Advisory

GHSA-27p8-2357-5qqv

Also known as: CVE-2026-83608

Summary

xmldom: DocType name Injection Bypasses requireWellFormed

Details

Summary

The @xmldom/xmldom serializer emits DocumentType.name verbatim into the
<!DOCTYPE …> declaration with no well-formedness guard. GHSA-f6ww-3ggp-fr8h
(CVE-2026-41674) hardened the serializer's requireWellFormed path for a
DocumentType's sibling fields — publicId, systemId, and internalSubset —
but it did not add any check for name. A > (or whitespace) in the name
terminates the doctype declaration early, letting the remaining characters
become sibling markup in the serialized output.

Because requireWellFormed: true — the recommended mitigation for the prior
xmldom injection CVEs — performs no validation on the DocType name, this is a
bypass of that control, in the same family as the open element-name
(GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj) and attribute-name (GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm) name-injection advisories.

Details

The serializer's DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE case runs the requireWellFormed block
only against publicId, systemId, and internalSubset, then pushes
n.name directly into the buffer between the <!DOCTYPE prefix and the
closing >:

Enabling write paths

DocumentType.name is a plain, writable own-property, so the enabling vector
differs by line:

  • 0.9.x — createDocumentType() validates the name via validateQualifiedName (`lib/dom.js#L925-L936`, validation at #L926), so the deliverable vector is a direct property write (dt.name = 'html><script>…') to the unguarded own-property.
  • 0.8.x — createDocumentType() does not validate the name (`lib/dom.js#L456-L464`), so the malicious name is reachable directly through createDocumentType() as well as via direct property write.
  • unscoped `xmldom` (<= 0.6.0) — createDocumentType() does not validate the name (`lib/dom.js#L286`), same as 0.8.x.

This is the same structural root cause the sibling name-injection advisories
share: the serializer's requireWellFormed path validates content delimiters
but no name field, and every name-like field is a plain writable property, so
mutation / direct property-write bypasses any creation-time check.

Root Cause

  1. The serializer's requireWellFormed DocType block checks publicId, systemId, and internalSubset (the fields hardened by GHSA-f6ww-3ggp-fr8h) but has no check for name.
  2. DocumentType.name is a plain writable own-property; on 0.8.x and the unscoped package createDocumentType() does not validate it either.
  3. The serializer emits name directly between the doctype delimiters: <!DOCTYPE ${name}…>.

Proof of Concept

Run against @xmldom/xmldom v0.9.10 (commit bb7a085):

const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer, DOMParser } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');

const impl = new DOMImplementation();
const serializer = new XMLSerializer();

// 0.9.x createDocumentType validates the name, so overwrite it via direct property write
const dt = impl.createDocumentType('html', '', '');
dt.name = 'html><script xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">alert(1)</script';
const doc = impl.createDocument(null, 'r', dt);

const output = serializer.serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });
console.log(output);
// Output: <!DOCTYPE html><script xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">alert(1)</script><r/>
//
// requireWellFormed: true did NOT prevent the injection (no exception thrown).
// The injected <script> is well-formed XHTML that a browser would execute.

Confirmed runtime behavior:

  • 0.9.x — createDocumentType() rejects the malicious name at creation (InvalidCharacterError); a direct write to dt.name bypasses that, and serializeToString(…, { requireWellFormed: true }) emits the breakout with no exception.
  • Re-parse confirmation — re-parsing the output shows the injected <script> is a real second top-level element originating entirely from the DocType name: the parser rejects it with HierarchyRequestError: Only one element can be added and only after doctype. A comment-injection variant (dt.name = 'html><!--INJECTED--', output <!DOCTYPE html><!--INJECTED--><r/>) re-parses cleanly and the injected comment node is enumerable, confirming the injected node is structurally live.
  • 0.8.x (v0.8.13, e5c1480) — createDocumentType('html><script>…', '', '') accepts the malicious name directly (no creation-time validation), and serializeToString(doc, null, null, { requireWellFormed: true }) produces <!DOCTYPE html><script>alert(1)</script><r/> with no exception.

A browser reproduction does not apply: browsers keep DocumentType.name
readonly, so the direct-write vector cannot be reproduced in a browser DOM.
The injection is specific to xmldom exposing name as writable and serializing
it without a guard.

Impact

Applications that build a DocumentType node with an attacker-influenced
name — via direct property write on any affected line, or via
createDocumentType() on 0.8.x and the unscoped package — and serialize the
document are vulnerable to XML/markup injection:

  • XML structure injection — breaking out of the <!DOCTYPE …> declaration to inject arbitrary sibling elements, comments, or additional markup into the output.
  • XSS via XHTML — if the serialized output is served as XHTML or processed by a browser-based XML parser, an injected <script> element (in the XHTML namespace) executes.
  • requireWellFormed bypass — applications that adopted requireWellFormed: true as a mitigation for the prior injection CVEs (including the sibling DocType fields fixed by GHSA-f6ww-3ggp-fr8h) remain vulnerable through the DocType name.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-09-08 21:02 UTC
Modified
2026-09-08 21:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@xmldom/xmldom

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.7.0, fixed 0.8.15 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.8.15

Fix

@xmldom/xmldom

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.9.0, fixed 0.9.12 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.9.12

Fix

xmldom

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 0.6.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences