Advisory

GHSA-268h-hp4c-crq3

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Observed output in this environment:

POSITIVE_HAS_INJECTED=true
POSITIVE_LIST_LINE="List-Unsubscribe: <https://example.test/u> (ok\nX-Injected: yes)"
CONTROL_HAS_INJECTED=false
CONTROL_SUBJECT="Subject: safe X-Injected: no"
VARIANTS=help=true,unsubscribe=true,subscribe=true,post=true,owner=true,archive=true,id=true

Expected vulnerable output: POSITIVE_HAS_INJECTED=true and all listed variants ending in =true. Expected negative/control output: CONTROL_HAS_INJECTED=false, showing the ordinary Subject header path does not create a separate injected header.

Cleanup: none required; the PoC uses only in-memory message generation.

Impact

A lower-privileged attacker who can influence list.*.comment fields in an application using Nodemailer can inject arbitrary additional headers into generated email messages. This can alter message semantics and downstream mail-client or mail-filter behavior, including adding attacker-controlled metadata headers. The PoC confirms header-boundary injection in the generated RFC822 output; it does not demonstrate SMTP command injection, recipient injection, or code execution.

Suggested remediation

Normalize or reject CR and LF in list.*.comment before constructing prepared List-* headers. Prefer sharing the same CRLF-neutralization behavior used for ordinary header values, or avoid using prepared: true for caller-controlled list comment content. Add regression tests for CRLF in every documented list comment-bearing field and verify that generated messages do not contain attacker-controlled standalone headers.

Sources & licences