Advisory

GHSA-2wfh-rcwf-wh23

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

import { join, resolve } from "path"

export const createTempFolder = (item: string) => {
  const tempDir = budibaseTempDir()
  const resolved = resolve(tempDir, item)

  // Ensure the resolved path is within the temp directory
  if (!resolved.startsWith(tempDir + "/") && resolved !== tempDir) {
    throw new Error("Invalid path: directory traversal detected")
  }

  try {
    if (fs.existsSync(resolved)) {
      fs.rmSync(resolved, { recursive: true, force: true })
    }
    fs.mkdirSync(resolved)
  } catch (err: any) {
    throw new Error(`Path cannot be created: ${err.message}`)
  }

  return resolved
}

Option 2: Sanitize at the upload handler (defense-in-depth)

Strip path components from the filename before use:

import path from "path"

export async function fileUpload(file: KoaFile) {
  if (!file.name || !file.path) {
    throw new Error("File is not valid - cannot upload.")
  }
  if (!file.name.endsWith(".tar.gz")) {
    throw new Error("Plugin must be compressed into a gzipped tarball.")
  }
  // Strip directory components from the filename
  const safeName = path.basename(file.name).split(".tar.gz")[0]
  const dir = createTempFolder(safeName)
  await extractTarball(file.path, dir)

  return await getPluginMetadata(dir)
}

Both options should ideally be applied together for defense-in-depth.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.

Sources & licences