Details
The control isolates the rekey window as the sole trigger. Both legs exercise
the real server entry point (Session::run → reply → server_read_encrypted)
over a real encrypted transport.
Reproduce: C=russh-lab N=800000 ./poc/run.sh (see poc/POC-README.md).
Remediation
The priority queue carries locally generated channel-open replies, which are
non-kex messages the server must not send during a rekey anyway (RFC 4253
§7.1). So the fix is to bound how much channel work is done during a rekey, not
to drain the queue mid-rekey. Any of:
- (recommended, minimal) cap the number of non-kex messages processed while a rekey is in progress and disconnect a peer that exceeds it. A stalled/abusive rekey is then torn down after a small constant instead of growing memory without bound. See
patch/rekey-message-cap.patch(a ~10-line change local toSession::run, validated in the lab — the attack leg is disconnected after the cap and RSS stays flat; a normal rekey, which completes in one round trip, is unaffected). - bound / deferred-buffer channel messages during a rekey using the existing (currently dead)
pending_reads/pending_lenmachinery, with a hard cap. - bound the number of in-flight channel opens per connection and reject beyond it.
OpenSSH does not service new channels mid-kex; matching that intent closes the
whole family.