Details
The destructive surface exceeds Fileeditor's intended capability: the saveFile/createFile allowlist signals an explicit design intent to restrict modifications to safe content extensions, yet delete/rename can target arbitrary file types. Even where the actor is already a superadmin, the bug widens the destructive blast radius beyond what the editor UI exposes and beyond what fileeditor.delete plausibly authorizes for non-superadmin role holders.
The path is gated by an admin-tier permission, so PR:H is honest; impact is limited to integrity/availability of files reachable by the web server user.
Recommended Fix
Apply the same allowedFileTypes() allowlist (or a stricter directory allowlist for editor-managed assets) to the source path in both destructive endpoints. After the existing realpath containment check:
// In deleteFileOrFolder, after line 224:
if (!is_dir($fullPath) && !$this->allowedFileTypes($fullPath)) {
return $this->failForbidden();
}
// In renameFile, alongside the existing $newName check at line 139:
if (!$this->allowedFileTypes($fullPath) || !$this->allowedFileTypes($newName)) {
return $this->failForbidden();
}
Stronger hardening — and aligned with the editor's apparent intent — is to confine all Fileeditor operations to a directory allowlist (e.g. public/templates/, public/uploads/) rather than the entire ROOTPATH, and to extend $hiddenItems (or replace it with a denylist of full path prefixes) so that app/Config, public/index.php, public/.htaccess, and similar framework artefacts cannot be reached even by symlink or alternate casing.