wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-34362
AVideo's WebSocket Token Never Expires Due to Commented-Out Timeout Validation in verifyTokenSocket()
Summary
The verifyTokenSocket() function in plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php has its token timeout validation commented out, causing WebSocket tokens to never expire despite being generated with a 12-hour timeout. This allows captured or legitimately obtained tokens to provide permanent WebSocket access, even after user accounts are deleted, banned, or demoted from admin. Admin tokens grant access to real-time connection data for all online users including IP addresses, browser info, and page locations.
Details
WebSocket tokens are generated via getEncryptedInfo() which calls getToken(43200) to create a token with a 12-hour expiration window. The token is encrypted and contains security-critical claims: isAdmin, from_users_id, user_name, IP, browser, and device ID.
The regular HTTP token verification at objects/functions.php:3437-3439 enforces the timeout:
// objects/functions.php:3437-3439
if (!($time >= $obj->time && $time <= $obj->timeout)) {
_error_log("verifyToken token timout...");
return false; // <-- enforced
}
But the WebSocket-specific verification at plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:65-82 has the enforcement commented out:
// plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:77-80
if (!($time >= $obj->time && $time <= $obj->timeout)) {
//_error_log("verifyToken token timout...");
//return false; // <-- NOT enforced, always falls through to return true
}
return true;
Execution flow:
?webSocketToken=TOKEN in URL queryonOpen() (Message.php:34) calls getDecryptedInfo($wsocketGetVars['webSocketToken']) (line 48)getDecryptedInfo() (functions.php:49) decrypts the token and calls verifyTokenSocket($json->token) (line 54)verifyTokenSocket() validates the salt (passes) but the timeout check at line 77 evaluates the condition without acting on failure — return false is commented outtrue — connection established with all token claims (isAdmin, from_users_id) trustedImpact amplification via isAdmin:
When a connection has isAdmin=true (from token, Message.php:58), the getTotals() function (Message.php:419-432) includes detailed data about every connected client in periodic broadcast messages:
// Message.php:419-432
if ($isAdmin) {
$index = md5($client['selfURI']);
// Exposes: selfURI, yptDeviceId, users_id, user_name, browser, ip, location
$return['users_uri'][$index][$client['yptDeviceId']][$client['users_id']] = $client;
}
Additionally, the webSocketToken message type (Message.php:212-217) allows anonymous connections (users_id=0) to upgrade their identity by providing a captured token, meaning stolen tokens work from new connections indefinitely.
The 10-minute inactivity timeout (Message.php:135-143) is not a mitigation — it only closes idle connections and resets on every message (line 243).
PoC
# Step 1: Obtain a WebSocket token as any authenticated user
curl -s -b 'PHPSESSID=VALID_SESSION' \
'https://target.com/plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php' | jq -r '.webSocketToken'
# Save as TOKEN=<output>
# Step 2: Wait for the token to expire (>12 hours)
# In a real scenario, the attacker already has a previously captured token
# Step 3: Connect with the expired token — succeeds because verifyTokenSocket() skips timeout
wscat -c 'ws://target.com:8888/?webSocketToken=TOKEN'
# Step 4: Verify the connection is established and receiving broadcasts
# The server will send periodic getTotals data
# Step 5: If the token was from an admin, the getTotals response includes
# all connected clients' selfURI, IP, browser, device ID, user_name, and location
# Step 6: Any user can also enumerate connected users without admin:
# Send: {"msg":"getClientsList","webSocketToken":"TOKEN"}
# Response includes all users_id, isAdmin status, and usernames
Scenario: Demoted admin retains permanent admin WebSocket access
isAdmin: true)isAdmin claim in the token is never re-validatedImpact
isAdmin flag baked into the token is never re-checked against the database.webSocketToken message type allows using a stolen token to assume another user's identity on new connections, enabling impersonation in chat and messaging.Recommended Fix
Uncomment the timeout enforcement in verifyTokenSocket() at plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:77-80:
function verifyTokenSocket($token) {
global $global;
$obj = _json_decode(decryptString($token));
if (empty($obj)) {
_error_log("verifyToken invalid token");
return false;
}
if ($obj->salt !== $global['salt']) {
_error_log("verifyToken salt fail");
return false;
}
$time = time();
if (!($time >= $obj->time && $time <= $obj->timeout)) {
_error_log("verifyToken token timeout time = $time; obj->time = $obj->time; obj->timeout = $obj->timeout");
return false; // <-- uncomment this line
}
return true;
}
Additionally, consider:
getClientsList handler (Message.php:219) so only admins can enumerate connected users.isAdmin claim against the database periodically rather than trusting the token claim for the lifetime of the connection.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0