github.com/getkin/kin-openapi
Affected
- introduced
0.144.0, fixed0.147.0(semver)
Fixed versions
0.147.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.147.0go get github.com/getkin/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-100351, GO-2026-6769
kin-openapi: ValidationHandler security-requirement bypass via encoded-path operation confusion
Summary
openapi3filter.ValidationHandler.Middleware validates requests with kin-openapi's
legacy router, which selects an OpenAPI operation from the decoded URL.Path. The
method is documented as implementing gorilla/mux.MiddlewareFunc, but a downstream
gorilla/mux router configured with UseEncodedPath() selects its handler from the
encoded representation (URL.RawPath).
An unauthenticated request such as /public%2Fstatus can therefore be validated as an
intentionally public operation (/public/status) and then dispatched to a protected
operation (/{id}). The configured, rejecting AuthenticationFunc is never invoked,
and the protected downstream handler runs.
This is distinct from GHSA-r277-6w6q-xmqw. The behavior below uses an explicit
authentication callback that rejects missing credentials and remains reproducible
after the v0.144.0 fix for the unsafe default callback.
Affected products
github.com/getkin/kin-openapiopenapi3filter.ValidationHandler.Middlewareopenapi3filter/, and that test passed; maintainers should independently confirm the version ranged33e44e67734dcde81b576582185e1343fb3985dSecurity impact
An unauthenticated remote requester can reach a handler whose OpenAPI operation
requires authentication when all of the following are true:
ValidationHandler.Middleware as the security gate;UseEncodedPath();The protected operation's path-parameter value is constrained: it is an encoded
representation that decodes to a public literal path (public%2Fstatus in this PoC),
not an arbitrary attacker-selected identifier. A protected operation without a
compatible parameterized path is not reachable through this specific mechanism.
AuthenticationFunc is never invoked.Root cause
At the confirmed development revision:
openapi3filter/validation_handler.go: ValidationHandler.Load constructs routers/legacy.NewRouter unconditionally.routers/legacy/router.go: route selection uses the decoded request path.routers/gorillamux/router.go: the kin-openapi gorilla router constructs a gorilla/mux router with UseEncodedPath().ValidationHandler.Middleware forwards the unchanged request after validation.The component making the authentication decision and the component dispatching the
handler can therefore disagree about the selected operation.
Reproduction
The attached PoC uses a real net/http server, an explicit API-key callback that
rejects missing credentials, and a downstream gorilla/mux router withUseEncodedPath().
From a kin-openapi checkout, copy the self-contained attachmentencoded_path_route_confusion_test.go.txt into openapi3filter/ asencoded_path_route_confusion_test.go, then run:
go test -v ./openapi3filter -run '^TestEncodedPathAuthorizationBypass$' -count=1
Expected attack observation:
status=202 downstream_route=/{id} protected_id=public%2Fstatus authentication_calls=0
wiring=Router.Use status=202 downstream_route=/{id} protected_id=public%2Fstatus authentication_calls=0
Controls included in the test show that:
/ordinary selects the protected operation, invokes authentication once, and is rejected with HTTP 401;/public/status reaches only the intentionally public handler;/{id} handler with HTTP 202 while the authentication callback remains uncalled;router.Use(validationHandler.Middleware) wiring reproduce the same result.Reverse-proxy reachability
The same request was reproduced through Nginx 1.31.3 using the officialnginx:alpine image digestsha256:4a73073bd557c65b759505da037898b61f1be6cbcc3c2c3aeac22d2a470c1752.
The exact container invocation was:
docker run --rm --name kin-openapi-nginx \
--add-host=host.docker.internal:host-gateway \
-p 18081:8080 -p 18082:8081 \
-v "$PWD/poc/nginx.conf:/etc/nginx/nginx.conf:ro" \
nginx:alpine
Container port 8080 uses proxy_pass http://host.docker.internal:18080; without a
replacement URI. Host port 18081 therefore preserved /public%2Fstatus; the protected
handler returned HTTP 202 and the
authentication callback remained at zero calls. Withproxy_pass http://host.docker.internal:18080/; on container port 8081 / host port
18082, Nginx canonicalized the upstream URI; both layers selected /public/status and
the bypass did not occur.
Nginx access-log observations:
server_port=8080 "GET /public%2Fstatus HTTP/1.1" 202 0 "curl/8.7.1"
server_port=8081 "GET /public%2Fstatus HTTP/1.1" 204 0 "curl/8.7.1"
server_port=8080 "GET /ordinary HTTP/1.1" 401 0 "curl/8.7.1"
The response route headers were X-Poc-Route: /{id} on the preserving listener andX-Poc-Route: /public/status on the canonicalizing listener. Backend observations for
the two requests were:
request_uri="/public%2Fstatus" path="/public/status" raw_path="/public%2Fstatus" auth_before=0
completed request_uri="/public%2Fstatus" auth_after=0
request_uri="/public/status" path="/public/status" raw_path="" auth_before=0
completed request_uri="/public/status" auth_after=0
This control shows that upstream path handling is a deployment precondition rather
than claiming that every proxy configuration is affected.
The canonical protected control produced:
request_uri="/ordinary" path="/ordinary" raw_path="" auth_before=0
completed request_uri="/ordinary" auth_after=1
Suggested remediation
The authentication layer and downstream dispatcher must select the same OpenAPI
operation from the same request representation.
Potential approaches:
ValidationHandler accept a caller-supplied routers.Router and require it to match downstream routing semantics;NewValidator already accepts a router but is safe only when the supplied router selects operations using the same semantics as the dispatcher; callers must also supply an AuthenticationFunc through ValidationOptions, or protected requests fail with the existing missing-authentication-service error;ValidationHandler fail closed on an encoded path separator when URL.Path and URL.RawPath can select different operations, and verify this behavior against the full suite;High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0.144.0, fixed 0.147.0 (semver)0.147.0
0.147.0go get github.com/getkin/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0