termux-sync
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.2.4(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.2.4
Fix
- Fixed version
1.2.4pip install --upgrade termux-sync==1.2.4
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-86046
termux-sync: Arbitrary file write during restore via attacker-controlled manifest source path
termux-sync restore trusts fields inside an untrusted backup manifest and uses them as the extraction destination without validation.
During restore, each archive entry is handled as:
src_dir = Path(info.get("source", ...)).parent
extract_archive(archive, src_dir, ...)
extract_archive opens the archive and runs tarfile.extract for every member with no path jail and no filter:
with tarfile.open(archive_path, "r:*") as tf:
for member in tf.getmembers():
tf.extract(member, dest_path, set_attrs=True)
There is no check that manifest "source" stays under an expected restore root, that tar members stay inside dest_path, or that backup_name used in temporary paths cannot contain ".." or separators.
Impact:
A victim who restores a malicious backup (local, shared, or from a compromised GitHub/Google Drive storage backend) can have arbitrary files written anywhere the Termux user can write. Overwriting shell startup files or executable scripts leads to local code execution on later use.
Reproduction (benign markers only):
Expected: restore only writes under fixed, validated roots; reject unsafe source values and members that resolve outside dest.
Actual: write destination is fully controlled by manifest.source; proof files and overwrites appear outside any intended jail.
Fix direction:
Actual result (local marker-only reproduction):
PROOF path: /data/data/com.termux/files/home/PWNED_BY_TERMUX_SYNC_RESTORE.txt
PROOF exists? True
PROOF content:
PWNED
This file was written by a malicious termux-sync backup restore path.
Root cause: manifest files.*.source controls extract destination.
*** VULN CONFIRMED: arbitrary write to $HOME ***
important.conf => secret=ATTACKER_CONTROLLED
*** VULN CONFIRMED: overwrite under attacker-chosen root ***
.bashrc_sim shows injected:
export ATTACKER=1
*** VULN CONFIRMED: startup-file style overwrite ***
Extract roots used:
home -> parent($HOME/dummy_for_parent) = $HOME
config -> parent(.../victim_sim/nested_dummy) = .../victim_sim
Reported and credited to Niranj R Mahaswar ( GitHub: @NiranjMahaswar )
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.2.4 (ecosystem)1.2.4
1.2.4pip install --upgrade termux-sync==1.2.4Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0