Advisory

GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx

Also known as: CVE-2026-54588

Summary

Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction.

Details

Summary
Poweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled HTTP_HOST request header as the
authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout
authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison
the redirect_uri sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the
victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full
account takeover with no credentials required.

Three independent code paths are affected:

  • Primary (Critical): OidcService::getCallbackUrl() - redirect_uri poisoning
  • Secondary (High): SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl() - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning
  • Tertiary (Medium): LogoutController::getBaseUrl() - post-logout redirect poisoning

Details

*Root Cause*

The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from HTTP_HOST rather than
from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not
validated before use in any authentication flow.

Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern -
DocsController::getValidatedHost() (line 244) calls isValidHostname() before
using the value - but this was never applied to authentication flows.

### Primary: lib/Application/Service/OidcService.php (~line 460)

  private function getCallbackUrl(): string
  {
      $scheme = $this->detectScheme();
      // HTTP_HOST taken directly with zero validation
      $host = $this->request->getServerParam('HTTP_HOST', 'localhost');
      $basePrefix = $this->configManager->get('interface', 'base_url_prefix', '');
      return $scheme . '://' . $host . $basePrefix . '/oidc/callback';
  }

  HTTP_HOST is embedded verbatim as redirect_uri in the OAuth 2.0 authorization
  request sent to the IdP. HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO is similarly used unvalidated
  for scheme detection.

  Secondary: lib/Application/Service/SamlConfigurationService.php (~line 134)

  private function getBaseUrl(): string
  {
      $configuredBaseUrl = $this->configManager->get('interface', 'base_url', '');
      if (!empty($configuredBaseUrl)) {
          return rtrim($configuredBaseUrl, '/');  // safe path - rarely configured
      }
      // Falls through on every default installation
      $host = $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] ?? 'localhost';
      ...
      return $scheme . '://' . $host . $prefix;
  }

  Used to construct SAML ACS URL, SLO URL, and entity ID - all poisonable via Host header.
  The safe fallback only activates when interface.base_url is explicitly set, which is
  optional and empty by default.

  Tertiary: lib/Application/Controller/LogoutController.php (~line 272)

  Same $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] pattern used for post-logout redirect URL construction.

### PoC
Environment: Poweradmin v4.3.2, Docker, PHP 8.2, OIDC enabled, interface.base_url empty (default).

  docker exec poweradmin-container php -r "
  require '/app/vendor/autoload.php';
  putenv('PA_CONFIG_PATH=/app/config/settings.php');

  use PowerAdmin\Application\Service\OidcService;
  use PowerAdmin\Infrastructure\Configuration\ConfigurationManager;
  use PowerAdmin\Infrastructure\Web\Request;

  \$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] = 'attacker.com';
  \$_SERVER['HTTPS']     = '';

  \$config      = ConfigurationManager::getInstance();
  \$request     = new Request();
  \$oidcService = new OidcService(\$config, \$request);
  \$authUrl     = \$oidcService->initiateAuthFlow('test');

  parse_str(parse_url(\$authUrl, PHP_URL_QUERY), \$p);
  echo 'redirect_uri: ' . urldecode(\$p['redirect_uri']) . PHP_EOL;

  if (str_contains(\$p['redirect_uri'], 'attacker.com')) {
      echo '[CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful' . PHP_EOL;
  }
  "

  Output:

  redirect_uri: http://attacker.com/oidc/callback

  [CONFIRMED] Host header injection successful - redirect_uri contains attacker.com

  The redirect_uri in the authorization request sent to the Identity Provider is
  http://attacker.com/oidc/callback. The victim's authorization code will be
  delivered to this URL upon successful authentication.

  Note on PKCE: PKCE does not mitigate this attack. The attacker initiates the
  flow themselves and controls both code_challenge and code_verifier.

### Impact
Direct Impact

  An attacker who can send a request with a spoofed Host header - directly or via a
  misconfigured reverse proxy (proxy_set_header Host $http_host is the nginx default) -
  can steal any user's authorization code and gain full authenticated access to Poweradmin.
  No credentials, malware, or prior access required.

  DNS Infrastructure Impact

  Poweradmin manages PowerDNS. A compromised administrator account grants full DNS zone
  control, enabling:

  - MX hijacking - redirect all inbound email to attacker's mail server; intercept
  password reset emails and 2FA codes for any third-party service registered with the domain
  - SPF/DKIM manipulation - add attacker's IP to SPF, publish attacker's DKIM key →
  send cryptographically authenticated email as the organization (passes DMARC)
  - Subdomain takeover - point mail., vpn., app. to attacker infrastructure
  - SSL certificate theft - remove CAA records and complete ACME DNS-01 challenge
  to obtain wildcard certificate *.company.com from any CA
  - Full domain delegation - delegate subdomains to attacker nameserver

  CVSS v3.1

  ┌──────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┬──────────────┐
  │             Scenario             │               Vector                │    Score     │
  ├──────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────┤
  │ Standard deployment              │ AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L │ 8.2 High     │
  ├──────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────────┼──────────────┤
  │ Proxy misconfigured ($http_host) │ AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L │ 9.3 Critical │
  └──────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────┘

  Recommended Fix

  Immediate mitigation: Set interface.base_url in config/settings.php -
  activates the safe branch in SamlConfigurationService immediately.

  Code fix for OidcService: Prefer the configured base URL; if absent, validate
  HTTP_HOST via filter_var($hostname, FILTER_VALIDATE_DOMAIN, FILTER_FLAG_HOSTNAME)
  before use - the same pattern already implemented in DocsController::getValidatedHost().

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-07-28 16:40 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:50 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

poweradmin/poweradmin

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 4.2.4 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.2.4

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

poweradmin/poweradmin

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 4.3.0, fixed 4.3.3 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.3.3

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences