Details
import { join, resolve } from "path"
export const createTempFolder = (item: string) => {
const tempDir = budibaseTempDir()
const resolved = resolve(tempDir, item)
// Ensure the resolved path is within the temp directory
if (!resolved.startsWith(tempDir + "/") && resolved !== tempDir) {
throw new Error("Invalid path: directory traversal detected")
}
try {
if (fs.existsSync(resolved)) {
fs.rmSync(resolved, { recursive: true, force: true })
}
fs.mkdirSync(resolved)
} catch (err: any) {
throw new Error(`Path cannot be created: ${err.message}`)
}
return resolved
}
Option 2: Sanitize at the upload handler (defense-in-depth)
Strip path components from the filename before use:
import path from "path"
export async function fileUpload(file: KoaFile) {
if (!file.name || !file.path) {
throw new Error("File is not valid - cannot upload.")
}
if (!file.name.endsWith(".tar.gz")) {
throw new Error("Plugin must be compressed into a gzipped tarball.")
}
// Strip directory components from the filename
const safeName = path.basename(file.name).split(".tar.gz")[0]
const dir = createTempFolder(safeName)
await extractTarball(file.path, dir)
return await getPluginMetadata(dir)
}
Both options should ideally be applied together for defense-in-depth.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.