Advisory

GHSA-37f3-6p89-6qr9

Also known as: CVE-2026-62237, CVE-2026-62672

Summary

Grav: Authenticated ReDoS via regex_replace in Twig Sandbox

Details

Summary

The regex_replace filter and function are allowlisted in Grav's Twig content sandbox. When Twig processing in page content is enabled security.twig_content.process_enabled: true, authenticated page editors can supply a catastrophically backtracking PCRE pattern, causing unbounded CPU consumption and denying service to the entire web server process.

---

Details

The Twig sandbox allowlists, defined in system/config/security.yaml, explicitly include regex_replace in both the filter and function permission lists:

Source: `system/config/security.yaml`

twig_sandbox:
  allowed_filters:
    # ...
    - regex_replace    #  user-controlled pattern allowed in sandbox
  allowed_functions:
    # ...
    - regex_replace    #  same

The underlying implementation passes the caller-controlled $pattern directly into PHP's preg_replace() without any pattern complexity validation:

Source: `system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Extension/GravExtension.php:1317-1319`

public function regexReplace($subject, $pattern, $replace, $limit = -1)
{
    return preg_replace($pattern, $replace, $subject, $limit);
}

When twig_content.process_enabled is true, page body content is sandboxed but can use any allowlisted filter. An editor who embeds a catastrophic backtracking pattern causes the PCRE engine to enter exponential time complexity, consuming 100% CPU until the PHP process is killed or the request times out.

Conditions required:

  1. security.twig_content.process_enabled: true (opt-in, false by default on fresh 2.0 installs)
  2. security.twig_sandbox.enabled: true (default) - the function is reachable under sandbox
  3. Attacker must have page edit access (authenticated contributor / editor role)

---

PoC

Configuration prerequisite - enable Twig in content:

# user/config/security.yaml
twig_content:
  process_enabled: true

Payload — embed in any Grav page body with process: { twig: true } in frontmatter:

---
title: Test
process:
  twig: true
---
{{ 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaab'|regex_replace('/^(a+)+$/', '') }}

Or as a function call in a page where the editor has Twig access:

{{ regex_replace('aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaab', '/^(a+)+$/', '') }}

Result: The PHP-FPM worker (or CLI server process) enters catastrophic PCRE backtracking. On a 2 GHz host, a 32-character string with the above pattern will exhaust one CPU core for seconds to minutes. With a slightly longer string, the time grows exponentially.

---

Impact

Vulnerability type: Regular Expression Denial of Service - ReDoS

Who is impacted: Server availability. Any Grav installation where:

  • An editor-role account exists (or has been compromised), AND
  • The operator has enabled twig_content.process_enabled: true

An attacker with page-edit access can render the site unresponsive for all visitors by publishing a page with a catastrophic regex. On single-worker PHP configurations this is a complete outage. On multi-worker setups, multiple concurrent page renders of the malicious page can saturate all workers.

---

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-09-02 14:50 UTC
Modified
2026-09-17 16:45 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

getgrav/grav

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 2.0.4 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

2.0.4

Fix

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Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences