Advisory

GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73

Also known as: CVE-2026-48035

Summary

@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened

Details

Affected: @hulumi/baseline < 1.4.0 — Fixed in: 1.4.0 — Severity: High — CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)

Summary

The S3 bucket that AccountFoundation creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant — if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened:

  1. No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket. The startup-hardened tier hard-coded objectLock: false on the audit bucket. (The reason was real — bucket-wide Object Lock blocks an AWS Config write-then-delete probe — but the fix was a sledgehammer that disabled WORM for all objects, not just the probe key.)
  2. `forceDestroy` was forwarded to the audit bucket. Nothing prevented a downstream stack from setting logBucketForceDestroy: true, which made pulumi destroy purge every audit-log object on teardown.
  3. Sandbox tier dropped everything. Sandbox-tier AccountFoundation created its audit bucket with tier: "sandbox", which skipped Object Lock, server access logging, AND the CloudTrail-Lake EventDataStore (the independent immutable mirror) — leaving sandbox accounts with no audit immutability at all.

Impact

Consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded).

Patches

Upgrade to @hulumi/[email protected]. A single invariant in SecureBucket now fires whenever the bucket actually backs CloudTrail/Config delivery (i.e. awsServiceLogDelivery.cloudTrail === true || .config === true):

  • refuses forceDestroy: true on the startup-hardened tier;
  • emits the CloudTrail-Lake EventDataStore regardless of parent tier (so sandbox accounts regain immutable audit capture);
  • adds a deny-s3:DeleteObject* bucket-policy statement scoped to the CloudTrail and Config history/snapshot prefixes (a retention floor on the audit objects). The deny excludes the AWS Config ConfigWritabilityCheckFile probe key so Config's write-then-delete still works, which is why bucket-wide Object Lock is intentionally NOT re-enabled.

Workarounds

Replicating audit logs out-of-account to an Object-Locked archive bucket partially mitigates while you upgrade.

Resources

  • PR #178 (Cluster C); see CHANGELOG ### Migration for the forceDestroy behaviour change.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-06-10 13:38 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:51 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@hulumi/baseline

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.4.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.4.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences