Details
No X-API-KEY header is required. Replace /etc/hostname with any file path accessible to the dalfox process (e.g., ~/.ssh/id_rsa, /run/secrets/db_password, /proc/self/environ).
Impact
- Arbitrary file read on the dalfox host: any file readable by the dalfox process (SSH private keys, TLS certificates,
.envfiles, cloud credential files,/proc/self/environ) can be exfiltrated one line at a time. - No authentication required under the default configuration.
- The exfiltration channel is the dalfox host's own outbound HTTP scan traffic — no inbound connection from the attacker to the dalfox host is needed beyond the initial REST API call.
- Combined with the
found-actionRCE finding (separate issue), an attacker could first read/proc/self/environto harvest secrets, then execute commands.
Recommended Remediation
Option 1: Strip filesystem-dangerous fields from API-sourced requests (preferred)
Apply a denylist of fields that should never be accepted from the REST API, regardless of auth state. This protects authenticated deployments against credential-theft or privilege escalation by external API consumers:
// pkg/server/server.go — in postScanHandler, before ScanFromAPI:
rq.Options.CustomPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.CustomBlindXSSPayloadFile = ""
rq.Options.FoundAction = ""
rq.Options.FoundActionShell = ""
rq.Options.OutputFile = ""
rq.Options.HarFilePath = ""
Option 2: Require --api-key at server startup
Make authentication mandatory and refuse to start without it:
// cmd/server.go — in runServerCmd:
if serverType == "rest" && apiKey == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.")
os.Exit(1)
}
Both options should be applied together. Option 2 prevents unauthenticated access to the API entirely; Option 1 ensures that even trusted API callers cannot leverage the server to read files from the host filesystem.
##Credit
Emmanuel David
Github:- https://github.com/drmingler