit = osp.join(curpath, ".git") ← the real git dir, considered lastis_git_dir (git/repo/fun.py:60) requires only that objects/ and refs/ are directories and thatHEAD is a file; `HEAD`'s contents are never parsed. The hook path is resolved fromindex.repo.git_dir (git/index/fun.py:73), i.e. the mis-resolved directory.
Proof of concept
Requires only pip install GitPython==3.1.59. Full script attached as poc1_rce.py; it runs entirely
in a temp directory and the payload only writes a marker file.
Attacker repository — four ordinary tracked files at the root:
| path | mode | content |
|---|---|---|
| gitdir | 100644 | .git\n |
| commondir | 100644 | .git\n |
| HEAD | 100644 | ref: refs/heads/master\n |
| hooks/pre-commit | 100755 | #!/bin/sh + payload |
Victim — two ordinary calls:
repo = git.Repo.clone_from(url, dst) # or git.Repo(dst)
repo.index.commit("automated commit") # code execution happens here
Observed on the PyPI release 3.1.59 (Linux and Windows):
real git says the git dir is : /tmp/.../victim/.git
GitPython says it is : /tmp/.../victim <- shadowed
attacker's hook executed : True
git fsck : (clean)
The pre-commit hook runs at git/index/base.py:1201, before write_tree(), so it fires even though
the commit later fails.
Impact
A service that opens or clones an untrusted repository with GitPython — a CI runner building a fork
pull request, a code-scanning/SBOM service, a mirror, a dependency bot, an AI code-review/agent tool —
can be made to:
<root>/hooks/pre-commit when the victim calls index.commit().<root>/config becomes the repository config and is parsed with merge_includes=True (git/repo/base.py:765), so [include] path = ~/.aws/credentials discloses the file. (Repo._config_reader still defaults merge_includes=True, so the hardening added in 3.1.59 for .gitmodules/GHSA-7833 does not cover this path.)commondir.Delivery is silent: git clone exits 0, git fsck (including --strict, and withtransfer.fsckObjects/fetch.fsckObjects=true) reports nothing, and the clone passes every read-only
probe (head.commit, branches, is_dirty(), untracked_files, iter_commits) because a trackedcommondir of .git pins common_dir to the real .git.
Threat model / preconditions
index.commit(). For the file-read impact, opening the repo and reading config is enough.GIT_WORK_TREE is not a mitigation — git_dir is assigned and the discovery loop breaks before the environment is consulted.Remediation
curpath/.git before the gitdir/commondir/HEAD triple and before is_git_dir(curpath).hook_path / _commit_hook_path / _get_validated_reflog_path through repo.common_dir.commondir/gitdir contents before joining (reuse SymbolicReference._get_validated_path).HEAD in is_git_dir (require ref: refs/... or a 40-hex sha).merge_includes=False in Repo._config_reader (git/repo/base.py:765).Note for the maintainers
Commit 406b98e1 (2026-05-31, "respect core.hooksPath for commit hooks") resolved the hook path viagit rev-parse --git-path, which is immune because git rediscovers the true .git. Commit 9bc287a2
(2026-07-20) reverted it to avoid an unconditional rev-parse dependency — reintroducing the exec step.
Measured at each commit with the healthy-looking layout: 406b98e1 → hook did not fire; 9bc287a2 …3.1.59 → hook fired.
Scope note
Only the repository-root case is reported: where a real .git exists, git prefers it, and GitPython
does not. A fake git dir in a subdirectory fools real git too, so that variant is out of scope as a
general ecosystem hazard rather than a GitPython defect.
###POC Files :
poc1_rce.py
poc2_file_read.py
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 3.1.60 (ecosystem)3.1.60
3.1.60pip install --upgrade gitpython==3.1.60Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0