eml-parser
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.0.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.0.1
Fix
- Fixed version
2.0.1pip install --upgrade eml-parser==2.0.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-29780, PYSEC-2026-2148
eml_parser: Path Traversal in Official Example Script Leads to Arbitrary File Write
Summary
The official example script examples/recursively_extract_attachments.py contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows arbitrary file write outside the intended output directory. Attachment filenames extracted from parsed emails are directly used to construct output file paths without any sanitization, allowing an attacker-controlled filename to escape the target directory.
Details
File: examples/recursively_extract_attachments.py
Lines: 61–64
for a in m['attachment']:
out_filepath = out_path / a['filename'] # No sanitization
print(f'\tWriting attachment: {out_filepath}')
with out_filepath.open('wb') as a_out:
a_out.write(base64.b64decode(a['raw']))
The value a['filename'] is attacker-controlled via crafted email attachment headers:
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="../outside/pwned.txt"
No path normalization or boundary validation is performed before writing.
PoC
.eml file:Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="../outside/pwned.txt"
python recursively_extract_attachments.py -p ./emails -o ./safe
./safe/pwned.txt ./outside/pwned.txt ← written outside the intended directoryVerified on Kali Linux with eml_parser installed via pip in a virtual environment.
Impact
This vulnerability is limited to the example script only and does not affect the core eml_parser library. However, as the script is part of the official repository and is likely to be adapted for production use, an attacker supplying a crafted email could achieve arbitrary file write within the execution context.
Potential attack scenarios include:
filename="../../etc/cron.d/backdoor"filename="../../var/www/html/shell.php"filename="../../home/user/.ssh/authorized_keys"Recommended Fix
import os.path
for a in m['attachment']:
filename = os.path.basename(a['filename'])
out_filepath = out_path / filename
if not out_filepath.resolve().is_relative_to(out_path.resolve()):
print(f'[!] Skipping suspicious filename: {a["filename"]}')
continue
print(f'\tWriting attachment: {out_filepath}')
with out_filepath.open('wb') as a_out:
a_out.write(base64.b64decode(a['raw']))Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2.0.1 (ecosystem)2.0.1
2.0.1pip install --upgrade eml-parser==2.0.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0