Advisory

GHSA-389r-rccm-h3h5

Also known as: CVE-2026-29780, PYSEC-2026-2148

Summary

eml_parser: Path Traversal in Official Example Script Leads to Arbitrary File Write

Details

Summary
The official example script examples/recursively_extract_attachments.py contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows arbitrary file write outside the intended output directory. Attachment filenames extracted from parsed emails are directly used to construct output file paths without any sanitization, allowing an attacker-controlled filename to escape the target directory.

Details
File: examples/recursively_extract_attachments.py
Lines: 61–64

for a in m['attachment']:
    out_filepath = out_path / a['filename']  # No sanitization
    print(f'\tWriting attachment: {out_filepath}')
    with out_filepath.open('wb') as a_out:
        a_out.write(base64.b64decode(a['raw']))

The value a['filename'] is attacker-controlled via crafted email attachment headers:

Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="../outside/pwned.txt"

No path normalization or boundary validation is performed before writing.

PoC

  1. Create a malicious .eml file:
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="../outside/pwned.txt"
  1. Run the example script:
python recursively_extract_attachments.py -p ./emails -o ./safe
  1. Expected: ./safe/pwned.txt
  2. Actual: ./outside/pwned.txt ← written outside the intended directory

Verified on Kali Linux with eml_parser installed via pip in a virtual environment.

Impact
This vulnerability is limited to the example script only and does not affect the core eml_parser library. However, as the script is part of the official repository and is likely to be adapted for production use, an attacker supplying a crafted email could achieve arbitrary file write within the execution context.

Potential attack scenarios include:

  • Cron job injection: filename="../../etc/cron.d/backdoor"
  • Web shell upload: filename="../../var/www/html/shell.php"
  • SSH key injection: filename="../../home/user/.ssh/authorized_keys"

Recommended Fix

import os.path

for a in m['attachment']:
    filename = os.path.basename(a['filename'])
    out_filepath = out_path / filename

    if not out_filepath.resolve().is_relative_to(out_path.resolve()):
        print(f'[!] Skipping suspicious filename: {a["filename"]}')
        continue

    print(f'\tWriting attachment: {out_filepath}')
    with out_filepath.open('wb') as a_out:
        a_out.write(base64.b64decode(a['raw']))

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-03-05 00:16 UTC
Modified
2026-07-13 07:26 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

eml-parser

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 2.0.1 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

2.0.1

Fix

  • Fixed version 2.0.1
    pip install --upgrade eml-parser==2.0.1

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences