Advisory

GHSA-2phh-27fw-q4gc

Also known as: CVE-2026-108360

Summary

PhpSpreadsheet: SSRF whitelist bypass via unre-validated HTTP redirect in Drawing::setPath external image loading

Details

Summary
PhpSpreadsheet's Worksheet\Drawing::setPath() validates an external-image URL against an operator-supplied isWhitelisted callback once, on the initial URL only, then fetches it with file_get_contents() using a stream context that does not set follow_location => 0. A whitelisted host that returns an HTTP 302 Location: redirect to an internal target is therefore followed by PHP's HTTP wrapper (default follow_location=1, max_redirects=20) with no re-validation of the redirect hop — defeating the whitelist and yielding a blind SSRF from the server.

This is an unfixed variant of CVE-2026-59931 (GHSA-6hq5-7373-42rg, the WEBSERVICE redirect-whitelist-bypass): the follow_location => 0 fix (commit 7ef7b25e) was applied ONLY to Calculation/Web/Service.php; Worksheet/Drawing.php was never touched.

Root Cause
src/PhpSpreadsheet/Worksheet/Drawing.php:

  • Scheme allowlist at :125 (/^(http|https|file|ftp|s3):/) permits http/https (the redirect-following schemes) and runs on the initial URL only.
  • Opt-in gate if (!$allowExternal) at :128 (requires setAllowExternalImages(true); default false, BaseReader.php:55).
  • Whitelist check if ($isWhitelisted !== null && !$isWhitelisted($path)) at :131 — validates the INITIAL URL only; never re-applied after a redirect.
  • Stream context built at :140-152 sets user_agent + header (+ ssl.crypto_method for https) but omits `follow_location`. git grep follow_location on tag 5.9.0 yields a single hit — Service.php:45 (the CVE-2026-59931 fix) — confirming it was never added to Drawing.php.
  • Sink file_get_contents($path, false, $ctx) at :154.

Impact
Blind SSRF from the server: reach and trigger internal GET-driven endpoints, coarse internal reachability/port probing, and reach cloud-metadata endpoints. The fetched body is written to a temp file, checked with isImage() (mime image/*, or application/octet-stream with bin/emf extension), only image dimensions are stored, and the temp file is unlinked — so the response body is not exfiltrated (non-image responses fail isImage()). This is a blind GET primitive, not full response read.

Proof of Concept

  1. Attacker server https://trusted-whitelisted.example/redir.png returns 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/.
  2. evil.xlsx with xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels: <Relationship ... Type=".../image" Target="https://trusted-whitelisted.example/redir.png" TargetMode="External"/>.
  3. Victim: $r = new Xlsx(); $r->setAllowExternalImages(true)->setIsWhitelisted(fn($p)=>str_contains($p,'trusted-whitelisted.example')); $r->load('evil.xlsx'); -> the server-side GET is forced to the internal target despite the whitelist.

HTML-reader variant: <img src="https://trusted-whitelisted.example/redir.png"> loaded via Reader\Html (Html.php:1237) with the same reader settings.

Attack Chain

  1. Entry: crafted evil.xlsx, xl/drawings/_rels/*.rels TargetMode="External", Target="https://trusted.example/redir.png" (whitelisted host). Guard: none (legal external-image relationship). Bypass proof: Target stored verbatim -> $url at Reader/Xlsx.php:1544.
  2. Config: victim loads with setAllowExternalImages(true)->setIsWhitelisted($cb) where $cb allows trusted.example. Guard: Drawing.php:128 opt-in (satisfied) + :131 whitelist. Bypass proof: initial URL is whitelisted -> returns true; check runs once on $path.
  3. Fetch/redirect: file_get_contents (:154) GETs the URL; whitelisted host returns 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/.... Guard: stream context (:140-152). Bypass proof: no follow_location key -> PHP follows the redirect (default follow_location=1, max_redirects=20) with no re-validation.
  4. Impact: server issues a blind GET to the internal target (body temp-filed, isImage()-checked, dimensions stored, temp file unlinked — body not exfiltrated).

Bypass Evidence

  • git grep follow_location 5.9.0 -- src/ -> single hit at Service.php:45; Drawing.php has none.
  • CVE-2026-59931's own regression harness (ServerTest.php + redirect.php: a whitelisted host 302-redirects to direct.php; only after follow_location => 0 does the fetch stop following it) demonstrates the exact behavior. That fix is present in Service.php and absent in Drawing.php.
  • git grep isWhitelisted 5.9.0 -- src/ confirms the callback is applied only at Drawing.php:131 (initial $path), never after the redirect.

Affected Versions
>= 5.5.0, <= 5.9.0. The isWhitelisted control being bypassed was introduced in 5.5.0 (commit 50a7552f); present and unfixed on the latest release (5.9.0) and on HEAD (05e99ebf). No post-release fix to Drawing.php.

Suggested Fix
Add 'follow_location' => 0 (and/or 'max_redirects' => 0) to $ctxArray['http'] in Drawing::setPath() (:140-148), mirroring the CVE-2026-59931 fix at Service.php:45; alternatively follow redirects manually and re-run $isWhitelisted on each hop.

---
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-10-27 15:38 UTC
Modified
2026-10-27 15:47 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 4.0.0, fixed 5.10.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

5.10.0

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 3.3.0, fixed 3.10.8 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

3.10.8

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 2.2.0, fixed 2.4.8 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

2.4.8

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 2.0.0, fixed 2.1.19 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

2.1.19

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.30.7 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

1.30.7

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences