Advisory

GHSA-239w-m3h6-ch8v

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Controls that held

The same harness confirmed that ordinary traversal is still rejected, so this is not generic ../ traversal:

  • GET /api/resources/../u2/secret.txt?checksum=sha256 did not succeed as the restricted user.
  • GET /api/resources/%2e%2e/u2/secret.txt did not succeed (encoded dot-dot).
  • POST /api/resources/../u2/new.txt did not create /u2/new.txt.
  • PATCH /api/resources/own.txt?action=rename&destination=/../u2/moved.txt did not move a file outside scope.

Affected code

users/users.go (scope setup); files/file.go (stat, readListing); http/raw.go (getFiles); http/resource.go (writeFile destination); http/tus_handlers.go (tusPostHandler, tusPatchHandler); http/share.go; http/public.go; http/http.go:90-91 (public routes); http/data.go (string-only path checks).

Remediation

Resolve symlinks and verify that the resolved target remains inside the user's real scoped root before any file operation — serving, sharing, writing, truncating, renaming, copying, or deleting. Specifically:

  • Call WithinScope (which resolves every path component with filepath.EvalSymlinks) for all paths in stat(), not only when the final element is a symlink. This closes the ancestor-symlink gap (Variant 2).
  • Add a WithinScope check before MkdirAll/OpenFile in tusPostHandler and tusPatchHandler, so a not-yet-existing leaf cannot skip containment.
  • Omit entries whose resolved target escapes the scope from readListing, and skip them in getFiles before stat/open/recursion.
  • Apply the same resolved-path check consistently to public share creation and public share serving.
  • As an alternative or defense-in-depth, reject symlinks for file operations unless an explicit administrator option enables them.

Add regression tests covering symlink reads, overwrites, TUS create/write, public shares (download, share-info, listing, and archive read paths), and the existing dot-dot controls — plus a positive test confirming that legitimately in-scope symlinks still resolve.

Limitations and non-claims

  • This is not generic ../ path traversal; dot-dot and encoded dot-dot controls held in the route-level tests.
  • This is not a proxy-auth confusion issue; the proofs use normal authenticated requests for a restricted user (and, for Variant 2's share case, an ordinary public-share recipient).
  • The proofs assume the relevant symlink already exists inside the scoped tree, or that another allowed workflow in the deployment can place it there — for example an SMB/NFS export, a Docker bind-mount, or an admin-created link. Web-UI-only creation of the symlink from scratch was not demonstrated.

Sources & licences