crawl4ai
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.8.7(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.8.7
Fix
- Fixed version
0.8.7pip install --upgrade crawl4ai==0.8.7
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-56260, CVE-2026-56261, CVE-2026-56262, CVE-2026-56263, CVE-2026-56264, CVE-2026-56265, CVE-2026-56266, GHSA-53rg-46cm-4g2v, GHSA-8qrg-7j2f-rf2h, GHSA-f23g-2f38-gg94, GHSA-g2pv-76hm-j4x9, GHSA-r9hw-78q5-478g, GHSA-xrfj-6m49-wfmm, PYSEC-2026-229, PYSEC-2026-230, PYSEC-2026-239, PYSEC-2026-3443, PYSEC-2026-3449, PYSEC-2026-596, PYSEC-2026-798
Crawl4AI: Multiple Docker API Vulnerabilities - File Write, SSRF, Auth Bypass, XSS, JS Execution
Summary
Multiple security vulnerabilities in the Crawl4AI Docker API server affecting endpoints for crawling, markdown/LLM extraction, screenshots, PDFs, webhooks, monitoring, JavaScript execution, and configuration.
Vulnerabilities
1. Arbitrary File Write via /screenshot and /pdf (CWE-22, CVSS 9.1)
The output_path parameter accepts arbitrary filesystem paths with no validation. An attacker can overwrite server files (DoS) or write to any appuser-writable location.
Fix: Added validate_output_path() restricting writes to CRAWL4AI_OUTPUT_DIR (/tmp/crawl4ai-outputs by default). Added Pydantic field_validator rejecting .. traversal sequences.
2. SSRF via Webhook URL (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)
Webhook URLs in /crawl/job and /llm/job accept internal/private IPs with no validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), internal services, and Docker networks.
Fix: Added validate_webhook_url() with blocklist for RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata IPs and hostnames. Validation at both job submission and send time. Explicit follow_redirects=False.
3. Authentication Bypass on Monitor Endpoints (CWE-306, CVSS 6.5)
The monitor router was mounted without token_dep dependency, making all monitoring endpoints (including destructive ones like /monitor/actions/cleanup) accessible without authentication.
Fix: Added dependencies=[Depends(token_dep)] to monitor router. Added explicit token check on WebSocket /monitor/ws endpoint.
4. Stored XSS in Monitor Dashboard (CWE-79, CVSS 6.1)
URLs and error messages rendered in the monitor dashboard via innerHTML without escaping, enabling stored XSS via crafted crawl URLs.
Fix: Server-side html.escape() on URL and error storage. Client-side escapeHtml() wrapper on all innerHTML template injections.
5. Arbitrary JavaScript Execution via /execute_js (CWE-94, CVSS 8.1)
The /execute_js endpoint accepts and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the server's browser with --disable-web-security enabled, combining arbitrary JS execution with SSRF capability.
Fix: Disabled by default via CRAWL4AI_EXECUTE_JS_ENABLED env var. Added SSRF blocklist on destination URL. Removed --disable-web-security from default browser args.
6. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key (CWE-798, CVSS 9.8)
The JWT signing key defaults to "mysecret" in the public source code, allowing anyone to forge valid authentication tokens.
Fix: Removed default value. Added startup validation rejecting weak/short secrets. Auto-generates ephemeral key when JWT enabled but no key set.
7. SSRF via Direct Crawl Endpoints /crawl, /md, /llm (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)
The primary crawl entry points (/crawl, /crawl/stream, /md, /llm) fetch arbitrary user-supplied URLs with no destination validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against internal services, Docker networks, and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). A blocklist that only inspects the literal hostname is additionally bypassable via IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (e.g. [::ffff:169.254.169.254], [::ffff:10.0.0.1]), which resolve to the blocked private/metadata ranges but evade a naive string check.
Fix: Added URL destination validation on all crawl/md/llm entry points, reusing the SSRF blocklist (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata IPs and hostnames). IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses are normalized to their IPv4 form before the blocklist check, closing the mapping bypass. raw:// URLs are skipped. Validation applies at request entry, not only at fetch time.
Workarounds
CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN to enable authenticationSECRET_KEY (min 32 chars) if using JWTCredits
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 0.8.7 (ecosystem)0.8.7
0.8.7pip install --upgrade crawl4ai==0.8.7Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0