ep_etherpad-lite
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.1.0(semver)
Fixed versions
3.1.0
Fix
- Fixed version
3.1.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55086
ep_etherpad-lite: Import/export uses Math.random() for temp file paths; predictable paths on shared /tmp enable symlink-based file overwrite
Description
src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts and src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts both compute their temporary working-file paths as:
const randNum = Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xFFFFFFFF);
const srcFile = `${os.tmpdir()}/etherpad_export_${randNum}.html`;
const destFile = `${os.tmpdir()}/etherpad_export_${randNum}.${type}`;
Two flaws compound:
Math.random() invocations). An attacker on the same host who observes any earlier temp-file name from logs or other side channels can predict subsequent names./tmp — a shared world-writable directory. An unprivileged local attacker can pre-create a symbolic link at a predicted path pointing at any file the Etherpad process can write: ln -s /etc/etherpad/SESSIONKEY.txt /tmp/etherpad_export_<predicted>.html
When ExportHandler calls fs.writeFile(srcFile, html) (or ImportHandler calls fs.rename(srcFile, destFile) / soffice writes its converted output to the path), the open syscall follows the symlink and either reads from or overwrites the linked target. For deployments where the Etherpad process runs as a privileged user (notably some Docker base images that run as root, snap confinement edge cases, or hand-rolled systemd units), this becomes arbitrary file overwrite.
The Import path is more impactful in practice: the file content the attacker can land in the symlink target is partially attacker-controlled (the post-soffice/post-mammoth conversion output of the uploaded document).
Severity rationale
Single-tenant deployments where only the Etherpad operator has shell access on the host are not exposed.
Affected versions
ep_etherpad-lite versions through v3.0.0 (inclusive). The Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xFFFFFFFF) pattern is present in src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts and src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts for as far back as the repository history extends — older than the 2024-03-16 snapshot at commit `107598b` where it first appears in the current file paths, and predating the v1.x era.Patched versions
ep_etherpad-lite >= 3.1.0 — the fix is on develop HEAD as commit 8c6104c. Update this field with the actual tagged release version when it ships.Proof of concept (sketch)
# Pre-condition: attacker has shell on the same host as Etherpad,
# has read access to /tmp, and Etherpad's process can write to the
# chosen target (e.g. runs as root inside a Docker container).
# 1. Observe a temp filename from logs (or guess via prior exports).
TARGET=/etc/etherpad/SESSIONKEY.txt
GUESS=/tmp/etherpad_export_$(./predict-next-random)$EXT # implementation-specific
# 2. Place the symlink before Etherpad creates the file.
ln -s "$TARGET" "$GUESS"
# 3. Trigger an export from the Etherpad UI (or via the API).
# Etherpad calls fs.writeFile(srcFile, ...) which open()s the symlink
# target with O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC and clobbers $TARGET with HTML content.
In practice the exact reproduction depends on the host's PRNG state predictability and the deployment's process-owner privileges. A reliable exploit chain needs setpriv-style host access or a sibling tenant.
Workarounds
/tmp (Docker: --tmpfs /tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=64m, systemd: PrivateTmp=true).TMPDIR to an Etherpad-private directory in the environment.Fix
Patched in `8c6104c` (PR #7784):
-const randNum = Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xFFFFFFFF);
+const randNum = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
128 bits of CSPRNG entropy. Predicting the next filename is no longer feasible.
A bigger follow-up — per-request mkdtemp subdirectories with O_EXCL/O_NOFOLLOW semantics — is deferred to a later release; the immediate window (predictable 32-bit collisions across processes) is what the patch closes.
Resources
8c6104c).Math.random() is not appropriate for security-sensitive contexts. See the MDN guidance for `Math.random()` and the Node.js recommendation to use `crypto.randomBytes` for unpredictable values.Credits
Reported during an internal security audit by Claude (via @JohnMcLear).
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 3.1.0 (semver)3.1.0
3.1.0npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0