pimcore/pimcore
Affected
- introduced
12.0.0-RC1, fixed12.3.7(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
12.3.7
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-45162
Pimcore has Unsafe PHP Deserialization in Multiple Locations Without allowed_classes Restriction
GitHub Security Advisory Draft — GM-374
Summary
Multiple locations in Pimcore v11 call PHP's unserialize() on data from database columns and filesystem files without the allowed_classes restriction, enabling object injection if an attacker can control the serialized data source.
Severity
CVSS 3.1: 8.0 (High) — AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected Component
pimcore/pimcore and pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundlelib/Tool/Authentication.php (line 82) — session token deserializationmodels/Site/Dao.php (line 68) — site domains from databasemodels/DataObject/ClassDefinition/CustomLayout/Dao.php (line 69) — layout definitions from databasemodels/Tool/TmpStore/Dao.php (line 64) — temporary store data from databasemodels/Asset/WebDAV/Service.php (line 36) — delete log from filesystemadmin-ui-classic-bundle/src/Helper/Dashboard.php (line 64) — dashboard config from filesystemDescription
Six locations in Pimcore core call unserialize() directly (bypassing Tool\Serialize) on data sourced from database columns or filesystem files without passing the allowed_classes parameter. This means any class available in the autoloader will be instantiated during deserialization.
If an attacker can write to the data source (e.g., via SQL injection targeting the tmp_store, sites, or custom_layouts tables, or via a file write vulnerability targeting the WebDAV delete log), they can inject serialized PHP gadget chains that execute arbitrary code when the data is deserialized.
This is related to but distinct from the Tool\Serialize::unserialize() issue — these calls bypass the wrapper entirely.
Impact
PHP object injection leading to Remote Code Execution when chained with a data source write vulnerability. Pimcore's dependency tree (Guzzle, Symfony, Monolog, Doctrine) provides numerous known gadget chains.
Proof of Concept
tmp_store table via SQL injection, or webdav-delete.dat via file write)BufferHandler chain from phpggc)Suggested Fix
Add allowed_classes parameter to all unserialize() calls. Where no objects are needed, use ['allowed_classes' => false]. Consider migrating to JSON serialization for data that doesn't require object preservation.
// Example fix for Site/Dao.php:
$siteDomains = unserialize($site['domains'], ['allowed_classes' => false]);
// Example fix for TmpStore/Dao.php:
$item['data'] = unserialize($item['data'], ['allowed_classes' => false]);
References
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
12.0.0-RC1, fixed 12.3.7 (ecosystem)12.3.7
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
0, fixed 11.5.17 (ecosystem)11.5.17
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
2026.1.0, fixed 2026.1.3 (ecosystem)2026.1.3
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0