better-auth
Affected
- introduced
0.3.4, fixed1.6.11(semver)
Fixed versions
1.6.11
Fix
- Fixed version
1.6.11npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-67334
Better Auth: Stale sessions persist after user deletion across admin, anonymous, and SCIM flows
Am I affected?
Users are affected if all of the following are true:
secondaryStorage on betterAuth(...) (Redis, KV, or any external session cache).session.storeSessionInDatabase is left unset or set to false (the default).admin plugin and calls auth.api.removeUser(...) or authClient.admin.removeUser(...).anonymous plugin and exposes /delete-anonymous-user or relies on the after-link hook to clean up the anonymous user.@better-auth/scim plugin and exposes DELETE /scim/v2/Users/:userId.If storeSessionInDatabase is true, sessions are also written to the database, and the database delete cascades; users are not affected.
Fix:
better-auth@<patched-version> or later (and @better-auth/scim@<patched-version> if they use SCIM).Summary
When secondaryStorage is configured and storeSessionInDatabase is false, three user-deletion endpoints in better-auth plus one in @better-auth/scim call internalAdapter.deleteUser(userId) without first calling internalAdapter.deleteSessions(userId). The deleted user's session payload (which carries a cached user object) remains in secondary storage, and internalAdapter.findSession(token) keeps returning it as a valid session until the session TTL elapses (default 7 days).
Details
The vulnerable call sites are:
admin plugin's removeUser (packages/better-auth/src/plugins/admin/routes.ts:1463).anonymous plugin's self-delete endpoint (packages/better-auth/src/plugins/anonymous/index.ts:222).anonymous plugin's after-link hook (packages/better-auth/src/plugins/anonymous/index.ts:325).@better-auth/scim's DELETE /scim/v2/Users/:userId (packages/scim/src/routes.ts:1019).Working callers that already do the right thing: the core /delete-user self-delete and /delete-user/callback (packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/update-user.ts:551).
The fix shape extends each vulnerable caller to invoke deleteSessions(userId) before deleteUser(userId). The architectural follow-up centralizes the cleanup inside deleteUser itself or introduces a single deleteUserAndSessions orchestrator so future callers cannot regress this contract.
Patches
Fixed in better-auth@<patched-version> and @better-auth/scim@<patched-version>. All four user-deletion call sites now invoke deleteSessions(userId) before deleteUser(userId) so sessions are evicted from secondary storage at the same time the user row is removed.
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
session.storeSessionInDatabase: true. Subsequent user-delete writes reach the session table and the database cascade removes rows. Increases write volume for high-throughput sessions but eliminates the gap.auth.api.removeUser, also call auth.api.revokeUserSessions({ body: { userId } }), which uses deleteSessions internally.auth.api.revokeUserSessions(...) after the SCIM DELETE.onLinkAccount, explicitly call internalAdapter.deleteSessions(anonymousUser.user.id) before allowing the new session to be issued.Impact
getSessionFromCtx until the session TTL elapses (default 7 days). Within that window, the deleted user retains their pre-existing read and write surface.Credit
Reported by @iruizsalinas.
Resources
Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
0.3.4, fixed 1.6.11 (semver)1.6.11
1.6.11npm install [email protected]1.6.0, fixed 1.6.11 (semver)1.6.11
1.6.11npm install @better-auth/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0