mcp-framework
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.2.22(semver)
Fixed versions
0.2.22
Fix
- Fixed version
0.2.22npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-39313
MCP-Framework: Unbounded memory allocation in readRequestBody allows denial of service via HTTP transport
Summary
The readRequestBody() function in src/transports/http/server.ts concatenates HTTP request body chunks into a string with no size limit, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to crash the server via memory exhaustion with a single large HTTP POST request.
Details
File: src/transports/http/server.ts, lines 224-240
private async readRequestBody(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<any> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
let body = '';
req.on('data', (chunk) => {
body += chunk.toString(); // No size limit
});
req.on('end', () => {
try {
const parsed = body ? JSON.parse(body) : null;
resolve(parsed);
} catch (error) {
reject(error);
}
});
req.on('error', reject);
});
}
A maxMessageSize configuration value exists in DEFAULT_HTTP_STREAM_CONFIG (4MB, defined in src/transports/http/types.ts line 124) but is never enforced in readRequestBody(). This creates a false sense of security.
PoC
Local testing with 50MB POST payloads against the vulnerable readRequestBody() function:
| Trial | Payload | RSS growth | Time | Result |
|-------|---------|-----------|------|--------|
| 1 | 50MB | +197MB | 42ms | Vulnerable |
| 2 | 50MB | +183MB | 46ms | Vulnerable |
| 3 | 50MB | +15MB | 43ms | Vulnerable |
| 4 | 50MB | +14MB | 32ms | Vulnerable |
| 5 | 50MB | +65MB | 38ms | Vulnerable |
Reproducibility: 5/5 (100%)
Impact
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Suggested CVSS 3.1: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
Suggested Fix
Enforce maxMessageSize in readRequestBody():
private async readRequestBody(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<any> {
const maxSize = this._config.maxMessageSize || 4 * 1024 * 1024;
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
let body = '';
let size = 0;
req.on('data', (chunk) => {
size += chunk.length;
if (size > maxSize) {
req.destroy();
reject(new Error('Request body too large'));
return;
}
body += chunk.toString();
});
// ...
});
}
Disclosure Timeline
This report follows coordinated disclosure. I request a 90-day window before public disclosure.
Reporter: Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI Ltd ([email protected])
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.2.22 (semver)0.2.22
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0