Advisory

GHSA-259w-wmqg-fp76

Also known as: CVE-2026-86046

Summary

termux-sync: Arbitrary file write during restore via attacker-controlled manifest source path

Details

termux-sync restore trusts fields inside an untrusted backup manifest and uses them as the extraction destination without validation.

During restore, each archive entry is handled as:

src_dir = Path(info.get("source", ...)).parent
extract_archive(archive, src_dir, ...)

extract_archive opens the archive and runs tarfile.extract for every member with no path jail and no filter:

with tarfile.open(archive_path, "r:*") as tf:
for member in tf.getmembers():
tf.extract(member, dest_path, set_attrs=True)

There is no check that manifest "source" stays under an expected restore root, that tar members stay inside dest_path, or that backup_name used in temporary paths cannot contain ".." or separators.

Impact:
A victim who restores a malicious backup (local, shared, or from a compromised GitHub/Google Drive storage backend) can have arbitrary files written anywhere the Termux user can write. Overwriting shell startup files or executable scripts leads to local code execution on later use.

Reproduction (benign markers only):

  1. Build a backup directory with home.tar.gz (members: proof filename + optional config names) and manifest.json.
  2. Set files.home.source to any path whose parent is the desired write directory (e.g. $HOME/dummy_for_parent so parent is $HOME).
  3. Run the same extract path the tool uses: src_dir = Path(source).parent; tarfile.extract each member into src_dir.
  4. Observe attacker-controlled files created under $HOME and under other chosen roots (config / shell-rc style overwrite).

Expected: restore only writes under fixed, validated roots; reject unsafe source values and members that resolve outside dest.
Actual: write destination is fully controlled by manifest.source; proof files and overwrites appear outside any intended jail.

Fix direction:

  • Do not trust manifest "source" for extract roots; use fixed app-defined destinations
  • Sanitize backup_name (basename; reject ".." and separators)
  • Extract with tarfile filter="data" (or equivalent boundary checks) and refuse escape
  • Treat backups as untrusted input

Actual result (local marker-only reproduction):

PROOF path: /data/data/com.termux/files/home/PWNED_BY_TERMUX_SYNC_RESTORE.txt
PROOF exists? True
PROOF content:
PWNED
This file was written by a malicious termux-sync backup restore path.
Root cause: manifest files.*.source controls extract destination.

*** VULN CONFIRMED: arbitrary write to $HOME ***

important.conf => secret=ATTACKER_CONTROLLED
*** VULN CONFIRMED: overwrite under attacker-chosen root ***

.bashrc_sim shows injected:
export ATTACKER=1
*** VULN CONFIRMED: startup-file style overwrite ***

Extract roots used:
home -> parent($HOME/dummy_for_parent) = $HOME
config -> parent(.../victim_sim/nested_dummy) = .../victim_sim

Reported and credited to Niranj R Mahaswar ( GitHub: @NiranjMahaswar )

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-11-16 22:09 UTC
Modified
2026-11-16 22:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

termux-sync

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.2.4 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

1.2.4

Fix

  • Fixed version 1.2.4
    pip install --upgrade termux-sync==1.2.4

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences