Advisory

GHSA-32gc-wf3m-78w9

Also known as: CVE-2026-107811, GO-2026-6702

Summary

0xJacky/nginx-ui /api/nodes Leaks Cluster Node Tokens and Allows Cross-Node Impersonation as initUser

Details

Summary
0xJacky/nginx-ui contains a high-severity trust-boundary failure between ordinary users and cluster node credentials. The source code shows that cluster node list and detail endpoints are reachable by ordinary authenticated users and return node objects containing the token field.

That same token is also used as the X-Node-Secret shared credential for node-to-node authentication. When the middleware receives a correct node secret, it upgrades the request to initUser and bypasses the normal user-authentication path. As a result, any low-privileged authenticated user can first read a node token from /api/nodes and then impersonate a trusted node against a remote node's management API, achieving cross-node administrative authentication bypass.

Details
The root cause is a combination of sensitive credential exposure and improper trust elevation for node-to-node authentication. First, router/routers.go:87-105 mounts cluster.InitRouter(g) inside the shared /api authenticated route group, so any successfully authenticated user can access node list and detail endpoints.

Next, api/cluster/node.go:19-48 implements GetNode and GetNodeList by directly returning analytic.GetNode(node). Meanwhile, model/node.go:8-13 defines Token with the JSON tag json:"token", meaning the node secret is serialized into API responses. The surrounding code path does not redact that field. Therefore, a low-privileged user can call /api/nodes or /api/nodes/:id and retrieve both the target node URL and the token value used for trusted node authentication.

The second half of the exploit chain is in internal/middleware/middleware.go:73-103. The middleware reads a node secret from the X-Node-Secret header or node_secret query parameter. If that supplied value matches settings.NodeSettings.Secret, the request is immediately associated with user.GetInitUser(c), stored in the context as user, and allowed to continue. In other words, possession of the node secret is treated as sufficient to become initUser and bypass the normal JWT-based user-authentication flow.

This makes the disclosed token directly reusable for privilege escalation. A low-privileged user logs in to the primary instance, retrieves the cluster node token through /api/nodes, then sends a request to the remote node with X-Node-Secret set to the leaked token. Because the remote node upgrades the request to initUser, the attacker can invoke sensitive management handlers. The verified evidence identifies api/system/router.go and api/system/restart.go as examples of reachable high-risk operations, including POST /api/system/restart.

Core vulnerable code path:

go
// router/routers.go:87-105
g := root.Group("/", middleware.AuthRequired(), middleware.Proxy())
{
debug.InitRouter(g)
user.InitUserRouter(g)
analytic.InitRouter(g)
user.InitManageUserRouter(g)
nginx.InitRouter(g)
sites.InitRouter(g)
streams.InitRouter(g)
config.InitRouter(g)
template.InitRouter(g)
certificate.InitCertificateRouter(g)
certificate.InitDNSCredentialRouter(g)
certificate.InitAcmeUserRouter(g)
dnsapi.InitRouter(g)
system.InitPrivateRouter(g)
settings.InitRouter(g)
llm.InitRouter(g)
cluster.InitRouter(g)
notification.InitRouter(g)
external_notify.InitRouter(g)
backup.InitAutoBackupRouter(g)
nginxLog.InitRouter(g)
upstream.InitHTTPRouter(g)
g.GET("/geolite/status", geolite.GetStatus)
}
This route block shows that cluster endpoints are mounted in the shared authenticated route group. Any user with a valid JWT can reach cluster management APIs; there is no administrator-only authorization gate here.

go
// api/cluster/node.go:19-48
func GetNode(c *gin.Context) {
id := cast.ToUint64(c.Param("id"))

nodeQuery := query.Node

node, err := nodeQuery.FirstByID(id)
if err != nil {
cosy.ErrHandler(c, err)
return
}

c.JSON(http.StatusOK, analytic.GetNode(node))
}

func GetNodeList(c *gin.Context) {
core := cosy.Core[model.Node](c).
SetFussy("name")

// fix for sqlite
if c.Query("enabled") != "" {
core.GormScope(func(tx *gorm.DB) *gorm.DB {
return tx.Where("enabled = ?", cast.ToInt(cast.ToBool(c.Query("enabled"))))
})
}

core.SetTransformer(func(m *model.Node) any {
return analytic.GetNode(m)
})

core.List()
}
These handlers return node information directly to authenticated users. Because the returned object ultimately embeds the raw model.Node and that model contains a JSON token field, the API leaks the remote node shared secret.

go
// model/node.go:8-13
type Node struct {
Model
Name string json:"name"
URL string json:"url"
Token string json:"token"
Enabled bool json:"enabled" gorm:"default:false"
}
The model definition confirms that Token is JSON-serializable. This is a core part of the sensitive-information exposure because the field is not restricted to internal-only use.

go
// internal/middleware/middleware.go:73-103
// getNodeSecret from header or query
func getNodeSecret(c *gin.Context) (secret string) {
if secret = c.GetHeader("X-Node-Secret"); secret != "" {
return secret
}

return c.Query("node_secret")
}

// AuthRequired is a middleware that checks if the user is authenticated
func AuthRequired() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
abortWithAuthFailure := func() {
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
"message": "Authorization failed",
})
}

xNodeID := getXNodeID(c)
if xNodeID != "" {
c.Set("ProxyNodeID", xNodeID)
}

// Check node secret authentication
if nodeSecret := getNodeSecret(c); nodeSecret != "" && nodeSecret == settings.NodeSettings.Secret {
initUser := user.GetInitUser(c)
c.Set("Secret", nodeSecret)
c.Set("user", initUser)
c.Next()
return
}
This authentication logic converts knowledge of the leaked node secret into an authenticated request as initUser. That makes the disclosed token immediately reusable for cross-node privilege escalation.

POC
Prerequisites: (1) the attacker has a valid low-privileged user account, (2) at least one cluster node is configured, and (3) the target node management address is reachable from the current deployment, which is typical in clustered setups.

Reproduction steps:

Log in as a low-privileged user with POST /api/login using a request body containing name and password. Capture the returned JWT token.
Request GET /api/nodes or GET /api/nodes/:id with the low-privileged user's Authorization token.
Inspect the JSON response and extract the target node's url and token fields. The token is the shared secret accepted by the remote node as X-Node-Secret.
Send a sensitive management request directly to the target node, such as POST /api/system/restart, with the leaked token in the X-Node-Secret header.
If the target node returns 200 or an equivalent success response, the request has been accepted as trusted node traffic.
Expected result: the attacker performs administrative actions on the remote node without possessing a legitimate high-privileged user session on that node, demonstrating cross-node authentication bypass and privilege escalation to initUser-level access.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-10-09 17:07 UTC
Modified
2026-10-19 21:41 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1, fixed 1.9.10-0.20260728091109-0ecbd106c37b (semver)

Fixed versions

1.9.10-0.20260728091109-0ecbd106c37b

Fix

  • Fixed version 1.9.10-0.20260728091109-0ecbd106c37b
    go get github.com/0xJacky/[email protected]

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences