Advisory

GHSA-2x8m-83vc-6wv4

Also known as: CVE-2026-41272

Summary

Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass (TOCTOU & Default Insecure)

Details

Summary
The core security wrappers (secureAxiosRequest and secureFetch) intended to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) contain multiple logic flaws. These flaws allow attackers to bypass the allow/deny lists via DNS Rebinding (Time-of-Check Time-of-Use) or by exploiting the default configuration which fails to enforce any deny list.

Details
The flaws exist in packages/components/src/httpSecurity.ts.

Default Insecure: If process.env.HTTP_DENY_LIST is undefined, checkDenyList returns immediately, allowing all requests (including localhost).

DNS Rebinding (TOCTOU): The function performs a DNS lookup (dns.lookup) to validate the IP, and then the HTTP client performs a new lookup to connect. An attacker can serve a valid IP first, then switch to an internal IP (e.g., 127.0.0.1) for the second lookup.

PoC
Ensure HTTP_DENY_LIST is unset (default behavior).

Use any node utilizing secureFetch to access http://127.0.0.1.

Result: Request succeeds.

Scenario 2: DNS Rebinding

Attacker controls domain attacker.com and a custom DNS server.

Configure DNS to return 1.1.1.1 (Safe IP) with TTL=0 for the first query.

Configure DNS to return 127.0.0.1 (Blocked IP) for subsequent queries.

Flowise validates attacker.com -> 1.1.1.1 (Allowed).

Flowise fetches attacker.com -> 127.0.0.1 (Bypass).

Run the following for manual verification

// PoC for httpSecurity.ts Bypasses
import * as dns from 'dns/promises';

// Mocking the checkDenyList logic from Flowise
async function checkDenyList(url: string) {
    const deniedIPs = ['127.0.0.1', '0.0.0.0']; // Simplified deny list logic

    if (!process.env.HTTP_DENY_LIST) {
        console.log(\"⚠️  HTTP_DENY_LIST not set. Returning allowed.\");
        return; // Vulnerability 1: Default Insecure
    }

    const { hostname } = new URL(url);
    const { address } = await dns.lookup(hostname);

    if (deniedIPs.includes(address)) {
        throw new Error(`IP ${address} is denied`);
    }
    console.log(`✅ IP ${address} allowed check.`);
}

async function runPoC() {
    console.log(\"--- Test 1: Default Configuration (Unset HTTP_DENY_LIST) ---\");
    // Ensure env var is unset
    delete process.env.HTTP_DENY_LIST;
    try {
        await checkDenyList('http://127.0.0.1');
        console.log(\"[PASS] Default config allowed localhost access.\");
    } catch (e) {
        console.log(\"[FAIL] Blocked:\", e.message);
    }

    console.log(\"\
--- Test 2: 'private' Keyword Bypass (Logic Flaw) ---\");
    process.env.HTTP_DENY_LIST = 'private'; // User expects this to block localhost
    try {
        await checkDenyList('http://127.0.0.1');
        // In real Flowise code, 'private' is not expanded to IPs, so it only blocks the string \"private\"
        console.log(\"[PASS] 'private' keyword failed to block localhost (Mock simulation).\");
    } catch (e) {
        console.log(\"[FAIL] Blocked:\", e.message);
    }
}

runPoC();

Impact
Confidentiality: High (Access to internal services if protection is bypassed).

Integrity: Low/Medium (If internal services allow state changes via GET).

Availability: Low.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-04-16 21:51 UTC
Modified
2026-05-05 16:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

flowise

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 3.1.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

3.1.0

Fix

flowise-components

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 3.1.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

3.1.0

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences