fast-jwt
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed6.2.1(semver)
Fixed versions
6.2.1
Fix
- Fixed version
6.2.1npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-35040
fast-jwt: Stateful RegExp (/g or /y) causes non-deterministic allowed-claim validation (logical DoS)
Impact
Using certain modifiers on RegExp objects in the allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options in verify functions can cause certain unintended behaviours. This is because some modifiers are stateful and will cause failures in every second verification attempt regardless of the validity of the token provided.
Such modifiers are:
This does NOT allow invalid tokens to be accepted, only for valid tokens to be improperly rejected in some configurations. Instead it causes 50% of valid authentication requests to fail in an alternating pattern, leading to:
Affected Configurations
This vulnerability ONLY affects applications that:
Example: allowedAud: /abc/g ← IMPACTED
Example: allowedAud: "/abc/" ← SAFE
Not Affected
Assessment Guide
To determine if you're affected:
Check if allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, or allowedNonce options use RegExp objects (/pattern/ or new RegExp())
If yes, review the pattern for stateful modifiers like /g, /y
If no RegExp usage or no stateful modifiers, you are NOT affected
Mitigation Options
While a fix will be coming in the next version of the package you can take steps to mitigate the issue immediately by removing any such modifiers (/g, /y) from the regex.
---
Summary
fast-jwt accepts RegExp for allowedAud, allowedIss, allowedSub, allowedJti, and allowedNonce.
If the provided regular expression uses the g (global) or y (sticky) flag, verification becomes non-deterministic: the same valid token alternates between acceptance and rejection across successive calls.
This occurs because RegExp.prototype.test() is stateful when g/y is set (it mutates lastIndex), and fast-jwt reuses the same RegExp object without resetting lastIndex.
Affected component
src/verifier.js
ensureStringClaimMatcher() returns the RegExp object directly.
validateClaimValues() performs repeated a.test(v) calls without resetting lastIndex.
Impact
Logical denial-of-service / authentication flapping.
A valid signed JWT can be intermittently rejected.
Causes unpredictable authentication outcomes across repeated verification calls.
Can trigger retry storms and cascading failures in API gateways and authentication middleware.
Affects any deployment that configures allowed* using RegExp and includes g or y flags.
Root cause
validateClaimValues() uses: allowed.some(a => a.test(v))
When a is a RegExp with g or y, a.test() mutates a.lastIndex.
Subsequent calls against the same input can return different results.
Proof of concept
Environment
PoC
const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')
const sign = createSigner({ key: 'secret' })
const token = sign({ aud: 'admin', iss: 'issuer' })
function run(name, opts) {
const verify = createVerifier({ key: 'secret', ...opts })
console.log('\n==', name)
for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
try { verify(token); console.log(i, 'PASS') }
catch (e) { console.log(i, 'FAIL', e.code || e.message) }
}
}
run('allowedAud global regex', { allowedAud: /^admin$/g })
run('allowedIss global regex', { allowedIss: /^issuer$/g })
run('control (non-global regex)', { allowedAud: /^admin$/ })
Observed behavior
/g alternates PASS/FAIL across calls/g alternates PASS/FAIL across callsExpected behavior
Validation must be deterministic.
The same token under the same verifier configuration must always yield the same decision.
Suggested fix (minimal and safe)
Wrap RegExp matchers inside ensureStringClaimMatcher() to reset lastIndex before calling test():
if (r instanceof RegExp) {
return { test: v => { r.lastIndex = 0; return r.test(v) } }
}
This preserves semantics for non-global regexes, makes g/y deterministic, and avoids changes in the rest of the verifier logic.
Security classification
Logical DoS / authentication reliability failure.
This can be weaponized to produce production outages via retry storms and auth instability.
Why this is not “misuse”
Notes
PoC Code:
'use strict'
/**
const fs = require('node:fs')
const path = require('node:path')
const { createSigner, createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')
const OUT_JSON = path.join(process.cwd(), 'evidence-regex-stateful-fastjwt.json')
const OUT_LOG = path.join(process.cwd(), 'evidence-regex-stateful-fastjwt.log')
// Make a stable, valid token
const sign = createSigner({ key: 'secret' })
const token = sign({
aud: 'admin',
iss: 'issuer',
sub: 'subject',
jti: 'id-123',
nonce: 'nonce-xyz'
})
function runCase(name, verifierOpts, iterations = 12) {
const verify = createVerifier({ key: 'secret', ...verifierOpts })
const results = []
for (let i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
try {
verify(token)
results.push({ i, ok: true })
} catch (e) {
results.push({ i, ok: false, code: e.code || null, message: e.message || String(e) })
}
}
return results
}
function summarize(results) {
const seq = results.map(r => (r.ok ? 'PASS' : 'FAIL')).join(' ')
const pass = results.filter(r => r.ok).length
const fail = results.length - pass
return { pass, fail, seq }
}
function printCase(name, opts, results) {
const s = summarize(results)
const lines = []
lines.push(== ${name})
lines.push(opts: ${JSON.stringify(opts)})
lines.push(PASS=${s.pass} FAIL=${s.fail})
lines.push(sequence: ${s.seq})
lines.push('')
return lines.join('\n')
}
function main() {
const meta = {
poc: 'stateful-regexp-allowed-claims',
package: 'fast-jwt',
node: process.version,
timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
note: 'RegExp.test is stateful when g/y flags are set; lastIndex mutation causes alternating PASS/FAIL.'
}
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 6.2.1 (semver)6.2.1
6.2.1npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0