Advisory

GHSA-2658-85cv-9wwq

Also known as: CVE-2026-111059

Summary

Mercury: Stored / DOM Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): mr.Markdown renders untrusted content as raw, unsanitized HTML

Details

Summary

Mercury turns Jupyter notebooks into shared web apps/dashboards. The mr.Markdown
widget converts its input to HTML with **python-markdown and no sanitization
step**. MarkdownWidget is an ipywidgets.HTML widget, whose value is written to
the page as raw HTML (via `innerHTML`) with no sanitization, so the result
reaches the DOM verbatim. When an app passes untrusted data (database rows,
user submissions, uploaded file contents, or an external/LLM API response) to
mr.Markdown, HTML/JS in that data executes in the browser of **whoever views the
app** — a data-driven stored/DOM-based XSS.

This is a library-provided rendering sink that fails to neutralize output; it is
triggered by ordinary, reasonable application code, not by an author mistake.

Root cause

mercury/md.py — MarkdownWidget._to_html() (verified at v3.2.6, lines ~57–65):

def _to_html(self, text: str) -> str:
    if md_lib is not None:
        body = md_lib.markdown(text)          # python-markdown: passes raw HTML through
    else:
        body = f"<pre>{escape(text)}</pre>"   # escape() is ONLY the md-lib-absent fallback
    return self._apply_inline_theme(body)     # regex styling — adds style=, removes nothing

Two neutralization failures compound:

  1. Markdown → HTML is unsanitized. python-markdown passes raw HTML through by default: <img src=x onerror=…>, <svg onload=…>, and javascript: links survive verbatim. There is no bleach/nh3 allowlist anywhere in the package. _apply_inline_theme() only injects inline style= attributes via regex; it is not a sanitizer and removes nothing. escape() runs only in the md-lib-absent fallback.
  1. The rendering sink is unsanitized `innerHTML`. MarkdownWidget (mercury/md.py:21) subclasses ipywidgets.HTML. The ipywidgets HTML widget renders its value into the DOM as raw HTML via innerHTML, with no sanitization (this is the widget's design). Event-handler payloads such as <img src=x onerror=…> therefore execute when the widget is displayed.

On the "sanitize" that exists: mercury_app/notebook_sanitize.py
(sanitize_notebook_for_mercury_runtime) and packages/lab/src/mercury/save.ts
(sanitizeMercuryNotebookContent) strip *runtime metadata* and clear *code-cell
saved outputs*. They do not neutralize HTML/JS, and they do not touch widget
values or markdown source. "Sanitize" here is notebook hygiene, not XSS defense.

Threat model (attacker → victim, not self-inflicted)

The CVE-relevant framing is data-driven: the app author writes ordinary code,
and the *data* is attacker-controlled.

import mercury as mr
# `row` comes from a DB / user submission / uploaded file / external API —
# i.e. NOT authored by the app developer:
mr.Markdown(row["comment"])

The attacker supplies the untrusted value (posts the comment, uploads the file,
poisons the API/RAG source). A different user — another app user, a reviewer,
an admin — then opens the app, and the payload executes in *their* browser. The
vulnerable component (Mercury's server-side widget rendering) and the impacted
component (the victim's browser session in the app origin) differ, which is the
classic stored-XSS attacker/victim separation.

Amplifier — session sharing (`--keep-session`). Mercury can serve one shared
kernel session to all viewers (mercury run … --keep-session, README "Arguments":
"share the same session between multiple users … others will see this"). It is
opt-in and defaults to off (keepSession=False in mercury_app/handlers.py),
so it is *not required* for the base case — any app that renders one user's
untrusted data to another user is already vulnerable. When enabled, content one
viewer submits is rendered into the session other viewers see, extending this to
cross-user delivery. Authentication is opt-in and off by default: a free
password gate exists (mercury run … --pass=…, README), while user-based
authentication is a paid add-on. Because auth is off unless the operator enables
it, unauthenticated public deployments — where the attacker needs no account — are
a realistic default.

Proof of Concept

import mercury as mr

# Value that would realistically arrive from untrusted data (DB row, form field,
# uploaded file, API/LLM response):
untrusted = '<img src=x onerror=alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))>'

mr.Markdown(untrusted)   # rendered to raw HTML, unsanitized, into the app DOM

The generated widget HTML contains the payload verbatim; when the widget is
displayed, the onerror handler runs.

What was confirmed (and how)

  • Confirmed by execution in a real browser (sink level): driving the *actual python-markdown output* into the same ipywidgets.HTML value sink the widget uses causes the payload to execute in headless Chromium. Execution was captured via Playwright's dialog event (which fires only on a genuine alert(), so the mere presence of the string in the HTML cannot cause a false positive). A benign control (**hello**) produced zero dialogs, confirming the harness reports only real execution. python-markdown passes <img src=x onerror=…> through verbatim by default (behavior is not version-specific).
  • Reasoned from source (not executed end-to-end): the full path from a mr.Markdown(...) call in a *served Mercury app* to a viewer's DOM was not run end-to-end, because no isolated container/VM was available in the reporting environment. Because MarkdownWidget *is* the ipywidgets.HTML sink above and Mercury's frontend applies no sanitizer to widget HTML values (the only frontend sanitizer strips notebook metadata at save time), the served-app path is expected to behave identically. Reproduce end-to-end before publishing if you want the advisory to state full-path browser confirmation.

Impact

Mercury shares notebooks as web apps/dashboards, often for non-technical audiences.
When an app renders untrusted data through mr.Markdown, the generated page carries
attacker-controlled script that runs in the browser of any other viewer, in the
app origin — enabling session/cookie/token theft, UI spoofing and forced actions as
the victim, and pivoting within the hosting origin. With --keep-session, this
extends to cross-user delivery within a shared session.

Severity rationale (CVSS 3.1 per-metric)

Base score reflects the realistic default: an unauthenticated deployment whose app
renders untrusted data via mr.Markdown.

| Metric | Value | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| AV Attack Vector | Network (N) | App is served over HTTP to remote users. |
| AC Attack Complexity | Low (L) | No special conditions or race; supply data that reaches an mr.Markdown call. |
| PR Privileges Required | None (N) | Baseline: the injection channel (public form/upload/API) needs no account; auth is optional/paid. See variant below. |
| UI User Interaction | Required (R) | A victim must open/view the app page for the stored payload to run. |
| S Scope | Changed (C) | The vulnerable component (server-side widget render) injects script that executes in a different security authority — the victim's browser session/origin. (This is the canonical XSS scoping in the CVSS 3.1 spec.) |
| C Confidentiality | Low (L) | Script can read data/session material available to the app origin; scored L (not H) for a generic app without asserting full account takeover. |
| I Integrity | Low (L) | Script can alter the page and act as the victim within the app; scored L generically. |
| A Availability | None (N) | No direct availability impact. |

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-10-19 17:01 UTC
Modified
2026-10-19 17:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

mercury

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 3.0.0, fixed 3.2.11 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

3.2.11

Fix

  • Fixed version 3.2.11
    pip install --upgrade mercury==3.2.11

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences