nocodb
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected0.301.3(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46548
NocoDB: SSRF Protection Bypass in Notification Webhook Plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams)
Summary
The request-filtering-agent SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because httpAgent / httpsAgent were passed as part of the request body rather than the axios config. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts.
Details
axios.post(url, data, config) expects connection agents in the third (config) argument. In all four plugins, the agents were placed in the second (data) argument and serialised as JSON body content:
// packages/nocodb/src/plugins/slack/Slack.ts (and Discord / Mattermost / Teams — identical pattern)
return await axios.post(webhook_url, {
text,
httpAgent: useAgent(webhook_url), // wrong position — serialised, not used
httpsAgent: useAgent(webhook_url),
});
The webhook flow: an Editor+ user creates a webhook with notification.payload.channels[].webhook_url pointing to an internal host; on trigger, WebhookInvoker.invoke() calls the plugin's sendMessage() which performs the outbound axios.post with no SSRF filtering applied.
This is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9, which covers a blind SSRF via HEAD in the upload-by-URL path.
Impact
169.254.169.254) and internal services.NC_AUTOMATION_LOG_LEVEL=ALL), response bodies may be exfiltrated.Credit
This issue was reported by @ik0z.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 0.301.3 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0