getgrav/grav
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.0.0-beta.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.0.0-beta.2
Fix
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Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-56701
Grav is Vulnerable to XXE via SVG Upload
Dear Grav Security Team,
A security vulnerability was discovered in Grav CMS that allows authenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the server through XML External Entity (XXE) injection.
Vulnerability Summary
| Field | Details |
|-------|---------|
| Vulnerability Type | XML External Entity (XXE) Injection |
| Severity | High (CVSS 7.5) |
| Affected Versions | Grav CMS <= 1.7.x |
| Affected Component | SVG file upload/processing |
| CWE | CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference |
| Authentication Required | Yes (Admin panel access) |
Technical Details
Root Cause
The application uses simplexml_load_string() to process uploaded SVG files without disabling external entity loading. This allows attackers to inject XXE payloads that are processed by the XML parser.
Vulnerable Code Pattern
// Current (Vulnerable):
$svg = simplexml_load_string($content);
// No LIBXML_NOENT flag or entity loader protection
Attack Vector
Impact
An authenticated attacker can:
/etc/passwd - System user informationuser/accounts/*.yaml - Admin credentials and 2FA secretsuser/config/system.yaml - System configuration.env files - Environment secrets and API keysProof of Concept
Malicious SVG Payload
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">
<text x="10" y="50">&xxe;</text>
</svg>
Steps to Reproduce
Recommended Fix
Option 1: Add XXE Protection Flags
libxml_use_internal_errors(true);
$svg = simplexml_load_string($content, 'SimpleXMLElement', LIBXML_NOENT | LIBXML_DTDLOAD);
Option 2: Use SVG Sanitizer Library (Recommended)
use enshrined\svgSanitize\Sanitizer;
$sanitizer = new Sanitizer();
$sanitizer->removeRemoteReferences(true);
$cleanSVG = $sanitizer->sanitize($content);
The enshrined/svg-sanitize library properly strips XXE payloads and other malicious SVG content.
Request
Turki Almatrafi.
---
Maintainer note — fix applied (2026-04-24)
Fixed across two repos:
VectorImageMedium::__construct (the code path that reads width/height from an uploaded SVG) now strips <!DOCTYPE> and <!ENTITY> declarations before parsing, and calls simplexml_load_string with LIBXML_NONET | LIBXML_NOERROR | LIBXML_NOWARNING. On PHP < 8 it also calls libxml_disable_entity_loader(true) for the duration of the parse.loadDocument now applies the same DOCTYPE/ENTITY strip and passes LIBXML_NONET to loadXML/loadHTML.With both layers in place, the PoC:
<!DOCTYPE svg [
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">
<text x="10" y="50">&xxe;</text>
</svg>
no longer expands &xxe;, and the parser cannot make outbound filesystem or network requests for external entities/DTDs. Billion-laughs-style entity expansion is also neutralized because the declarations are stripped before libxml ever sees them.
Files:
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2.0.0-beta.2 (ecosystem)2.0.0-beta.2
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0