Summary
anacrolix/torrent's bencode decoder (bencode/) applies no limit on the nesting depth of nested dictionaries and lists. Two distinct denial-of-service mechanisms follow from that single root cause, both reachable from a single crafted .torrent file or from metadata obtained from a peer on a magnet-link/v2 download:
- Stack-overflow process crash.
Decoder.readOneValue recurses once per nesting level with no depth bound. A .torrent whose info value is a list nested a few million levels deep (≈8 MB file) drives the recursion past the 1 GiB goroutine-stack limit and the process dies with an unrecoverable fatal error: stack overflow. 2. Quadratic CPU exhaustion. metainfo.FileTree.UnmarshalBencode (BitTorrent v2) re-parses each subtree at every level, making parse time grow ~O(n²). A v2 info dict with a ~30,000-level file tree (≈0.2 MB) takes ~66 s to decode; 60,000 levels exceeds 90 s of decode time.
Affected: every application embedding github.com/anacrolix/torrent that ingests attacker-supplied metainfo - the CLI tools (cmd/torrent, cmd/torrent2), any server that opens .torrent files, or any client that accepts metadata from a peer for a magnet/v2 download. No depth limit has ever existed in the decoder.
Vulnerability Details
All file:line references are against the pinned commit 4ad31c5170787215c51c6ddaa54abc06b623c11c.
Root cause - no recursion/depth limit in the bencode decoder
bencode/decode.go implements three independently unbounded recursive parsers. There is no depth counter and no MaxDepth/nesting guard anywhere in bencode/ or metainfo/.
Defect 1 - `readOneValue` recursion (`bencode/decode.go:546-549`)
case 'd', 'l':
// read until there is nothing to read
for d.readOneValue() {
} // <- recurses once per nested dict/list level, unbounded
readOneValue is invoked by Decoder.parseUnmarshaler (bencode/decode.go:591) whenever a decoded field implements bencode.Unmarshaler, which includes bencode.Bytes - the type of MetaInfo.InfoBytes (metainfo/metainfo.go:17). So decoding a normal .torrent routes the entire info value through this recursion. Stack usage is ~256 bytes per level (consistent with the observed ~4M-level crash at the 1 GiB goroutine-stack limit), so nesting l a few million levels deep exhausts the 1 GiB default goroutine-stack limit. Go's stack overflow is a fatal error - it is not a recoverable panic, so the recover() in Decoder.Decode (bencode/decode.go:35-55) cannot intercept it, and the whole process terminates.
Entry points that reach readOneValue with attacker-controlled bytes:
metainfo.Load (metainfo/metainfo.go:35) / metainfo.LoadFromFile (metainfo.go:50) - decoding a .torrent file; the info value becomes a bencode.Bytes unmarshaler field.Client.AddTorrent / Client.AddTorrentFromFile -> metainfo.LoadFromFile (client.go:1776 inside AddTorrentFromFile), and TorrentSpec.InfoBytes -> setInfoBytesLocked -> bencode.Unmarshal(b, &info) (torrent.go:638) - peer-fetched metadata.
For the remote-peer path (magnet-link/v2 download), peer-supplied metadata pieces are reassembled and passed to setInfoBytesLocked once complete (torrent.go:1874). The accepted metadata size is capped at maxMetadataSize = 16 MiB (global.go:18), which comfortably admits the ≈8 MB Defect-1 payload and the ≈0.2 MB Defect-2 payload, so both defects are reachable from an untrusted peer, not only from a locally-opened .torrent.
Defect 2 - `FileTree.UnmarshalBencode` recursive re-parse (`metainfo/file-tree.go:42-49`)
for key, bytes := range dir {
var sub FileTree
err = sub.UnmarshalBencode(bytes) // <- recurses once per file-tree level, and each call re-runs
// bencode.Unmarshal over its entire subtree
FileTree implements bencode.Unmarshaler (file-tree.go:53), so the file tree field of a v2 info dict (metainfo/info.go:33) routes through it. Each level calls sub.UnmarshalBencode, which starts with bencode.Unmarshal(bytes, &dir) over the *whole remaining subtree*. A file tree nested D levels deep therefore performs O(D) bencode.Unmarshal calls, each over an O(D)-sized payload - O(D²) total parse work. The steady state is a CPU-bound single goroutine, so the embedding process simply hangs.
Reachability: any bencode.Unmarshal into metainfo.Info, including the peer-metadata path setInfoBytesLocked (torrent.go:638) for a magnet/v2 download, and MetaInfo.UnmarshalInfo (metainfo/metainfo.go:61-64).
Sanitizers / existing limits that do NOT apply
Decoder.MaxStrLen (bencode/decode.go:787-791, default 128 MiB) bounds a *single string value*; it is never consulted by readOneValue (decode.go:564 does io.CopyN(&d.buf, d.r, length) with no MaxStrLen check) and does not bound dict/list nesting depth.- The existing fuzzers (
bencode/fuzz_test.go) only round-trip interface{} values; small fuzz inputs cannot synthesize the millions of nesting levels needed to trip the stack limit, which is why this has evaded them.
Impact
- Denial of service / availability (complete process crash). A single ~8 MB
.torrent file, or ~8 MB of metadata from a malicious peer, crashes the embedding application with fatal error: stack overflow (Defect 1). The crash is not recoverable in-process. For a server that ingests user-submitted torrents or runs a long-lived swarm, this is a trivial remote DoS: seed a torrent whose metainfo nests lists deeply, and any client that fetches the metadata dies. - Denial of service / availability (CPU starvation). A ~0.2-0.6 MB v2 info dict with a deeply nested file tree pins a core for ~66 s to minutes and blocks any other decode work sharing the process (Defect 2).
Threat actor: an unauthenticated remote peer (v2/magnet metadata, within the allowed 16 MiB metadata size - global.go:18) or a local user opening a malicious .torrent. The remote-peer case is the higher-reachability/cloud scenario; the local-file case requires the victim to open one file (conservative UI:R). Headline CVSS 3.1 base CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H = 6.5 (remote, low-complexity, unauthenticated, requires the victim to open a torrent or receive peer metadata, single-process availability loss); for applications that ingest torrents with no user interaction (programmatic server ingestion), UI becomes N, raising it to 7.5. CWE-674 (Uncontrolled Recursion) is the precise root cause for Defect 1; CWE-407 (Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity) covers Defect 2.
Per-metric justification (headline 6.5 vector, UI:R):
- Attack Vector (AV): Network - the trigger is peer-supplied metadata (magnet/v2 download, within the 16 MiB metadata budget) or a
.torrent file opened by any client of the library; no local access required. - Attack Complexity (AC): Low - the payload is a deterministic list-nesting pattern in metainfo; no race, heap grooming, or special environment.
- Privileges Required (PR): None - feeding metainfo to the decoder is the unprivileged, public API usage.
- User Interaction (UI): Required - the conservative remote scenario needs the victim to open a magnet/torrent (or accept a peer's metadata); programmatic server ingestion removes this (UI:N -> 7.5).
- Scope (S): Unchanged - the impacted security authority is the embedding process itself.
- Confidentiality (C): None - no data disclosure.
- Integrity (I): None - no data modification.
- Availability (A): High - Defect 1 terminates the process with
fatal error: stack overflow (unrecoverable); Defect 2 starves a core for ~66 s+ per 0.2 MB v2 info dict with clean quadratic scaling.