openclaw
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2026.3.24(semver)
Fixed versions
2026.3.24
Fix
- Fixed version
2026.3.24npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-35667
OpenClaw has incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-27486: Unvalidated SIGKILL in !stop Chat Command via shell-utils.ts
> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.
Advisory Details
Title: Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-27486: Unvalidated SIGKILL in !stop Chat Command via shell-utils.ts
Description:
Summary
The !stop (and /bash stop) chat command kills background bash processes using SIGKILL directly, without first sending SIGTERM to allow graceful shutdown. This is because bash-command.ts imports killProcessTree() from src/agents/shell-utils.ts, which still contains the pre-CVE-2026-27486 aggressive kill logic, rather than from the patched src/process/kill-tree.ts.
Details
CVE-2026-27486 fixed unsafe process termination by introducing a graceful shutdown sequence in src/process/kill-tree.ts — sending SIGTERM first, waiting a configurable grace period (default 3 seconds), then escalating to SIGKILL only if the process is still alive.
However, an identical copy of the unpatched killProcessTree function remains in src/agents/shell-utils.ts (lines 170–192). This function sends SIGKILL immediately with no SIGTERM:
// src/agents/shell-utils.ts:170-192
export function killProcessTree(pid: number): void {
// ... Windows handling ...
try {
process.kill(-pid, "SIGKILL"); // Immediate hard kill, no SIGTERM
} catch {
try {
process.kill(pid, "SIGKILL");
} catch {
// process already dead
}
}
}
The !stop chat command handler in src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts imports and calls this vulnerable version at line 302:
// src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts:5
import { killProcessTree } from "../../agents/shell-utils.js";
// src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts:300-304
const pid = running.pid ?? running.child?.pid;
if (pid) {
killProcessTree(pid); // Calls the UNPATCHED version
}
markExited(running, null, "SIGKILL", "failed");
Compare this to the patched version in src/process/kill-tree.ts:
// src/process/kill-tree.ts:46-78
function killProcessTreeUnix(pid: number, graceMs: number): void {
// Step 1: Try graceful SIGTERM to process group
try {
process.kill(-pid, "SIGTERM");
} catch { /* ... */ }
// Step 2: Wait grace period, then SIGKILL if still alive
setTimeout(() => {
if (isProcessAlive(-pid)) {
try { process.kill(-pid, "SIGKILL"); } catch { /* ... */ }
}
}, graceMs).unref();
}
PoC
This PoC demonstrates the difference between the vulnerable and patched code paths inside a running OpenClaw Gateway container.
Setup:
# Build and start the gateway container
cd CVE-2026-27486-variant-exp/
docker compose up -d
sleep 5
Exploit (vulnerable `killProcessTree` from `shell-utils.ts`):
The following script is injected into the container and executed. It starts a bash process that traps SIGTERM for graceful shutdown, then kills it using the same code path as !stop:
// exploit_sigkill.cjs — replicates src/agents/shell-utils.ts:183-190
const { spawn } = require('child_process');
const fs = require('fs');
try { fs.unlinkSync('/tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt'); } catch {}
const child = spawn('/bin/bash', ['-c',
'trap \'echo GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN > /tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt; exit 0\' SIGTERM; while true; do sleep 1; done'
], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' });
child.unref();
setTimeout(() => {
// VULNERABLE: same as shell-utils.ts — SIGKILL only
try { process.kill(-child.pid, 'SIGKILL'); } catch {
try { process.kill(child.pid, 'SIGKILL'); } catch {}
}
setTimeout(() => {
if (fs.existsSync('/tmp/graceful_shutdown.txt')) {
console.log('[BLOCKED] SIGTERM was received.');
process.exit(1);
} else {
console.log('[EXPLOITED] SIGKILL sent directly — SIGTERM never delivered.');
process.exit(0);
}
}, 2000);
}, 1000);
Run:
python3 poc_exploit.py
Log of Evidence
Exploit output (SIGKILL only, no graceful shutdown):
[*] Running exploit (vulnerable killProcessTree from shell-utils.ts)...
[*] Victim PID: 78
[*] Calling vulnerable killProcessTree (SIGKILL only, no SIGTERM)...
[EXPLOITED] SIGKILL sent directly — SIGTERM never delivered.
[EXPLOITED] Graceful shutdown handler was NEVER invoked.
[SUCCESS] CVE-2026-27486 variant confirmed:
killProcessTree() in shell-utils.ts sends immediate SIGKILL,
bypassing the graceful shutdown fix in process/kill-tree.ts.
Control output (SIGTERM first, graceful shutdown works):
[*] Running control (patched killProcessTree from process/kill-tree.ts)...
[*] Victim PID: 93
[*] Calling patched killProcessTree (SIGTERM first, then SIGKILL after grace)...
[NORMAL] SIGTERM received — graceful shutdown completed. Flag: GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN
[NORMAL] Control confirmed: patched killProcessTree sends SIGTERM first,
allowing graceful shutdown before escalating to SIGKILL.
Impact
When !stop is used, background processes are killed instantly via SIGKILL with no chance to perform cleanup. This can result in:
This is the same class of impact that CVE-2026-27486 was filed for — the fix simply missed the shell-utils.ts copy of the function.
Affected products
Severity
Weaknesses
Occurrences
| Permalink | Description |
| :--- | :--- |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/agents/shell-utils.ts#L170-L192 | The vulnerable killProcessTree function that sends immediate SIGKILL without SIGTERM. |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts#L5 | Import statement pulling the vulnerable killProcessTree from shell-utils.ts instead of the patched kill-tree.ts. |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/auto-reply/reply/bash-command.ts#L300-L304 | The !stop handler calling the vulnerable killProcessTree(pid). |
| https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/f2849c2417/src/process/kill-tree.ts#L46-L78 | The patched killProcessTreeUnix with graceful SIGTERM → grace period → SIGKILL sequence (for reference). |
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2026.3.24 (semver)2026.3.24
2026.3.24npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0