github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.7.9(semver)
Fixed versions
1.7.9
Fix
- Fixed version
1.7.9go get github.com/modelcontextprotocol/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45781, GO-2026-5008
MCP Registry: OCI validator skips ownership check on upstream rate limits
OCI ownership validation fails open on upstream rate limits, allowing attacker to claim arbitrary public OCI images under their own namespace
Severity: Low (re-scored post-triage; see Maintainer triage note below)
Affected: modelcontextprotocol/registry main branch at commit fe0cb3b (current HEAD as of 2026-05-09).
Live deployment: https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io (per repo README).
Route: GitHub private security advisory (per repo SECURITY.md).
---
Title
OCI ownership validation skips label-match check when upstream OCI registry returns HTTP 429, letting any authenticated publisher bind their io.github.<user>/* namespace to OCI images they do not control.
Summary
internal/validators/registries/oci.go:104-119 fails open on http.StatusTooManyRequests: when the
registry's anonymous fetch to the upstream OCI registry is rate-limited, ValidateOCI returns nil
and the publish is accepted without ever running theio.modelcontextprotocol.server.name label-match check at lines 122-141. That label check is the
only cross-system ownership proof the registry applies to OCI packages — every other registry type
(NPM, PyPI, NuGet, MCPB) treats a non-200 upstream response as a hard error.
The fail-open trigger is attacker-controllable. The registry uses authn.Anonymous against Docker
Hub, which is rate-limited to 100 manifest pulls per 6 hours per egress IP, and the production
NGINX rate limit allows 180 publishes/minute (3 RPS, burst 540) per source IP. A single attacker
from a single IP can exhaust the registry's shared anonymous quota in roughly 33 seconds, then
submit a final publish that points packages[].identifier at a Docker Hub image they do not own.
The validator hits the 429 fail-open branch, returns nil, and the registry stores a record under
the attacker's namespace claiming the unrelated image as its package payload, with no label proof
in evidence.
The fail-open is also reached without an attacker present. Docker Hub routinely 429s busy egress IPs
during organic traffic, so publishes during those windows skip OCI ownership validation silently.
Vulnerable code
internal/validators/registries/oci.go:97-142:
img, err := remote.Image(ref, remote.WithAuth(authn.Anonymous), remote.WithContext(timeoutCtx))
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return fmt.Errorf("OCI image validation timed out after 30 seconds for '%s'. The registry may be slow or unreachable", pkg.Identifier)
}
var transportErr *transport.Error
if errors.As(err, &transportErr) {
switch transportErr.StatusCode {
case http.StatusTooManyRequests:
// Rate limited - skip validation to avoid blocking publishers
// This is intentional: we prioritize UX over strict validation during high traffic
log.Printf("Skipping OCI validation for %s due to rate limiting", pkg.Identifier)
return nil // <-- FAIL-OPEN
case http.StatusNotFound:
return fmt.Errorf("OCI image '%s' does not exist in the registry", pkg.Identifier)
case http.StatusUnauthorized, http.StatusForbidden:
return fmt.Errorf("OCI image '%s' is private or requires authentication. Only public images are supported", pkg.Identifier)
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch OCI image: %w", err)
}
// Get the image config which contains labels
configFile, err := img.ConfigFile()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get image config: %w", err)
}
// Validate the MCP server name label
if configFile.Config.Labels == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("OCI image '%s' is missing required annotation. Add this to your Dockerfile: LABEL io.modelcontextprotocol.server.name=\"%s\"", pkg.Identifier, serverName)
}
mcpName, exists := configFile.Config.Labels["io.modelcontextprotocol.server.name"]
if !exists {
return fmt.Errorf("OCI image '%s' is missing required annotation. Add this to your Dockerfile: LABEL io.modelcontextprotocol.server.name=\"%s\"", pkg.Identifier, serverName)
}
if mcpName != serverName {
return fmt.Errorf("OCI image ownership validation failed. Expected annotation 'io.modelcontextprotocol.server.name' = '%s', got '%s'", serverName, mcpName)
}
The fail-open returns before any of the three label-match guards run.
The validator is reached on every publish per internal/service/registry_service.go:151-158, gated bycfg.EnableRegistryValidation, which defaults to true in internal/config/config.go:18.
Reachability and authorization
POST /v0/publish (and /v0.1/publish) is registered with bearer-JWT auth ininternal/api/handlers/v0/publish.go:30-50. JWTs are issued by /v0/auth/github-at
(internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_at.go:46-67), which exchanges any GitHub OAuth access token for
a 5-minute registry JWT carrying Permission{Action: Publish, ResourcePattern: "io.github.<login>/*"}.
Any free GitHub account can mint such a JWT, so the publish path is reachable to anyone on the
internet at the cost of a GitHub account.
Trigger conditions
internal/validators/registries/oci.go:97: anonymous Docker Hub auth, subject to the 100 manifest-pulls/6h/IP unauthenticated rate limit Docker Hub publishes.deploy/pkg/k8s/registry.go:330-331: production NGINX limits incoming requests to 180/minute per source IP with a 3× burst multiplier (540)./publish against an allowlisted OCI identifier in internal/validators/registries/oci.go:29-42 (docker.io / registry-1.docker.io / index.docker.io / ghcr.io / quay.io / mcr.microsoft.com / *.pkg.dev / *.azurecr.io) consumes one slot, including publishes that go on to fail with the missing-annotation error after the manifest is fetched.Attacker chain
attacker → POST /v0/auth/github-at → registry JWT with Permission{Action: Publish, ResourcePattern: "io.github.attacker/*"}.packages[].identifier references real public Docker Hub images that lack the io.modelcontextprotocol.server.name label (e.g. docker.io/library/alpine:latest, docker.io/library/nginx:latest, …). Each publish fails with "OCI image is missing required annotation" but consumes one anonymous-quota slot from the registry's shared egress IP.name = "io.github.attacker/<typo-squat-name>", packages[].registryType = "oci", packages[].identifier = "docker.io/<reputable-org>/<reputable-image>:<tag>".ValidateOCI calls remote.Image(ref, authn.Anonymous, …); Docker Hub returns 429; transportErr.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests matches the fail-open branch; ValidateOCI returns nil; ValidatePackage returns nil; validateRegistryOwnership returns nil; the publish proceeds and CreateServer writes the record. The registry now publishes a server record under io.github.attacker/<typo-squat-name> that asserts the reputable image as its package payload, without ever inspecting that image's labels.Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
0, fixed 1.7.9 (semver)1.7.9
1.7.9go get github.com/modelcontextprotocol/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0