Advisory

GHSA-353c-v8x9-v7c3

Also known as: CVE-2026-39313

Summary

MCP-Framework: Unbounded memory allocation in readRequestBody allows denial of service via HTTP transport

Details

Summary

The readRequestBody() function in src/transports/http/server.ts concatenates HTTP request body chunks into a string with no size limit, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to crash the server via memory exhaustion with a single large HTTP POST request.

Details

File: src/transports/http/server.ts, lines 224-240

private async readRequestBody(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<any> {
    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
      let body = '';
      req.on('data', (chunk) => {
        body += chunk.toString();   // No size limit
      });
      req.on('end', () => {
        try {
          const parsed = body ? JSON.parse(body) : null;
          resolve(parsed);
        } catch (error) {
          reject(error);
        }
      });
      req.on('error', reject);
    });
  }

A maxMessageSize configuration value exists in DEFAULT_HTTP_STREAM_CONFIG (4MB, defined in src/transports/http/types.ts line 124) but is never enforced in readRequestBody(). This creates a false sense of security.

PoC

Local testing with 50MB POST payloads against the vulnerable readRequestBody() function:

| Trial | Payload | RSS growth | Time | Result |
|-------|---------|-----------|------|--------|
| 1 | 50MB | +197MB | 42ms | Vulnerable |
| 2 | 50MB | +183MB | 46ms | Vulnerable |
| 3 | 50MB | +15MB | 43ms | Vulnerable |
| 4 | 50MB | +14MB | 32ms | Vulnerable |
| 5 | 50MB | +65MB | 38ms | Vulnerable |

Reproducibility: 5/5 (100%)

Impact

  • Denial of Service: Any mcp-framework HTTP server can be crashed by a single large POST request to /mcp
  • No authentication required: readRequestBody() executes before any auth checks (auth is opt-in, default is no auth)
  • Dead config: maxMessageSize exists but is never enforced, giving a false sense of security
  • Affected: All applications using mcp-framework HttpStreamTransport (60,000 weekly npm downloads)

CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Suggested CVSS 3.1: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)

Suggested Fix

Enforce maxMessageSize in readRequestBody():

private async readRequestBody(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<any> {
    const maxSize = this._config.maxMessageSize || 4 * 1024 * 1024;
    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
      let body = '';
      let size = 0;
      req.on('data', (chunk) => {
        size += chunk.length;
        if (size > maxSize) {
          req.destroy();
          reject(new Error('Request body too large'));
          return;
        }
        body += chunk.toString();
      });
      // ...
    });
  }

Disclosure Timeline

This report follows coordinated disclosure. I request a 90-day window before public disclosure.

Reporter: Raza Sharif, CyberSecAI Ltd ([email protected])

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-04-16 20:44 UTC
Modified
2026-05-05 15:59 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

mcp-framework

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.2.22 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.2.22

Fix

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences